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PATRONS AND CLIENTS IN THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

by

Jane Catherine Schneider

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Doctoral Committee:

Professor James H. Meisel, Chairman
Associate Professor Samuel H. Barnes
Associate Professor Raymond Grew
Professor Eric R. Wolf

PREFACE

The subject of this dissertation is the evolution of a political system in Italy. It focuses on a pattern of political organization which is indigenous to Italian culture, even in its "backward" sectors, its hinterland, its "rural-agrarian" outposts. The pattern, the patron-client network, is important because of a local organizational capacity to connect town and country and because of its influence on the development of national institutions. The emphasis on it reflects the fact that I discovered Italy through her southern peasants.

I owe the discovery to Eric Wolf, whose interest in peasant societies and in my work has been a source of great encouragement. For this, and for a wealth of ideas, I am very grateful.

The dissertation was also read by Samuel Barnes and Raymond Grew--the latter with the critical but sympathetic eye of an historian of the Risorgimento. I appreciate both readings and am much in debt to Professor Grew's suggestions.

Above all, my thanks go to my teacher of many years and friend, James Meisel. The development of my ideas owes much to his influence. In addition, I am grateful for his contribution to this manuscript. I think that his criticisms

produced many improvements; I know that they saved me from many mistakes.

It is to my regret that I have never seen Italy, nor known a peasant family. Yet I am fortunate that the members of my committee were more than generous with their experience and knowledge of the country. My own inexperience should be short-lived, thanks especially to the enthusiasm for Italy, and for peasants, that my husband shares. He has my appreciation for this--as for the good will with which he endured chaos in his household.

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INTRODUCTION

The Italian political system resulted from a unique configuration of forces, some of which can be traced to the ancient world. But, in contemporary political sociology, there is a distinct tendency to minimize unique configurations in order to discover universal processes of development. It is my contention that the search for universal processes itself began with a unique configuration and that, as a result, it obscures, unnecessarily, our understanding.

To be more precise, the contemporary social sciences give a universal application to the concepts "traditional" and "legal-rational" or "traditional" and "modern." Development is held to occur when the differentiated, or modernizing, elements of a society mobilize an increasing percentage of human and material resources in opposition to traditional elements. The results of the developmental process can vary considerably, but variation is a function of the position on a continuum at which traditional forces prevent the further elaboration of modern ones. In other words, variation is understood as the product of a <u>variety of patterns</u> in which two antithetical forces coexist.

The traditional-modern dualism, either explicitly or implicitly, subsumes several others: <u>gemeinschaft</u> and

gesellschaft; rural and urban, or agrarian and industrial; particularism and universalism, ascription and achievement; sacred and secular; primary loyalties and secondary associations. It is argued that all political cultures are "mixed" or, in other words, the product of a particular alignment of these dualisms. While the alignments do not reflect mere quantitative differences betweer cultures, the point of reference must always be the same continuum.

It can be shown, I think, that these dualisms, and the continuum that they imply, are extensions of dichotomies which, in the nineteenth century, explained the evolution of Western European society. When held against another experience--as, for example, the Italian--they are partially irrelevant. The argument will be made by illuminating an indigenous evolutionary process for Italy, the roots of which lay not in feudalism, but in the ancient world. Rationalization, or modernization, "coexisted" not only with some traditional elements, but with this alternative evolutionary process as well. In other words, a combination of traditional and modern forms does not account for the entire origin and structure of the political system. Indeed, the potential of such combinations to explain the entire origin and structure of any system is, one might argue, limited to Western Europe, and perhaps to England.

Tracing the indigenous evolution of Italian culture to ancient Rome will not, of course, be attempted here. Yet, it will be important to understand the evolution in

terms of an essentially non-traditional and non-feudal background. In the course of making this clear, it becomes apparent that ancient institutions were in many ways an alternative to feudalism--a fact easily obscured by emphasizing how they preceded it.[1] For several reasons, many of them related to the importance of cities in the ancient world, it seems likely that the indigenous Italian evolution was remarkable for its relative, if sometimes subterranean, continuity.[2] Ultimately, I think, this is why the dualisms of the Western European experience make but limited sense in Italy.

The distinctive features of the Italian evolution are most clearly revealed in the history of the Risorgimento.

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[1]The Marxist heritage is ambiguous on the relationship between classical antiquity and feudalism, but can be interpreted to have implied that the two forms were alternative. Eric Hobsbawm does so in his introduction to Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, trans. Jack Cohen, ed. E. J. Hobsbawm (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1964), pp. 28 and 31-35. The German Ideology, he says,

> "suggests no logical connection between them, but merely notes the succession and the effect of the mixture of broken-down Roman and conquering tribal (Germanic) institutions. Feudalism appears to be an alternative evolution out of primitive communalism, under conditions in which no cities develop, because the density of population over a large region is low."

Similarly, the Communist Manifesto is held to imply, in its historical sections, that the two were "alternative routes . . . linked only by the fact that the second established itself on the ruins of the first."

[2]H. Stuart Hughes emphasizes the continuity of Italian culture in these terms, noting that the city-state of ancient Rome is represented today in the provinces, which are not only administrative but also social and cultural entities, and which take the names of their principal cities. See The United States and Italy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 38-39.

This event, covering several decades of the nineteenth century, produced national unification for an historically divided peninsula. Because it involved significant social changes, it stimulated the crystallization of social forces in identifiable movements. The structures of these movements, their values, and their goals indicate their respective relationships to the indigenous and Western European patterns of development. Furthermore, the shifting alliances between movements were an index of the relative importance of each pattern. In 1848, when several Italian cities "rose" against foreign rulers, the European pattern and ideologies held the center of the stage. The risings failed, however, and, when Italy was finally unified in 1860, the initiative shifted to movements which compromised the European pattern with the indigenous one. In 1876, when the nation-builders of 1860 lost control of the state, indigenous forces ascended to the national arena for the first time. From there, they made a major contribution to the integration of the political system.

A second reason for concentrating on the Risorgimento is that, on the surface, it appears to have emerged in accordance with the universal processes of development articulated by contemporary social science. Or, at least, it is easily interpreted in these terms. For one thing, the movement for unification was, if not initiated, then greatly accelerated, by the Napoleonic occupation of Italy in the late eighteenth century. Prior to it, Lombardy in

northern Italy was ruled by Austria and the remainder of the peninsula divided into two kingdoms (the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, and the Piedmontese Kingdom of Sardinia); a garter of historically defined regions (Latium, Umbria, the Marches and the Romagna), ruled by the papacy in its temporal capacity; two republics (Venice and Genoa); and three duchies (Tuscany, Parma, Modena). By 1806, the French Army, assisted by an Italian "fifth column," had compressed these political units, excluding Sicily, into three: an extension of the French Empire and two French-ruled kingdoms. Together they covered 120,000 square miles and included 18 million people.

The European reaction to the French Revolution, and especially to its ecumenical thrust, is well known. The defeat of Napoleon in 1814 and the collapse of the Empire resulted in a new map for Europe, drawn at the famous Congress of Vienna (1814-15) and rejecting, as far as possible, the principles of national sovereignty and bourgeois administration. In Italy, Lombardy was returned to Austria and the duchies restored, also under Austrian rulers. Similarly, the Republic of Venice, abolished during the occupation, went with the region of Venetia to the Austrians. The papacy regained control of the Papal State and, in the South, a Spanish Bourbon was restored to govern Naples and Sicily under one administration: the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In the eighteenth century, Sicily had been administered separately and, during the occupation,

protected by the English from events on the mainland. The new arrangement was consequently among the more difficult to impose. Everywhere, though, the policemen of conservative Europe found that force was required for the "restoration of order."

The impression is easily derived from the above that through the eighteenth century "traditional" forces predominated in the several Italian states although, in coexistence with a rationalizing element, probably spearheaded by a middle class. Surely, the French occupation got middle class support and in turn encouraged the expansion of rational as against traditional forces. The partial restoration of the latter after 1814 must have placed an undue constraint on the former--artificially inflated as they were from the occupation--and caused them to become militart in the quest for a more modern society. In short, the Risorgimento resulted from their renewed confrontation with traditionalism.

Not only does this interpretation seem convincing, but it articulates with a characteristic approach to the political system, a good example of which is offered by Joseph LaPalombara. He, under the influence of Gabriel Almond, in turn a product of the "Weber-Parsons school" of sociology, depends heavily on the traditional-modern dualism. He notes, for example, that "Italy's division into essentially

two political subcultures is a critical datum."[3] Southern Italy, where agriculture is the dominant economic activity, is "still overwhelmingly traditional. . . . in politics, traditional structures still count for more than legal-rational ones, notwithstanding that the formal setting for the political process itself appears to be almost entirely legal-rational."[4] Northern Italy, on the other hand, is "not nearly as traditional although traditional structures are found in the rural sectors." Here, though, "the rural institutions have been strongly influenced by the urban, industrial, secular, and legal-rational centers that surround them."[5]

LaPalombara insists, as do all those who share his perspective, that purely traditional or legal-rational cultures nowhere exist; that all political systems are therefore "mixed." He suggests that the Italian mixture is difficult to define, except in the following, very general, formula:

> Not only do we find a dual or mixed system there but also a combination which is neither fused nor fluid, but fractured and highly crystallized. The two cultures, the old and the new, are *antagonistic to each other*. They maintain at best an armed truce; at worst open hostility. . . .[6]

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[3]Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 62.

[4]*Ibid*., p. 61.

[5]*Ibid*., p. 62.

[6]*Ibid*., pp. 62-63, italics added.

We hope to show the extent to which this statement is untrue.

The first chapter takes up the broad outlines of the indigenous evolution, introducing the structure (neither traditional nor modern) that predominately expressed it. This is the network of face to face relations, often based on patronage, that, in Italy, had the capacity to connect town and country, merchant and peasant, urban and rural life together. We will see that networks also appear in contemporary social science, but only as relatively unimportant transitional phenomena; as forerunners of certain legal-rational institutions. Consequently, it will be necessary to contrast their meaning for the Italian evolution with their meaning for the "universal processes" of development. Their meaning in the latter sense is not altogether irrelevant for Italy; only incomplete.

Chapters two, three, and four outline the Risorgimento, beginning with a description of rationalizing forces and their failure in 1848; ending with the compromise between the indigenous and rationalizing patterns in 1860. Chapters five and six describe the structure of the Italian political system as it emerged in 1876. In the second of these, it is held against a background provided by what, for contemporary social science, is the apogee of modernization: "Anglo-American democracy." Finally, in a concluding chapter, we will suggest some possible relations between the political system and the more marked discontinuities in

twentieth century Italian history; namely those created by socialist and fascist movements.

CHAPTER I

THE CONTINUITY OF TOWN AND COUNTRY IN ITALIAN CULTURE

The Land of a Hundred Cities

The indigenous pattern of Italian evolution cannot be said to have emerged out of, or in opposition to, traditionalism because, in Italy, gemeinschaft type structures were strikingly limited in their extent and always had been. One of the most impressive things about the culture is its deeply ingrained commitment to urban life. Italy is sometimes dubbed "the land of a hundred cities" in recognition of the fact that, historically, the dominant centrifugal forces were urban. The reasons for this are complex, but it is worth noting that the Mediterranean encouraged a similar tendency on much of its periphery. In the words of Julian Pitt-Rivers, it is a "kindly sea," which connects points of restricted distances.[1] As such it made the conduct of trade, commerce, and war relatively easy, even for ancient civilizations.

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[1] Julian Pitt-Rivers, ed., Mediterranean Countrymen: Essays in the Social Anthropology of the Mediterranean (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1963), p. 9.

The period in world history between the fall of the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages is a controversial one, the controversy having in part to do with the role of cities in the West. Henri Pirenne is the author of one well-known thesis, the first part of which argues that from the invasions of Italy by Germanic tribes in the fourth century until well into the eighth century, cities continued to be the centers of social life.

> . . . It would be a decided mistake to imagine that the arrival of the Germanic tribes had as a result the substitution of a purely agricultural economy and a general stagnation in trade for urban life and commercial activity.
>
> The supposed dislike of the barbarians for towns is an admitted fable to which reality has given the lie. If, on the extreme frontiers of the Empire, certain towns were put to the torch, destroyed and pillaged, it is none the less true that the immense majority survived the invasions.[2]

The secular, administrative and political activities of the cities were, it is true, on the decline--a trend paralleled by the ascendency of an ecclesiastical hierarchy. The hierarchy, though, had been patterned after the administrative structure of the Empire and likewise used the cities as centers of activity.[3]

The second part of Pirenne's thesis is that "the world-order which had survived the Germanic invasions was not able to survive the invasion [in the eighth and ninth

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[2]Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade, trans. Frank D. Halsey (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1956), pp. 7-8.

[3]Ibid., pp. 8-9 and 42-45.

centuries] of Islam."[4] The turning point came when the latter destroyed the foundations of East-West trade. Cities were left entirely to their bishops and became vulnerable to the stifling expansion of self-sufficient agriculture. Only then, the Dark Ages began, and continued until the eleventh century when trade with the East was revived. Thereafter, both Northern Europe and the Mediterranean experienced a resurgence of urban life.[5]

Pirenne's thesis has been much criticized, perhaps because it is so imaginative. Against it the arguments are made that trade between East and West was already on the decline in the last days of the Roman Empire; that it was never so completely eclipsed, especially in Italy; that Europe's recovery from the Dark Ages was not only the result of an external stimulus--the revival of trade--but also of internal developments.[6]

Another problem is that Pirenne minimizes the distinction between the Romans and the Germanic tribes, subordinating it to the consequences for both of the status of East-West trade. It is useful, however, to maximize the unique evolutions of Western Europe and the Mediterranean, apart from the Islamic invasions. Pirenne himself points

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 55-59.

[6] See, especially, Rodney Hilton, "Comment," in Paul M. Sweezy, *et al.*, *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism: A Symposium* (New York: Science and Society, 1963), pp. 65-66.

out that, during the Dark Ages, the commercial activity of Italian cities--for instance, Venice--declined less than elsewhere.[7] He further acknowledges the uniqueness of the Mediterranean in his discussions of types of cities and their origins. The first city was a Mediterranean institution: "the administrative, religious, political and economic center of all the territory of the tribe whose name it . . . took."[8] It was particularly distinguished by the fact that its political life extended beyond its walls. "The city, indeed, had been built for the tribe, and every man in it, whether dwelling within or without the walls, was equally a citizen thereof."[9] In contrast, the city-dwelling bourgeoisie of the Middle Ages--characteristic especially of France and Germany--was "strictly local and particularistic"; protected by the city walls from an encroaching and hostile countryside.[10]

In spite of these differences, however, Pirenne argues that the burg of the Middle Ages was eventually transformed "back" into a classical city, though much more developed economically and somewhat less politically. This occurred after the revival of East-West trade, and took about

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[7] Pirenne, Medieval Cities . . ., pp. 59-65. Italian cities also experienced the economic revival in advance of other cities in Europe, stimulating progress in industry and commerce on the Lombard Plain, and influencing the development of urban life to their north.

[8] Ibid., p. 41.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., pp. 41 and 51-53.

the same form in Italy as in Western Europe. In other words, the objective of Pirenne's thesis is to demonstrate how the ancient city, established in Europe under the Empire, declined and was revived. During the Dark Ages, it was eclipsed everywhere, and though it revived first in Italy through an early expansion of commercial activity, it did not thereby develop uniquely in that culture. As commercial activity diffused, the ancient city reappeared in Northern Europe. Finally, after a diffusion from both north and south, it emerged in France and Germany as well.[11] Here the effects were not felt until the twelfth century, but when they were, it was with the same results as elsewhere:

> As in antiquity, the country oriented itself afresh on the city. Under the influence of trade the old Roman cities took on new life and were repopulated, or mercantile groups formed round about the military burgs . . . [and] at the junction points . . . of communication.
>
> . . . .
>
> Invigorated, transformed and launched upon the route of progress, the new Europe resembled, in short, more the ancient Europe than the Europe of the Carolingian times. For it was out of antiquity that she retained the essential characteristic of being a region of cities. And if, in the political organization, the role of cities had been greater in antiquity than it was in the Middle Ages, in return their economic influence in the latter era greatly exceeded what it had ever been before.[12]

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[11]*Ibid.*, pp. 53-74. Pirenne stresses the chronological similarity in all cases, and the congruence of forms which proceeded from it. The theory is a functional one: "the same needs, [created by the status of East-West trade], brought in their train like results everywhere."

[12]*Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

For our purposes, it is more important that the ancient city was a Mediterranean phenomenon, and different from the cities of Western Europe. In certain historical periods, one or the other of these cultures dominated, but both have been on separate evolutionary tracks throughout. In this connection it is suggested, for example, that political organization remained important in the relations between Mediterranean cities and their surrounding territories but was never particularly striking in Western Europe. Cities in the latter culture developed in opposition to the countryside, while in the former development proceeded on the basis of continuity.

There are some interesting justifications for this position. Marx, for instance, makes a nice distinction between the social organization of classical antiquity and that of feudalism, implying that the latter succeeded the former only by establishing itself on its ruins. In other words, feudalism did not proceed in a linear path from antiquity, but can be understood as an alternative evolution from "primitive communalism." More flexible and more productive, it was able to conquer the surface of ancient culture. Beneath the surface, and especially in the cities, that culture remained intact.[13] This was because its basic

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[13]It is not absolutely certain that Marx viewed ancient and feudal institutions as alternative forms. Eric Hobsbawm draws this conclusion from his reading of The German Ideology, and the Manifesto, supra, p. 3, note 1. See his Introduction in Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. Also see Marx's own explication, pp. 77-78.

organization, in contrast to feudalism, was urban. Each center of population controlled its surrounding territory, and was not, like the village, an "appendage of the land." The rural people lived in it, organized primarily along lines of kinship, but approaching a degree of individuality in their social and property relations.[14] These population centers were political entities as well; larger ones, in fact, being city-states. Governing positions were held by a class of patricians who exercised power through intermediaries, known as "clients."[15] In the most general sense, a client was someone who owed political fidelity to an individual or a lineage in return for certain privileges and protection. As will be shown, a relationship not unlike this existed under feudalism, although especially in transitional periods when "the rest of the social framework (was) giving way."[16] What distinguished it in the ancient world was its intimate connection with a well established social framework. It pertained where both kinship groups and the state were viable, whereas under feudalism it did not. In both cases, though, the clientele relationship reflected the weakness or non-existence of the village community.

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[14] Ibid., pp. 90-94.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, trans. L. A. Manyon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 148.

Once established, feudal institutions looked more unlike the ancient ones. Their "locus of history" was in the countryside; their development proceeded through the "opposition of town and country."[17] The rural population did not live in political communities like the city-states but concentrated their activities in the household. The latter, in fact, became independent centers of production, self-sufficient in most respects and dependent upon the domestic industry of the women. A household participated in occasional assemblies with other households, but its members, in contrast to the rural population of the ancient world, were isolated from institutions of state and market.[18] Ironically, though, this very isolation of rural life was what made its "urbanization" possible. Beyond a certain point, the development of the towns depended upon the "solubility" of social structure in the country. The first prerequisite for large-scale industry, Marx insisted, "is the involvement of the entire countryside in the production . . . of exchange relations."[19] Compared to the village community of more primitive societies, the household economy could submit with relative facility to the necessary changes. Its surplus labor was absorbed by the towns as it was transformed from a producing to a consuming unit. In other words,

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[17] Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, pp. 77-78.

[18] Ibid., pp. 79-80.

[19] Ibid., p. 116.

the evolution from feudalism involved not only "the opposition of town and country" but the absorption by town of country for its own economic purposes, as well.

The evolution from antiquity is something about which we know little, especially insofar as it occurred independently of feudalism. However, it is possible to speculate on its distinctive characteristics. First, "the opposition of town and country" is more or less irrelevant as is the transformation of the self-sufficient household into a unit of consumption. From the outset, the links between town and country, market and household, state and peasant, were much more significant than any antagonisms. The rural structure had no independence and was therefore not "soluble." But, on the other hand, it did not have to be: it presented no obstacle to the further evolution of the cities. It would seem, then, that the evolution occurred within that framework which joined town and country together, proceeding on a basis of continuity rather than antagonism. It could not, at the same time, proceed as far, since the very absence of antagonism precluded the direct utilization of the countryside by the towns for distinctly urban economic pursuits. As we will see, the evolution in question had an agricultural emphasis and was not directed toward the development of large-scale industry. Political organization remained important to it.

What evidence is there that, in Italy, a distinctive non-feudal evolution occurred? For one thing, it is known

that the process of infeudation did not result in a substantial manorial system.[20] In turn, this was related to the survival and growth of the Italian cities. Weber's classic study of the city is of some help here. In Europe, he informs us, medieval cities were "quick to be cut off from status connections with the rural nobility." However,

> in the South, chiefly Italy, the reverse occurs when, with the mounting power of the cities, rural nobles took up urban residence. This latter phenomenon also appears in augmented form in antiquity where the city originated precisely as the seat of nobility.[21]

The pattern described by Weber suggests why Italian merchants invented the mechanisms of commercial capitalism in advance of the rest of Europe--indeed by the thirteenth century. These mechanisms--the money economy; the profit-making enterprise; banking, investment, insurance, and credit arrangements; systems of bookkeeping and written communications--appeared spontaneously in a social environment where traditional forces did not constrain the cities. In the long run, they were critical weapons for cities to the north in their struggle with the countryside. Recall too that, in that struggle, the cities of France and England were allied with absolute monarchs--figures for which there is no Italian counterpart.

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[20]Robert L. Reynolds, Europe Emerges: Transition Toward an Industrial World-Wide Society, 600-1750 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), pp. 29-33.

[21]Max Weber, The City, trans. and ed. Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 101.

Not only did Italian noblemen live in the cities but throughout the Renaissance they participated actively in trade and commerce. At the same time, the urban middle classes consistently sought to invest in land. One result was that the nobility did not distinguish itself as a "ruling class."[22] For political purposes, middle class landowners, and landowning but commercially active noblemen, formed a layer of patricians. Alone and under despotic princes, they extended the hegemony of the most important cities.[23] Within the cities conflicts between nobles and non-nobles were overlaid by conflicts between noble lineages, each aided by clienteles from all levels of society. Forms of the vendetta were therefore highly developed.[24]

There are other interesting corrolaries to the nobility's lack of exclusiveness. For example, the military life which we often associate with rurality and feudalism was absorbed by the cities in Italy. According to one source, "there were always boys from the country who drifted towards the cities in search of an arms bearing and fighting career. . . . Inside the city there were always citizens who knew how to handle weapons."[25] In contrast to Western

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[22]Reynolds, _Europe Emerges . . ._, pp. 75-78; Wallace K. Ferguson, _The Renaissance_ (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1962), pp. 59-66.

[23]_Ibid._, pp. 54-59.

[24]_Ibid._, pp. 54-56.

[25]Reynolds, _Europe Emerges . . ._, pp. 77-79.

Europe, arms-bearing noblemen defended cities, not fiefs. Moreover, they were flanked by mercenary soldiers, called the *condottieri*, who rendered their services because they were paid to. They were not, in other words, bound in vassalage to the lord.[26]

Other institutions which are loosely associated with feudalism, or at least traditionalism, partook of urban life in Italy. Like the courts of the Italian princes, the papacy, for instance, patronized certain factions of the patrician elite, favoring their businesses or their social and political interests. In the papal court, as in the others, one did not have to be of noble birth to succeed. Artists, the *condottieri*, diplomats--in general, the educated, rich, or charming--were "courted."[27] It should be no surprise, therefore, that "the great majority of the Italian cardinals, papal secretaries, bishops and abbots were recruited from the intelligentsia and the patrician classes of the cities or from the urban princely courts." It is suggested that "under such circumstances, the Church did little to stem the rising tide of secular interests."[28] The Renaissance of Italian Catholicism that came in the sixteenth century never matched the radicalism of the Reformation to its north. Perhaps the reason was that, in the

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[26]Ferguson, *The Renaissance*, pp. 57-58.

[27]*Ibid.*, p. 68.

[28]*Ibid.*, p. 69.

North, the exigencies of "breaking through" traditions--of opposing town to country, bureaucracy to enclaves, middle class to aristocracy--were that much less ambiguous.

Finally, the universal interest of city people in the land meant that a separation between their economy and the agricultural economy could not develop. Even in southern Italy where vast extensively cultivated estates prevailed, agriculture was a commercially linked activity. Small proprietors, share-tenants, and day-laborers predominated over serfs. The self-sufficient household economy did not appear, and peasants cannot be said to have been "embedded" in traditional communities. In the city-states of Milan, Venice, Florence, Ferrara, peasants were organized by a system of land tenure known as _mezzadria_. (It is still common in these regions today.) The _mezzadria_, says Weber, "rested on the consideration that the lord was predominantly a resident of the city . . . ."[29] Typically, he supplied the land, plantings, and equipment necessary for permanent improvements. For a share (up to half) of the crop, the peasant contributed cheaper implements, some animals, and his labor. Each tenancy was contracted annually and involved only the peasant and his immediate (nuclear) family. Contracts were usually renegotiable for several years, and sometimes for generations. But the peasant's security in

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[29]Weber, _The City_, pp. 192-93.

this regard was offset by the lack of an economic foundation for the extended family.[30]

Italian peasants did not live in traditional "village communities" either. According to R. L. Reynolds, peasants frequently migrated to the cities to participate for a period of time in the labor force, an army, the market place, or to seek the charity of a religious order. Reynolds also suggests that, in Italy, people got power at the local level not because they protected a closed community from its environment but, on the contrary, because they had important contacts in the cities.[31] In southern Italy where large estates (the _latifondi_) predominated, the peasants lived in a characteristic Mediterranean community: the "agro-town." Unlike villages, these towns were very large, often numbering several thousand in population. They separated the peasants from the land, both physically (sometimes up to five hours daily walking time) and psychologically. The land, moreover, was controlled by intermediaries of the lord, himself no doubt a resident of some distant city. Tenancy contracts were arranged by individuals and did not sustain the extended family. Compared to the _mezzadria_ tenures, they were shorter and less secure. Since, by the law of the Church, inheritance was partible, having a small patrimony did not alleviate

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[30]Kent Roberts Greenfield, _Economics and Liberalism in the Risorgimento: A Study of Nationalism in Lombardy, 1814-1848_ (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1934), pp. 6-7.

[31]Reynolds, _Europe Emerges . . ._, pp. 69-77.

this condition. The status of the next generation was always in some doubt--a fact which underscores again the limits of traditionality in the "rural-agrarian" South.[32]

Two Evolutionary Patterns

During the sixteenth century, trade routes shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic seabord, contributing to the rise of "rational bourgeois capitalism" in England and to the decline of merchant capitalism in Italy. In the wake of this change, the textile and woolen industries of northern Italy were somewhat divested of capital and forced into semi-rural areas to escape high costs of production in the cities. Their chief difficulty was characteristic--even of banking and credit institutions: they were no longer competitive.[33] It was perhaps because of their very success that radical changes elsewhere should send them into decline. The consequences were momentous. Thereafter, the Italian evolution would be influenced by the hegemony of Western Europe. Put differently, the nation state would emerge

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[32]See Pitt-Rivers, Mediterranean Countrymen . . ., pp. 21-22 for a similar description of the position of the Andalusian peasant. Where a system like primogeniture "ensures the stability of the family in time," partible inheritance "submits its continuity to the hazards of its procreative power." After the abolition of entailments in the nineteenth century, "a family with numerous heirs [could] not hope to pass on an equivalent economic position to its children who [had to] rely upon their own exertions or a fortunate marriage. . . ."

[33]Carlo M. Cipolla, "The Decline of Italy; the Case of a Fully Matured Economy," Economic History Review, V (August, 1952), pp. 177-88.

from two intersecting lines of development: a Mediterranean pattern (the indigenous evolution) and a European pattern, the centers of gravity for which were England and France. By the eighteenth century, both lines had accelerated considerably in keeping with the increased pace of change elsewhere. The French Revolution of 1789 further stimulated them, and from that point on one can outline the configuration of forces in terms of organized social movements.

The line of development which had England and France for its centers of gravity will be identified hereafter as the "process of rationalization," since on the whole its main outlines articulate with the traditional-modern dichotomy of contemporary social science. Rationalization originated with the bureaucratic authorities of several centralizing kingdoms and duchies but, by the eighteenth century, was increasingly more true for the North as opposed to the Center and South. In the nineteenth century, only the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont) exhibited a real enthusiasm for it. In that century, however, associations and clubs of various kinds expressed demands for a more rational social order independently of, or at least in advance of, bureaucratic authorities. Again, though, these structures were concentrated in the North.

The focus of the indigenous evolution was, by contrast, in the South. It was continuous with the "open" or non-feudal society, described in the preceding section, and involved what is variously called a "commercial revival"

or the expansion of "agrarian capitalism." During the eighteenth century, trade relations between the Kingdom of Naples and France were especially favorable to the export of grain. After the French Revolution, a blockade of Russian wheat occasioned by the Napoleonic Wars further enhanced both domestic and export markets for this commodity. At the same time, the French occupation of southern and central Italy encouraged the transfer of land from noble, clerical, or communal control to more "enterprising types." The latter had theretofore been only tenants and managers of the estates. Most transfers were accomplished because increasing commercial activities impoverished older members of the nobility. The occupying forces did legislate the end of "feudal" privileges, but, until the unification of Italy in 1860, rules of this sort were difficult to enforce. One might say that until then only as much land changed hands as was necessitated by economic crises--the more easily, of course, because of the Napoleonic Codes.

The "enterprising types" belonged to a category of people whom we shall refer to as "intermediaries." They came into possession of power by acquiring land, but their activities were multiple, and it was not as a landed class that they contributed to the unification of Italy. Nor were they a "middle class" in the European sense. In fact, the intermediaries did not constitute a class at all, but were recruited from several layers of society. Sometimes they were ex-peasants, sometimes young noblemen, most often

managers, brokers, agents, contractors, for others.[34] The commercial revival of the eighteenth century; the acceleration of social change that resulted from it; the vast political and administrative upheavals of the nineteenth century; and especially the unification of the state--these events selected for intermediaries in central and southern Italy. They had the effect of swelling their ranks, making them powerful and sometimes rich, allowing them to express the evolutionary process in their own terms.

Unlike a classical bourgeoisie, the intermediaries were not "free floating resources" for a bureaucratic authority to mobilize against "traditionalism."[35] Nor did they readily form voluntary associations and political clubs for the expression of demands or the exercise of influence. Their medium was more personal than that. It involved nets of contacts between individuals and the play by individuals for power. The contacts, or "networks" as we shall call them, cut across lines of social class. They were not

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[34]The intermediaries, as a social type, will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV. See <u>infra</u>, pp. 128-38.

[35]The concept "free floating resources," and its relationship to rationalization, or modernization, are developed by Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt. See <u>The Political Systems of Empires</u> (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963). Eisenstadt's theory of development is dualistic; built around Weberian or Parsonian categories. He argues that the historical bureaucratic empires are of special typological importance because "historically and analytically they stand between what may be called the 'traditional' and the 'modern' political systems and regimes." (P. 4.) It was on the basis of a mobilization of resources which were not "embedded" in traditional groupings that these bureaucracies developed.

traditional structures but could infiltrate an enclave or reflect its lack of solid boundaries. They were not bureaucratic, either, but again could infiltrate bureaucracies. Lest it appear that a war of all-versus-all prevailed, it is necessary to insist that the networks had a certain structure. Most often the personal exercise of power occurred within a framework of patron-client ties. Their nature, and the etiquettes that governed them, will occupy us in the remaining sections of this chapter.

Before turning to them, however, it is necessary to note that as the differences between northern and southern Italy unfolded, internal tensions of the Papal State increased. The region known as the Romagna characteristically veered toward the North. Separated from the rest of the State by the Appenines, its people looked at Rome as an unenlightened suburb of the Vatican. They had long resented their subjection to papal authority and fought it, at least partly, with ideas from the French Revolution. South of the Appenines, the State was more southern in culture; more supportive of the indigenous than of the "foreign" evolutionary pattern. Still, it is important that both patterns were experienced throughout the peninsula. Political clubs of lawyers and intellectuals, agricultural and scientific associations, took up the cause of rationalization in Naples as well as Milan; the networks of intermediaries which expressed the indigenous evolution infiltrated such associations in Milan as well as Naples. If we exaggerate the

differences between North and South it is to identify the foci of the alternative evolutions.

The Patron-Client Relationship

A good description of the abstract qualities of the patron-client relationship is suggested by an anthropologist, Eric Wolf. It is partly based on Michael Kenny's field work in Andalusian Spain and further supported by other research in Italy and Greece.[36] According to Wolf, relations of patronage are like those of kinship and friendship in that they involve many sides of the actors' personalities. In other words, they are relatively diffuse relations, in which people do not perform exclusively in specialized roles. However, unlike friendship, patronage relations are "lop-sided."[37] They reflect positions of dominance and subordination, facilitating an exchange of goods and services that

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[36] Eric R. Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies," Conference on "New Approaches to the Study of Social Anthropology," n.d. (Mimeographed.) To be published as an Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth Monograph (London: Tavistock Publications, 1965). J. K. Campbell, _Honour, Family, and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); Ernestine Friedl, "The Role of Kinship in the Transmission of National Culture to Rural Villages in Mainland Greece," _American Anthropologist_, LXI (February, 1959), pp. 30-38; Michael Kenny, _A Spanish Tapestry: Town and Country in Castile_ (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1962); Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, _The People of the Sierra_ (New York: Criterion Books, 1954).

[37] Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations . . .," p. 19.

is asymmetrical. Patrons offer more tangible provisions, such as economic assistance, special privileges, or protection. (Protection may be from outlaws or the law, depending on the situation.) In return, clients have to demonstrate esteem for their patrons; supply them with credit for political support in the future; keep them informed of the "machinations" of their enemies; and so on.[38] One way to bolster a patron's status is to see that others are aware of his good deeds. The means for enhancing his political power are varied. They could involve the exercise of violence or voting rights on his behalf, or simply a demonstration of loyalty for him, as opposed to other potential patrons.[39]

The usual outcome of a patron-client transaction is that the patron translates esteem, information, and the promise of support into power, with which he then seeks to influence individuals to whom he is a client. Clients, on the other hand, attempt to use their new economic and political security to become patrons over others. Because of these extensions of the relationship, it tends to express itself in networks of contacts in which any given person is patron to some, client to others.[40] The shape of the

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[38] Ibid., p. 20.

[39] Ibid., p. 20; Kenny, A Spanish Tapestry . . ., p. 136.

[40] Ibid., p. 135. "God is the ultimate patron and the Virgin and hundreds of patron saints are there to intercede with Him on behalf of their clients." Campbell,

networks might vary, depending on the social context. They could embody shifting alliances, re-negotiations, maneuvering, or relations approaching kinship in their continuity. The overall tendency is toward overlapping vertical structures. But at the same time that they are vertical, networks have the effect of "levelling out . . . inequalities, and avoiding the abuses of powerful superiors."[41] In Italy, they recall the clienteles of the Roman patricians.

The proliferation of patron-client networks, then, can be an adaptation to severe insecurities of environment, or inequalities of social life. Wolf suggests further that one condition under which networks occur is "where no corporate lineal group or corporate village intervene between potential client and potential patron, but where the network of kin and friendship relations is sufficiently open for each . . . to enter into independent, dyadic contracts."[42] Another condition is that the "formal institutional structure of the society is weak and unable to deliver a sufficiently steady supply of goods and services especially to the terminal levels of the social order."[43]

Honour, Family and Patronage . . ., pp. 256-62; Jeremy Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics in a Sicilian Agro-Town," Preliminary Report (Université de Montréal, June, 1964), pp. 39-41. (Mimeographed.)

[41]Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage . . ., pp. 224-38 and 256-59; Kenny, A Spanish Tapestry . . ., pp. 135-36.

[42]Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations . . .," p. 20.

[43]Ibid.

Marc Bloch, the historian of feudal society, offers a similar interpretation:

> To seek a protector, or to find satisfaction in being one--these things are common to all ages. But we seldom find them giving rise to new legal institutions save in civilizations where the rest of the social framework is giving way.[44]

Bloch's example is drawn from Gaul during the Merovingian period. I will quote at length, because it expresses precisely a relationship between networks and the absence of other constant structures.

> Neither the state nor the family any longer provided adequate protection. The village community was barely strong enough to maintain order within its own boundaries; the urban community scarcely existed. Everywhere, the weak man felt the need to be sheltered by someone more powerful. The powerful man, in his turn, could not maintain his prestige or his fortune, or even ensure his own safety except by securing, for himself, by persuasion or coercion, the support of subordinates bound to his service. . . . And as the notions of weakness and strength are always relative, in many cases the same man occupied a dual role--as a dependent of a more powerful man and a protector of humbler ones. Thus there began to be built up a vast system of personal relationships whose intersecting threads ran from one level of the social structure to the other.[45]

Bloch adds that the terminology of "clientelism" was borrowed from Ancient Rome to cover the contingencies of ritual and stability in this on the whole unstable world. This is not to imply that Ancient Rome was equally "unstable." Rather, it indicates that there can be more than one context for

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[44]Bloch, Feudal Society, p. 148. "Legal institutions," as used here, refer to "customary procedure." See p. 151.

[45]Ibid., p. 148.

the proliferation of networks; more than one meaning for patronage.

Bloch's description has an interesting parallel in Robert Merton's well-known "functional analysis" of the political machine in America. Merton argues that one should "ordinarily (not invariably) expect persistent social patterns and social structures to perform positive functions which are at the same time not adequately fulfilled by other existing patterns and structures."[46] In American society, the state is constitutionally restricted in the extent to which it can centralize power and perform services for various social groups. Since the latter require privileges, services, protection and so on for their proper operation, they must support "illegitimate" structures, capable of consolidating the legally scattered "fragments of power."[47] Characteristically, American machines made their strongest allies in neighborhoods of first generation immigrants, where neither family nor local associations could meet the exigencies of poverty and estrangement. These were also areas in which the state barely penetrated, the welfare services being, for instance, in their infancy. The machine filled in, providing a network of "quasi-feudal" and highly personal contacts through which were distributed jobs, food, favors, and services of mediation with a hostile world. The

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[46]Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 71-72.

[47]Ibid., p. 72.

price, of course, was votes. At the same time, the machines enjoyed pay-offs and financial backing from legitimate and illegitimate businesses, likewise in need of privileges or protection, though for different reasons.[48]

In other words, in societies as different as Merovingian Gaul and the United States, patron-client relations were manifest where, on one side, family and community were "open" (vulnerable, inadequate, unbounded), on the other, the state somehow handicapped as an effective center of power. The implication is that, in general, patronage networks *substitute for* more appropriate institutions when they are missing. In the long run, we shall find that this characterization does not quite fit the Italian intermediaries. Before doing that, however, let us look at patronage in Parsonian terms. For the network has a place in the universal processes of development as they are understood by contemporary sociology. Instead of being a "substitute" it becomes a precursor--the forerunner in particular of "party-political activity" and voluntary associations.

Networks in Contemporary Social Science

In analyzing the process of social differentiation--the cornerstone of the universal processes of development--Parsons takes up the general nature of "linking structures." In the traditional society, organized almost entirely around

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[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 72-82.

the status groups of kinship and community, differentiation begins with certain "interstitial" relations.[49] The structure of these relations has little or no effect on the over-all system and in all probability recruits what the society regards as deviants. Examples would be the marriage broker, who conducts negotiations between families, or the itinerant peddlar who travels between communities.[50] In the evolution from traditionalism, differentiation proceeds so as to make linking structures more numerous and more important. There are two stages in this development, at least analytically. One might be called "intermediate," the other "modern." The first is characterized by linking structures that Parsons calls "ecological complexes." They include a "market nexus" and an "expressive network of 'purely personal' friendships."[51] Patronage relations are clearly implied by the latter, and probably by the former too.

The modern stage is the product of further differentiation and supports modern or legal-rational linking structures. Collectivities replace the networks of individuals; "purely personal friendship" gives way to relations that are functionally specific. The task of linking economic units to each other and to the state is assumed by the "instrumentally

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[49] Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 173-74.

[50] Ibid., p. 174.

[51] Ibid., pp. 174-75.

oriented organization"--the voluntary association--which replaces the "market nexus." Links between status groups (kinship, community, class), and the institutions of government, evolve from networks to political parties.[52]

Now, at the two poles of Parsons' conceptualization, one finds that _either_ the linking structures do not cover much of the social space (traditional society), _or_ they are themselves of the same organizational type (modern) as the other differentiated structures of the society. But what about the intermediate stage? The essential point here is that, in the Parsonian scheme, networks are only relevant in terms of what they will become. The reason, I think, is that Parsons is committed to the proposition that "the scope of 'purely personal' behavior in the uninstitutionalized sense is narrowly limited by the functional requirements of social systems."[53] What this means in concrete cases is almost always that relations not governed by legal-rational structures are already or readily absorbed by traditional ones; or vice-versa.[54] Consequently, networks of "purely

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[52] _Ibid._, pp. 174-77 and 182-84.

[53] Talcott Parsons, "Introduction," Max Weber, _The Theory of Social and Economic Organization_, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947), p. 69.

[54] According to Parsons, the scope of "purely personal" behavior is relatively broad in Western society, but only because the individual is protected by legal-rational norms. "The tendency to break down the segregation between the official and the personal spheres will not, therefore, probably result in the permanent increase of individualistic freedom, but rather in the increase of institutionalization

personal friendship" take on their real significance by virtue of their evolutionary mission: to become voluntary associations and political parties. In Italy, however, these networks cover so much of the social space, and are so very well developed, that one is tempted to see in them a kind of alternative.

It is interesting that social scientists in the Parsonian tradition are likely to find certain segments of Italian culture socially disorganized.[55] Moreover, the particular sub-culture most often described in these terms--the south Italian--is precisely the one which I believe became the locus of patron-client networks. Edward Banfield, who is sometimes accepted as an authority on the political life of the Mezzogiorno, begins his analysis with Hobbes.[56]

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of individual functions and status in the 'total' status form, in other words, of features Weber treats as typical of traditional authority." See ibid., p. 69. The same conclusion is implicit in Parsons' discussion of "the principle types of social structure," illustrated by American society, the Chinese bureaucratic empires, pre-Nazi Germany, and Spanish America. In all four, either traditional or legal-rational structures account for virtually all of the relationships between men. See The Social System, pp. 182-200, passim.

[55]See, for example, Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958); William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), especially pp. 134-35 and 154-58; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 39-40 and 402-14.

[56]Banfield recalls the famous words of DeToqueville: "In democratic countries the science of association is the mother of science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made." And he recalls the famous words of Hobbes: In man's natural state, ". . . there is no art;

One learns from it that a "war of all against all" prevents people from organizing social or political groups. According to Banfield, the south Italians are "amoral familists," because the only identifications that they maintain are with their respective nuclear families.[57] Beyond these tightly closed, and highly defensive, units there is virtually no lasting social organization and especially no "linking structures." This is because political parties, while represented in the local communities, are not consistently supported by the same individuals, classes, or groups; and because there are no voluntary associations to speak of.[58] I will try to show that it is because networks of intermediaries structure and control the war of all against all, and link families to the nation state, that

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no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." The Mezzogiorno, having progressed hardly at all in the science of association, approaches the Hobbesian State of Nature.

[57]According to Banfield, south Italians "act as if they were following this rule: Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise." See *ibid*., p. 85.

[58]*Ibid*., pp. 85-127. LaPalombara disagrees with Banfield that the nuclear family is the only viable source of loyalties in the South, arguing on the contrary that the South is a traditional subculture, and therefore dominated by primary associations in general: family, kinship, neighborhood, village. He does, however, agree that "secondary associations that are economically or politically based, such as interest groups, have failed to attract Southerners except in the rarest cases." As a result, many of his conclusions about the relationship between the South and the nation state are the same. See *Interest Groups in Italian Politics*, p. 38.

Italian parties and associations have a distinctive character, especially (though not exclusively) in the South.

Networks and Wider Institutions

Whether patronage networks are a substitute for inadequate institutions or a transitional stage in the development (or decline) of institutions, they cannot be said to have much stature as an alternative pattern of social evolution. Neither of these interpretations of their meaning give them much weight in their own right. It is only against the background of what they replace, or what they will become, that they are understood. But in the evolution from ancient, as opposed to feudal, forms, we have seen, for instance, how clientelism organized social life, making the lines between classes less relevant than those between one family and another, each reinforced by its various allies. It played an especially important part in the relationship between town and country, expressing the fact that lines of continuity were more fundamental than lines of cleavage. Networks penetrated the countryside, drawing resources toward the towns for redistribution from them. They underscored the impossibility of an autonomous "rural" existence and maximized the capacity of cities for political organization.

In his discussion of patron-client relations, Wolf offers some additional information on their organizational potential:

> . . . Where the institutional framework of society is farflung and solidly entrenched, patronage cannot lead to the formation of bodies of followers relatively independent of the formal structure. Rather, patronage will take the form of sponsorship, in which the patron provides connections . . . with the institutional order.[59]

The Spanish, Wolf notes, have dignified this pattern with a word, _enchufe_, meaning "plug-in." It is a pattern in which the distribution of goods and services is less important than the exercise of influence on a client's behalf. It is also a pattern in which the patron's "hold on the client is weakened . . . with clients often moving from one orbit of influence to another."[60]

The question I wish to raise is how one gets from patronage relations generally to networks that are "plugged-in" to a wider institutional context. One can see that, if networks operate in lieu of, or in advance of, wider institutions, the "plug-in" function is unlikely. It is only where they parallel these institutions in time and space that the term makes sense. One can think of the relation between _sans-culottes_ and Jacobins in the French Revolution, or Soviets and Bolsheviks in the Russian. Two sides of one coin are apparent: one, that the "wider institutions"--e.g., political parties or nation states--need a broad basis of social support; two, that a spontaneous

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[59]Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations . . .," p. 21.

[60]_Ibid._, p. 21. Also see Kenny, _A Spanish Tapestry . . ._, pp. 130-51.

evolution produces a sufficiently high level of organization to make the acquisition of support possible. For example, in the Russian Revolution it was crucial that the Bolsheviks, while a select organization of "trained revolutionaries," based their operations on the spontaneous activity of workers and peasants. And it was equally crucial that the workers and peasants threw up organizations of their own. Their control of resources (including people) made it necessary to approach them; their organizational capacity made them approachable.

In Italy, we shall find that national unification--proceeding through evolutionary rather than revolutionary means--likewise forced the "great institutions" to build a social base. They were, after all, copied from France and England and that much more removed from the Italian social world. The spontaneous evolution of mediating networks provided them with an opportunity. "Plugging-in" occurred when the nation state made contact with the networks of intermediaries in central and southern Italy or, conversely, when the intermediaries offered their organizational capacity to the state in exchange for a greater range of privileges and power. The important point is that, through their networks, the intermediaries had _already_ achieved a substantial level of organization. In particular, they provided a link to the countryside. Had this not been so, the peasants might well have turned, guerilla-style, against

the state or lent their support to a competing political force.

The outcome of a relation between "wider institutions" and the organizations of a spontaneous evolution is always problematical. We cannot assume, with contemporary social science, that the latter must contract or be destroyed in favor of the former. Social scientists reach this conclusion because they do not attribute an evolutionary potential to traditional structures and at the same time believe that all structures which are not modernizing (or disorganized) are somehow traditional. Parsons' explication is indicative. He concedes that the category *gemeinschaft*, or traditional, covers "the great majority of known societies" and "an enormous structural variation."[61] However, these attributes of the category are held to be of little interest to the sociologist. They are what anthropologists have to worry about. Parsons argues that the many variations of *gemeinschaft* structures "can be treated by more detailed breakdowns in terms of the same conceptual scheme," but that these variations become less relevant the more interested one is in "lines of fundamental structural differentiation which are in some sense of evolutionary significance."[62]

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[61]Parsons, *The Social System*, p. 181.

[62]*Ibid.*, p. 182.

Wolf, a social anthropologist with an interest in complex and literate societies, rejects the proposition that all premodern societies are traditional, or incapable of "breaking through the primacy of ascriptive [kinship, neighborhood, village] foci."[63] For one thing, he suggests that there are several types of peasant communities, a basic one being "open." Its configuration is such that the relationships which connect people in the community to institutions beyond it are more important that relationships which defend the community from the outside world.[64] The connecting relationships do not have to involve collectivities; often they are networks of dyadic, or two-person contacts--symmetrical, as in friendship, or asymmetrical, as in patron-client ties.[65] Furthermore, under certain conditions, these relationships can shape the character of "wider institutions" in complex societies. Wolf suggests that the possibility be understood in terms of an "upward circulation" of social forms, occurring when the "etiquettes," patterns of organization, styles of behavior, that distinguish a spontaneous

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[63]*Ibid.*, pp. 175-76; Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations . . .," pp. 1-3.

[64]See, especially, Wolf, "Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion," *American Anthropologist*, LVII (June, 1955), pp. 452-71, and Wolf, "San Jose: Subcultures of a 'Traditional' Coffee Municipality," *The People of Puerto Rico*, ed. Julian Steward (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), pp. 171-264.

[65]Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations . . .," pp. 14-21. Also see George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract: A Model for the Social Structure of a Mexican Peasant Village," *American Anthropologist*, LXIII (December, 1961), pp. 1173-92.

evolution are called on, in the course of development, to organize people on a wider, and possibly national, scale.[66] The suggestion is reinforced by some of the recent historical research on social movements, in which a deliberate attempt is made to write history from the "bottom up." If it is not always shown that "wider institutions" are shaped by the spontaneous contributions of "little people" to great events, there is nonetheless impressive evidence for the fact that "little people" (pre-literate and pre-modern) can spontaneously organize themselves above and beyond the ascribed groups to which they belong. In fact, in a wonderful variety of ways--demonstrated, for instance, by the Cargo Cults of Melanesia, the sans-culottes of the French Revolution, the English working class, or the anarchist peasants of Spain--their spontaneous organizations acquire a distinct political meaning.[67] Fortunately, Eric Hobsbawm has devoted his talents to the spontaneous movements of

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[66]Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations . . .," pp. 21-24. In Sons of the Shaking Earth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), Wolf presents the Mexican Revolution as in large part the product of an "upward circulation." See pp. 233-56.

[67]See, in particular, Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound; A Study of 'Cargo Cults' in Melanesia (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1957); Robert R. Palmer, "Popular Democracy in the French Revolution," French Historical Studies, I (Fall, 1960), pp. 445-69; Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the Revolutions of Paris: An Essay on Recent Historical Writing," Social Problems, XII (Summer, 1964), pp. 99-121; Edward P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964).

south Italian peasants, and we shall find many occasions to refer to his discoveries.[68]

The concept "upward circulation" is likewise important for the analysis of political development in Italy. We will have to consider the outcome of a "plug-in" configuration in which the "wider institutions" began to look more like networks of intermediaries than the other way around. A "downward circulation" would have pertained if the "wider institutions," modeled after others in France and England, had prevailed over intermediaries--and over the aspects of Italian culture that can rightly be called "traditional." More specifically, a "downward circulation" should have occurred if the rationalizing forces of 1848-49 had been successful--for which reason we will begin our analysis with an enquiry into their failure.

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[68]Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959).

CHAPTER II

THE RISORGIMENTO AS A PROCESS OF RATIONALIZATION: 1848

Rationalization in Piedmont

A process of rationalization, not unlike that which Western Europe underwent, did begin in Italy. In fact, as far back as the sixteenth century, some of the royal houses of the peninsula were engaged in "rational" pursuits: centralizing power, differentiating political from other functions, mobilizing resources to limit the power of local feudatories and communes, furthering the bureaucratic administration of their police powers and of justice. The administrative reforms that were important in the eighteenth century took place in Naples (under a Spanish Bourbon), in Tuscany and Lombardy (ruled respectively by a Hapsburg duke and emperor), and in Piedmont (under the House of Savoy--the ruling house of the Kingdom of Sardinia).[1] It is also noteworthy that liberal Catholics were at this time advising the papacy to suppress its feudatories--especially the

[1] Agatha Ramm, The Risorgimento (Historical Association Pamphlet Series, No. 50; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 4.

Jesuit societies--and to apply the principle of equality before the law to religious dissenters and Jews.[2]

Of all the examples of rationalization, the Piedmontese, while not necessarily the most comprehensive, was certainly the most consequential. For, in the end, only the House of Savoy lent its strength to the cause of national unity. After 1848, the others lined up on the side of reaction, while this court became involved with the politically active forces of the society it governed. It was under the House of Savoy that a Kingdom of Italy finally emerged in 1860.

What, then, were the reforms which that House initiated? In the early part of the eighteenth century, steps were taken to differentiate a secretariat for internal from one for foreign affairs; to separate both from the royal family; to admit the bourgeoisie to ministerial posts; to coordinate fiscal policy and mobilize provincial resources for a centrally directed policy of mercantilism.[3] In order to restrict the local influence of bishops and the nobility, and to gain control over communal (or municipal) authorities, the monarchy created a new kind of field representative called an Intendant. His job was to apportion and collect

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[2]Arturo Carlo Jemolo, Church and State in Italy, 1850-1950, trans. David Moore (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), pp. 8-12.

[3]Robert C. Fried, The Italian Prefects: A Study in Administrative Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 6-9.

taxes, inspect the royal monopolies (e.g., mines), regularize the use of coins, weights, and measures, supervise conscription. The intendants were recruited "from among middle-class lawyers, magistrates, and financial officials."[4] As the state expanded during the eighteenth century, taking over tasks such as education that had formerly been the responsibility of other institutions, the power of the Intendants increased. In fact, they gained control of all royal activities at the provincial level with the exception of internal security. The Military Governors were the provincial policemen.[5]

Between 1792 and 1798, the French Army occupied Piedmont, organizing it as a military division. (In 1802 Piedmont was annexed to France.) Using the same territorial divisions that the House of Savoy had established, but consolidating them, the French furthered the processes of centralization. They introduced, for example, a prefect system. The Prefect replaced the Intendant and increased his jurisdiction, both territorially and functionally. In particular, he acquired the policing functions of the Military Governor, becoming the political, as well as the administrative, arm of the central authority. The French also established councils at the provincial level so that local interests might be represented independently of the communal

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[4] _Ibid._, pp. 10-11.

[5] _Ibid._, pp. 12-13.

bodies in which the nobility predominated. They also admitted bourgeois careerists to the one remaining stronghold of the Piedmontese noblemen: the army.[6]

During the Restoration (1814-1848), the House of Savoy attempted to return to its eighteenth century formulae--to replace Prefects with Intendants and Military Governors; to abolish the provincial councils and demote middle class officers in the army. It did not, however, attempt to reverse the inroads which the occupation had made against feudal privileges.[7] Moreover, it restricted the policing prerogatives of the military by creating a Ministry of Police and an armed police force called the Carabiniers. The latter was a part of the army but it was controlled by the new ministry.[8]

In the course of the Restoration, the tasks of policing became difficult indeed. For now certain groups in the population--demoted army officers, to take one, characteristic, example--were awake politically as they had never been before. According to Robert Fried, whose research has provided the basis for this discussion of Piedmontese rationalization, the monarchy began to call in "the largely

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[6] _Ibid._, pp. 15-21.

[7] _Ibid._, p. 23.

[8] _Ibid._, p. 23. The Ministry of Police was destined for a short life, however. In 1821, liberal army officers and nobles revolted without success, after which the Secretary of the Interior took over the police, and "an extensive network of spies was developed to keep under surveillance the dissident groups. . . ." (Pp. 23-24.)

legitimist army, nobility, clergy, and peasantry in its resistance to the anticlericalism, constitutionalism, nationalism, and egalitarianism of the opposition."[9] Polarization--or dichotomization--characterized the alignment of forces at this point and would until 1848.

However, at the same time that the Piedmontese monarchy made an alliance with "traditionalist" forces, it began breaking it. The first shifts occurred under Charles Albert, who took the throne in 1831, and who "wished to make concessions to the growing liberal opposition without affecting his absolute political power."[10] So, for example, he permitted the first meaningful legal codes to be drafted, and formally, at least, executed the end of "feudalism." Guilds were abolished and voluntary associations in agriculture and commerce chartered.[11] Yet the vitality and initiative of these years rested not with his government, but with that "growing liberal opposition," to which we now turn. It was, after all, <u>creating</u> the associations that wanted to be chartered. After 1848, the Piedmontese monarchy (under Victor Emmanuel II) became less ambiguous in its commitment to change. Only then did it become a rallying point for the Risorgimento.

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[9]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 24.

[10]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 30.

[11]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 30-34.

The "opposition," in contrast to the monarchs and their advisors, emphasized less the development of administration, more the development of "constitutionalism." Freedom of association and the right to exercise political power were therefore critical issues with its members. These were of roughly two types: moderates or liberals, radicals or democrats. The former represented enlightened members of the aristocracy and upper middle class, often though not exclusively landowners; the latter came more from intellectual and professional careers.[12] Although the two

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[12]The same division was characteristic of the European middle classes, especially after 1830. See E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 112-13.

> ". . . The political models created by the Revolution of 1789 served to give discontent a specific object, to turn unrest into revolution, and above all to link all Europe into a single movement--or perhaps it would be better to say current--of subversion.
>
> There were several such models . . . [which] corresponded to the . . . main trends of post-1815 opposition: the moderate liberal (or, in social terms, that of the upper middle classes and liberal aristocracy), the radical-democratic (or, in social terms, that of the lower middle class, part of the new manufacturers, the intellectuals and the discontented gentry). . . . The inspiration of the first was the Revolution of 1789-91, its political ideal the . . . constitutional monarchy with a property qualified . . . parliamentary system. . . . The inspiration of the second could best be described as the Revolution of 1792-3, and its political ideal a democratic republic with a bias towards a 'welfare state' and some animus against the rich. . . ."

Hobsbawm lists a third opposition which was not yet relevant for Italy: the socialist. Of the others, we will see that the moderates copied almost directly the constitutional monarchy of 1830 in France, while the democrats sought republican institutions.

groups advocated divergent programs and strategies, they shared in common a kind of distance from the indigenous evolution and a distinctly north Italian base. Members of both were careful observers of the economic and political institutions of Italy's northern neighbors, and alike staggered under the burden of adapting what they admired elsewhere for consumption at home.

The Lombard Publicists

Our best source on the early liberals is Kent Roberts Greenfield, who has written the history of their spokesmen in Lombardy up to 1848.[13] By the late eighteenth century, these spokesmen had formed an intellectual movement of journalists, publicists, promoters of scientific congresses and agricultural associations, which, especially as it encouraged the multiplication of contacts among the upper classes, anticipated the moderate Risorgimento. Liberal aristocrats predominated in the movement, although many participants were from the bourgeoisie.[14] Most of them did not see themselves as political types, yet they believed

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[13] Kent Roberts Greenfield, Economics and Liberalism in the Risorgimento: A Study of Nationalism in Lombardy, 1814-48 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1934).

[14] Ibid., p. 299. "The Italian liberal program was initiated, expounded, and propagated . . . not by an aspiring and self-conscious bourgeoisie, with strong economic interests, but by landed proprietors and a group of intellectuals, many of whose leaders were of the aristocracy." They were supported, though, by members of an "insipient commercial and industrial class."

that a "unity of action and political emancipation" were essential to economic progress.[15]

The economic interests that the publicists represented were varied, but one was outstanding. It stemmed from the application of new techniques, developed elsewhere, to silk cultivation in the hills of Lombardy. Investors, farmers, promotors, engineers, and so on, were encouraged by the changes, and merchants--wanting a cheaper product for the competitive European market--frequently prodded them on.[16] In Piedmont, a similar though less advanced development occurred. The man who would lead the Risorgimento in 1860 was, before 1848, the founder of an association to promote scientific farming and an experimental farmer himself. This was, of course, the Count of Cavour.[17] The publicists also represented "industrial" developments, to the extent that there were any. Italy had a considerably restricted domestic market, compared to Western Europe, and was poor in natural resources, especially for fuel. The cotton textile industry was among the few to have an expanding home market for its products. It is significant

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[15] Ibid., p. 156.

[16] Ibid., pp. 44-58. According to Greenfield, the cultivation of silk made businessmen out of landowners, and multiplied their relations with the outside world. A section of the wealthier aristocracy (called the Austriacanti), remained aloof. By 1830, many others had become liberals.

[17] Ibid., pp. 26-27. Greenfield, "The Man Who Made Italy," Studi in onore di Gino Luzzatto (Milan: Giuffrè, 1950), III, pp. 185-86.

that this industry was "based on a supply of raw materials entirely imported from abroad."[18]

Indeed, more than representing economic interests, the publicists had to create them.[19] For they were convinced that the acceleration of history to their North offered "the people on its periphery a fatal choice between reaction and progress."[20] Consequently, they travelled often, borrowing techniques (gas lighting, the steam engine, silk culture); ideas (free trade, the "spirit of association"); and institutional outlines (popular schools, banks, insurance companies) for Italy.[21] According to Greenfield, the publicists reserved a particular fascination for England--"that union of knowledge, of interests, of powers . . . by which supernatural things are executed. Since 1814 everyone seeks to imitate with his own means Great Britain."[22] Cavour, for instance, travelled in England at every opportunity, becoming the link by which Piedmont, and eventually Italy, learned the refinements of parliamentary procedure--and what might have been had Italy had a "governing class."[23] From France came concrete commodities: capital, technicians,

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[18]Greenfield, Economics and Liberalism . . ., pp. 108-109.

[19]Ibid., pp. 84-93, 155-56, 216, 230.

[20]Ibid., pp. 155-56.

[21]Ibid., pp. 223-30.

[22]Quoted in ibid., p. 309.

[23]Greenfield, Studi . . ., pp. 201-40.

models of financial and administrative bodies--finally, in 1848, a constitution.[24]

England and France were not to be copied all at once, however. Before Italy could "join the leading nations of the world," she would have to prepare. The foremost requirement was that she encourage the "animating art" of association. On the Lombard Plain, this was relatively easy, since the "requirements of an artificial distribution of water" made human association necessary. There, the publicists promoted the agricultural consorzio, a legally chartered society for the direction, especially, of irrigation.[25] At the same time, they prodded investors "to be persuaded that it is to their interest to animate the national industry by imitating the English in the spirit of association . . . ."[26] That spirit, they argued,

> permits a nation to provide for its own needs, employing the capital produced thereby in the greatest enterprises: . . . digging canals and mines, draining swamps, reclaiming land, constructing roads and bridges, launching steamships on the water, locomotives on the land, erecting docks, or warehouses; . . . illuminating factories and theatres, houses and cities, with gas . . . issuing insurance against damage by fire, hail, shipwreck and death itself; and more than this, conquering 500,000 square miles of territory . . . as the English Company did in the East Indies.[27]

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[24] Supra, p. 51, note 12.

[25] Greenfield, Economics and Liberalism . . ., pp. 31-33.

[26] Quoted in ibid., p. 309.

[27] Quoted in ibid., p. 310.

In addition, all manner of institutions for public benefit and charity were shown to be the "blessed fruits, the magnificent consequences of private association."[28]

Contemporary opinion recognized a need to promote mutual aid societies among workmen, provided they "did not interfere with laissez-faire and the free expansion of industry."[29] This requirement, it was felt, ruled out the independent organization of labor, and mutual aid societies were well patronized by the upper classes. Most often, in fact, they were taken as mere "timely precautions against a social menace," or as a "debt of honor to the laboring poor."[30]

On the other hand, the publicists were quite committed to what they called the "moral re-integration" of Italian society. To the extent that they had shouldered responsibility for "making a nation," they had grown sensitive to the enormous cultural discontinuities that surrounded them. In response to the "plight of the masses" they agitated for popular secular education, for "democratizing" dictionaries, for programs of lay philanthropy and, especially, for the inculcation of "a dutiful respect for law and order" and other "virtues of the bourgeoisie."[31] It

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[28]Quoted in ibid., p. 311.

[29]Ibid., p. 146.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid., p. 298.

was not inconsistent to them that factory discipline should contribute to the new morality although, when they proposed it, they were careful to dissociate Italian factories from the "genius of evil" they had seen unleashed in Manchester. "No statesman," one of their leaders warned, "could propose the English economic state as a model for any civilized country."[32]

The educational and philanthropic thrust of the publicist movement was equivalent--though remotely--to certain aspects of Jacobinism. This (far more intense) phenomenon had made, for its nation, what the publicists wanted for theirs: a "public" of "citizens"--even out of former peasants. Certainly the enemies of Italian rationalization were sure they smelled a guillotine behind the publicists' programs. For example, bishops and priests thought that the very idea of a public pre-school was "a plot against the good of society"--calculated to snatch babies "from the breast of the mother, their sole mistress . . ." and so on.[33]

Actually, one makes a comparison between Jacobins and publicists so as to learn something from unmaking it.

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[32]Quoted in <u>ibid</u>., p. 309. If this appears to contradict the earlier statement that "everyone seeks to imitate with his own means Great Britain," it is only because Great Britain was a country of contradictions: ". . . a country truely portentous, where immense wealth is coupled with fatal misery . . . a country where the most liberal, the most reasonable, the most admirable institutions, exist along with insulting privileges, greedy monopolies, barbarous laws . . ."

[33]Quoted in <u>ibid</u>., pp. 243-44.

These early Italian moderates were energetic, enlightened, progressive, on economic questions (the Jacobins were not, necessarily), and ready, moreover, to consider the relationship between national unity and economic progress. They had been led, as a result, to seek the meaning of a national "public" and, unhappily, to acknowledge the likelihood that most Italians would not join one on their own. Yet, once having reached this insight, they had to stop. In contrast to the Jacobins, they were not ready to develop the relationship between cultural discontinuities and "social questions." On poverty, on exploitation, on landlessness and the *latifondi*, they were mostly silent. According to *their* social reality, such questions would be adequately answered by the new nation, which, they believed, had every chance of unleashing great prosperity with one exception--should it emerge out of new relations between the social classes. Indeed, until after 1848, the publicists were not necessarily active as a *political* force. When they came into their own in this respect, it was under the label of "moderates."

Young Italy

The democratic rationalizers of Italian society had a different history and different values from the publicists or moderates of Lombardy and Piedmont. For example, they frequently were, at least potentially, committed to republican institutions. If they can be said to have represented "interests" these were the interests of the mushrooming

professions, small and medium proprietors, officials, some new manufacturers, a few young noblemen, and especially students and teachers in the universities.[34] According to Hobsbawm, "the advance guard of middle class nationalism fought its battle along the line which marked the educational progress of large numbers of 'new men' into areas hitherto occupied by a small elite. The progress of schools and universities measures that of nationalism, just as schools and especially universities became its most conscious champions."[35]

Like the moderates, the center of gravity for the democrats was in northern Italy. However, they had better contacts with patriotic groups throughout the peninsula and were more likely to succeed in certain northern cities than in others. The relationship between Genoa, a merchant city with a fairly articulate middle class and artisan population, and Turin, the seat of the House of Savoy, was indicative. The democrats were concentrated in the former city, while Turin became a headquarters for the moderates.[36]

Outstanding among the democratic movements were the brotherhoods of the _Carbonari_, named for a charcoal burning ritual. They were originally founded by dissident (and

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[34]Hobsbawm, _The Age of Revolution . . ._, pp. 132-35.

[35]_Ibid._, p. 135.

[36]Bolton King, _A History of Italian Unity, Being a Political History of Italy, 1814-1871_ (London: James Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 1899), I, pp. 48-49.

republican) French soldiers, angry at Napoleon's effort to bring masonic fraternities under the Empire's surveillance. Sometime after 1808, south Italians copied the brotherhoods, using them first against the occupying army, then, with the assistance of its officers, against the restored Bourbon monarch.[37]

The purposes of Carbonarism are difficult to ascertain, because the movement, at least initially, represented a variety of forces. In southern Italy, insurrections were plotted in order to force the King to grant a constitution and the Church to relinquish its land.[38] Professional men and intellectuals--the educated classes--understood these demands in terms of their own careers, and their own interest in land, but also in terms of the ideals of the Enlightenment, which they believed in. They were joined by numerous new landowners, and would-be landowners, whose main concern was that the government protect the grain market from foreign competition and refrain from taxing them unduly.[39] Some of

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[37]Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution . . ., p. 115; Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels . . ., pp. 163-64; Massimo Salvadori, Cavour and the Unification of Italy (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1962), pp. 31-32.

[38]Ibid., p. 32; George T. Romani, The Neapolitan Revolution of 1820-21 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1950), p. 11.

[39]Ibid., pp. 11-12 and 21-22.
"The land tax had been introduced by the French rulers, but the resentment against it had been eased under their administration by the provision that unprofitable lands were exempt from taxation. Medici [Ferdinand's Minister of Finance] allowed no exceptions and in addition did nothing to make

these people came from intellectual and professional careers in the cities. Most of them, however, were "intermediaries"--at the time, or in the past, brokers, managers, chief tenants, gabelloti (middlemen or labor contractors) for the old landowners.[40] They were in some respects a progressive force, seeking in particular the redistribution of land. But they were also intellectually out of touch with Western Europe. It is interesting, too, that where members of the educated classes acquired land, they became rather like these intermediaries. With somewhat more interest in cash than the older landowners, they replaced them without transforming the economic organization of the countryside.[41]

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the lands more profitable, ignoring, for example, the plight of the grain farmers who were faced at this time by the competition of great amounts of cheap grain which began to flow out of Odessa once the war blockades were lifted. Instead of instituting the protective tariff demanded by provincial councils or reducing taxes on farmers who could not meet the foreign competition, Medici strongly emphasized the land tax and insisted upon its strict collection."

[40]For a detailed discussion of these intermediaries and their mobility in the early nineteenth century, see infra, pp. 128-38. In passing, it should be noted that the word gabelloti is sometimes spelled gabellotti, though more often in English than Italian sources.

[41]Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution . . ., pp. 157-58. "Why should even a middle class purchaser--a city lawyer, merchant or speculator--in economically undeveloped and inaccessible areas saddle himself with the investment and trouble of transforming landed property into a soundly run business enterprise, instead of merely taking the place, from which he had been hitherto debarred, of the former noble or clerical landlord . . . ?" Also see John S. and Leactrice MacDonald, "Institutional Economics and Rural Development: Two Italian Types," Human Organization, XXIII (Summer, 1964), pp. 114-15.

To the extent that new landowners and intermediaries participated in the brotherhoods, the ideals of the Enlightenment failed to dominate them. As one went north in the peninsula, however, the participation of these people diminished. For one thing, more landowners--new and old--lived in the cities and belonged to the educated classes. For another, the influence of Western Europe was greater. Consequently, unlike in the South, the *Carbonari* of the North represented quite explicitly the demands of the intellectual "front." Before 1848, this included some moderates as well as democrats.[42] Both were involved in several Carbonarist insurrections--at Turin in 1820; in Modena, at Bologna, and other cities of the (northern) Papal State, in 1830-31. Yet, in the course of the early nineteenth century, this alliance, like so many others, broke down. The risings of 1830 were directed by democratic elements and, in their wake, the democrats, but not the intermediaries or the moderates, inherited the tradition of insurrection. The risings of 1848-49--at Milan, Venice, Florence, Rome, and in the South--were led by them. In fact, the democrats thereafter decried the complicity of moderates (in the North) and intermediaries (in the South) with representatives of reaction.

In 1831, the democrats achieved an identity apart from the *Carbonari* as Giuseppe Mazzini and a nucleus of

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[42]Salvadori, *Cavour . . .*, pp. 32-36.

exiles from the risings of that year founded an organization called Young Italy at Marseilles. Its purposes were to protest the "ineptitude" of Carbonarist leaders and to free the Risorgimento from unreliable French support.[43] In 1830, French revolutionaries and Carbonarists had been undercut by the increasing conservatism of bourgeois liberals in their own country. France was abandoning her role as the "revolutionary nexus" of the world. When Austrian troops entered the Papal State to put down the risings in its cities, the French Army, earlier promised to the insurrection, backed instead another "restoration of order." Without France, Carbonarism, for purposes of insurrection, was dead.[44]

The organization of Young Italy departed somewhat from the highly select and secret lodges of the *Carbonari*--called in masonic vocabulary, the *Vendite*. A deliberate effort was made to introduce some flexibility into the new

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[43]Edward Elton Young Hales, *Mazzini and the Secret Societies: The Making of a Myth* (New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1956), p. 59; Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution . . .*, p. 120. Hobsbawm, much more sympathetic to the traditions of the French Revolution than to Italian nationalism, perceives the contrast this way:

> ". . . A nationalist reaction against the Francocentric internationalism of the Carbonarist period gained ground, an emotion which fitted well into the new fashion of romanticism which captured much of the left after 1830: there is no sharper contrast than that between the reserved eighteenth century music master and rationalist Buonarroti [a Carbonarist leader] and the woolly and ineffective self-dramatizer Joseph Mazzini . . . ."

[44]*Ibid.*, pp. 117-20.

brotherhoods, to reduce the hierarchical gradings of their memberships, and turn them into something like "clubs."[45] In practice, however, members retained chosen pseudonyms and the practice of gathering in secret. The exigencies of insurrection forced them to keep the older patterns; to be _de facto_ less than democratic.[46] Their program, on the other hand, was obviously more advanced. The brotherhoods of Young Italy sought the liberation of the entire peninsula from foreign rule and its incorporation, through universal suffrage, under a secular, and Italian, republic. Social justice would be the purpose of the new government; Rome, relieved of the Temporal Power of the Pope, would be its capital.

In many ways, the nationalism expressed by Young Italy broke with the Enlightenment synthesis in which freedom, progress, nationalism, and internationalism were held in one coherent framework. Under the Mazzinians, nationalism was formulated as a patriotic mission: a people would not claim its rights, but would fulfill its duties--if necessary against another, possibly inferior, people. "Through Italy . . . the suffering peoples of the world were to be led to freedom."[47] At the same time, socialism in Western Europe

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[45]Hales, _Mazzini and the Secret Societies . . ._, pp. 60-69.

[46]Hobsbawm, _Primitive Rebels . . ._, pp. 170-71; Hobsbawm, _The Age of Revolution . . ._, p. 126.

[47]_Ibid._, p. 133.

became the heir of internationalism, which it turned to a new effort: the organization of workers as a class. The contradiction was especially pronounced in 1848, when Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto for a "brotherhood" of itinerant journeymen, steeped in the Vendite tradition. The journeymen were German, but residents of the world's historic "revolutionary nexus": Paris. Countries like Italy had yet a long way to go under the auspices of non-socialist--and anti-socialist--leaders. Mazzini, appropriately, was an arch enemy of materialism and of the class struggle and, after 1850, devoted a lot of energy to containing the diffusion of socialism in Italy.[48]

When compared to the European socialists, and especially to the Marxists, the Mazzinians lose the rationalizing impetus that we have identified with them. For one thing, they were philosophical romantics and rejected, along with internationalism, some of the rationalist premises of the Enlightenment. They were religious where the *philosophes* had been agnostic and, as it turned out, divorced from the revolutionary mainstream which engulfed both their forerunners and the Marxists. Yet in the social science of traditional and legal-rational categories, rationalism has a more inclusive meaning than that expressed, either by the Enlightenment or by revolutionary socialism. Durkheim and Weber, the nineteenth century social theorists who contributed

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[48]Gaetano Salvemini, *Mazzini*, trans. I. M. Rawson (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), pp. 169-74.

most to the development of gemeinschaft-gesellschaft dualisms, made very clear their break with both the individualistic and contract-based rationalism of the eighteenth century and the rationalizing process which Marx and Engels understood in terms of economic determinism and the proletarian revolution.[49] Their interpretation of what Weber called "rational bourgeois capitalism" emphasized a society which existed somewhere in between. It was based neither on individual contracts nor on classlessness. What made it modern, or rational, (especially for Durkheim), was a complex set of developments all of which the Mazzinians more or less advocated for Italy. One of these was the acceptance and incorporation of an expanding division of labor; another, a radical break with traditionalism.[50] (The Mazzinians were militantly anti-clerical, although "religious.") A third was the re-integration of society on

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[49]Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 200-206; Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937), p. 311 and pp. 503-16. According to Parsons, Weber's bureaucracy was equivalent to the class struggle in Marx.

> "This shift has one most important concrete result: in contradistinction to Marx and most 'liberal' theories, it strongly minimizes the differences between capitalism and socialism, emphasizing rather their continuity . . . . This important difference of perspective is, indeed, closely connected with Weber's attempt to appraise the modern order in terms of a very broad comparative framework." (P. 509.)

[50]For Weber, the break was made initially and spontaneously only within the confines of ascetic Protestantism.

grounds as solid and nourishing as those of traditionalism only at another, more complex or "secondary" level. One of the crucial mechanisms for this re-integration was the voluntary association, which bound individuals together on the basis of their occupational and professional roles and connected them to the wider institutions of their society.[51] Along with the voluntary association, the nation state, developing simultaneously with liberated individuals, provided a foundation both for safeguarding their liberty and integrating their lives afresh along modern or rational lines.[52] Mazzini's nationalism, and his pronouncements on the "spirit of association," place him, it seems to me, securely within this tradition--a tradition which, incidentally, is profitably traced to Rosseau.

Now, Mazzini called himself a socialist and was influenced by Saint-Simon.[53] The materialism which repelled him was not exclusively that of the European socialists; on the contrary, it was more precisely the materialism of a seemingly premature (individualistic and contract-oriented) bourgeois society. "The doctrine of human rights," he wrote, "is, in essense, only a great and sacred protest in the face

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[51]Durkheim, The Division of Labor . . ., pp. 402-409; Edward A. Tiryakian, Sociologism and Existentialism: Two Perspectives on the Individual and Society (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 61-63.

[52]Ibid., pp. 58-59; Durkheim, The Division of Labor . . ., pp. 220-27.

[53]Salvemini, Mazzini, pp. 160-68.

of every tyrant . . . . Strong in destruction, it is powerless to build up. It can break fetters, but cannot forge the bonds of harmonious work and love." Accordingly, individual rights, "if not harmonized and guided by a common faith in a divine moral law, must lead sooner or later to a reciprocal clash of interests; and all defense of injured rights assumes an aspect of warfare and revenge."[54]

The Mazzinian solution paralleled Durkheim's; a re-integrated moral order would come through the "principle of association."[55] Critical associations would be producers' and consumers' cooperatives in which capital and labor could be joined. "The workers' associations, free, spontaneous, varied in character and founded upon sacrifice, virtue, love and upon economic principles [the division of labor], must gradually transform the present constitution of labor . . . . Voluntary association among the workers [must] replace, as peacefully and progressively as possible, individual paid work at the mercy of the capitalists."[56]

In other words, Mazzini was as much impressed as the publicists with the spirit of association--DeToqueville's "queen of the sciences" and the "social ideal" of Europe. His proposals did not necessitate a class struggle or the

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[54]Quoted in ibid., pp. 26-27.

[55]Ibid., pp. 48-49. "From the principle of Association Mazzini deduces the whole future of mankind, religious, political, social and intellectual."

[56]Quoted in ibid., pp. 52-53.

collective ownership of the means of production. The influence of Saint-Simon is evident here: a bourgeoisie which contributed to society--which was not idle or privileged out of proportion to the work it performed--was entirely acceptable. It too would be organized in voluntary associations, through which it could demonstrate its social responsibility. It would, for instance, participate on boards of conciliation aimed at the peaceable solution of labor disputes.[57] A nation state, in turn, was not the right arm of a ruling class, or destined for extinction, but the most comprehensive level of integration for a varied associational life.[58] The principle of association no more contradicted the bourgeoisie than it did the division of labor. Its purpose was to "humanize" them both.[59]

The overriding fault with the middle class, as Mazzini saw it, was the rapacious egotism of the individuals composing it. Who owned and controlled the means of production was a secondary concern. Young Italy was itself a middle class movement. Much of its action occurred in an arena where the enemy was not "the bourgeoisie" but "the

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[57] Ibid., pp. 51-55.

[58] Ibid., pp. 50-51. Mazzini wrote, "Our future lies in association, in unity of belief and of endeavor; this is what constitutes a Nation."

[59] Mazzini's efforts to implement the principles of association and "class collaboration" came largely after 1860. They are discussed briefly in Maurice F. Neufeld, Italy: School for Awakening Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 57-58 and 89-96.

countryside." The Mazzinian antagonism toward the moderates was in response to their propensity for compromise with "reaction"--with monarchs, for instance, and with the papacy. Furthermore, where the Mazzinians were in conflict with "bourgeois society," it was in part the peculiar Italian society of "middlemen"--the intermediaries--that repelled them. It has been said of Mazzini that he did not know Italy very well and that what he knew he never liked.[60] As a participant in rationalization, this is not surprising. He stood in opposition, not only to the traditional enemies of reform, but to an alternative development that would eventually render the full scale of his proposed reforms unnecessary. When we reach our evaluation of that development, it will be necessary to emphasize the extent to which it devalued the principle of association, so central--though for different reasons--to both moderate and democratic forces.

The Volunteer Army

One of the men to meet Mazzini in a Marseilles suburb after the risings of 1831 was Giuseppe Garibaldi--a Piedmontese who had become a sea captain because education was "geared to the manufacture of laywers and priests rather

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[60] Salvemini, *Mazzini*, pp. 155-56 and 189-92. Also see John A. Thayer, *Italy and the Great War: Politics and Culture, 1870-1915* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 10.

than of good citizens and soldiers."[61] One of the first insurrections of the Young Italians marked his debut in the Risorgimento. It took place at Genoa in 1834 and was not only a failure, but severely repressed by the Military Governors of Piedmont.[62] Garibaldi's part was to agitate in the Piedmontese Navy, and for it he had to go into exile. The Mazzinians who fled to France could not contain his spirit, however, and (at the age of 26) he sailed for South America. He would not return until 1848 when the democrats launched the most serious of all the insurrections of the Risorgimento. Then, on the basis of his experience in South America, he would come back to organize and lead an army of "volunteers."

Garibaldi's choice of political asylum was not unlikely. There were already communities of Italian adventurers in the cities of South America. Many had gone to get rich; others, especially those who attached themselves to Garibaldi, were soldiers. They participated in the revolutionary movements of the South American countries and, in this way, learned the art of irregular warfare. It was largely as irregular soldiers that the Garibaldians contributed to the Risorgimento.[63]

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[61] Denis Mack Smith, _Garibaldi, A Great Life in Brief_ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 5-6.

[62] _Ibid._, p. 9; Salvadori, _Cavour . . ._, p. 42; King, _A History of Italian Unity . . ._, pp. 136-43.

[63] Mack Smith, _Garibaldi . . ._, pp. 11-29. Also see Charles Arrivabene, _Italy Under Victor Emmanuel: A Personal_

It may seem peculiar to include Garibaldi in a discussion of rationalizing forces. The exile in South America put him in touch with extreme cases of adventurism and with another society in which evolutionary developments did not conform to the European framework.[64] Moreover, Garibaldi was much impressed with the _caudillos_ of South America--the self-styled dictators who, with their retainers, could impose a personal order on political chaos. Characteristically these dictators came from the interstices of society and had received their "training" in the exercise of power as intermediaries _par excellence_.[65] They were none of them

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Narrative (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1862), I, p. 55. "The secret of Garibaldi's victories is to be found principally in the system he has adopted of doing almost always the contrary of that which is suggested by the strict rules of war . . . ."

[64]I mention this because Weber took great care to distinguish various forms of "adventurism" from the spirit of rational capitalism. Where the former had a "profiteering" quality, the latter was based upon a general and disciplined acquisitiveness; on profit making in a "continuous, rationally conducted, enterprise." See Parsons, _The Structure of Social Action_, pp. 503-16, and Weber, _The Theory of Social and Economic Organization_, pp. 278-80.

[65]See Wolf, _Sons of the Shaking Earth_, pp. 233-48, for a description of the intermediaries (the mestizos) who eventually controlled the Mexican Revolution.

> ". . . Paradoxically, the very weakness of the mestizos, their very alienation from society, spelled subterranean strength. As society abdicated to them its informal and unacknowledged business, they became brokers and carriers of the multiple transactions that caused the blood to flow through the veins of the social organism. Beneath the formal veneer of Spanish colonial government and economic organization, their fingers wove the network of social relations and communication through which alone men could bridge the gaps between formal institutions." (P. 243.)

middle class in the Western European sense; yet they filled the vacuum that had resulted from the withdrawal of the Spanish Crown in the eighteenth century, and as a result took power, like middle classes, in a national arena.[66] The differences in style were considerable, however, and one would call them "rationalizers" of the social order only with important reservations. Like the European nation builders, they forced their allies into the enclaves of an older order, freeing men and materials for circulation and breaking down the "traditional" means of sustenance and protection. On the other hand, their style was to make capital out of the process of circulation itself, and there was little basis for committing the freed resources to a growth of "rational bourgeois capitalism."[67]

There is another respect in which Garibaldi's contribution to the Risorgimento stands outside the formula established for development by the experience of Western Europe. Like the irregular soldiers and legionnaires in South America, the Italian volunteers shaded off into what Wolf has called a "social shadow-world": pirates, smugglers,

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[66] Ibid., pp. 241-42.
"Denied his patrimony by society, the mestizo was yet destined to be its heir and receiver. Superficially, this rise to power resembles the experience of the European middle classes and their emancipation in a series of 'bourgeois' revolutions. But the mestizo mass was not a middle class, or a class at all--if class be defined in terms of differential access to the means of production."

[67] Ibid., pp. 242-43 and 252-56.

bandits, speculators, fixers, "soldiers of fortune." In Mediterranean cultures, where the interstices of society are wide and well populated, types like these are rarely negligible in military operations.[68] The conservative myths of Garibaldi's army often hint at subterranean links with contraband and crime.

However, in other Garibaldian myths, the general is a perfect hero--untouched by "practical politics" or the exigencies of mediation and compromise. Rather, he is equal to Mazzini as an idealist. There is evidence for this image, as there is for the other. Garibaldi's interest in dictatorship, for instance, derived largely from his distrust of "politicians." In his view, parliamentary debates were an immense waste of time; parliamentary institutions a kind of mask for corruption. After national unification, he sometimes sat as a deputy, only to resign in disgust having

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[68]*Ibid.*, p. 237. A reason for the width of social interstices in Central and South America is suggested by the fact that

> "there was little correspondence between law and reality in the utopian order of the New Spain. The crown wished to deny the colonist his own supply of labor; the colonist obtained it illegally by attaching peons to his person and his land. Royal prescript supported the trade monopoly over goods flowing in and out of the colony; but along the edges of the law moved smugglers, cattle rustlers, bandits, the buyers and sellers of clandestine produce. To blind the eyes of the law, there arose a multitude of scribes, lawyers, go-betweens, influence peddlars, and under-cover agents, the *coyotes* of modern Middle America . . . . In such a society, even the transactions of everyday life would smack of illegality; yet such illegality was the stuff of which this social order was made."

reconfirmed his preference for action.[69] Dictatorship did not attract him because he was a caudillo; it seemed to be necessary because he was idealistic.[70] In this context, the participation of the "shadow world" in the volunteer army becomes more or less irrelevant. Garibaldi had no more to do with adventurers and brigands than would any other general who had to fight amongst them.

The Garibaldi-as-idealist myth raises, of course, the issue of his ideals. Were they antithetical to traditional values, either from a moderate or democratic perspective? Were they rooted at all in the Enlightenment? The questions are difficult ones because Garibaldi, while idealistic, was not a man of ideas. It is clear that he was heavily influenced by Mazzini and in touch with him throughout his South American exile. However, after 1848-49, Garibaldi became linked to the moderates and, in the war of 1859 against Austria, he fought for them.[71] What is important is not that he himself was inconsistent on certain issues--monarchy and republic; democracy and liberalism--but that he was, in any case, an instrument of rationalizing forces. He had, as we will see, only short-lived and

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[69] Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., pp. 115-19.

[70] See Carlo Tivaroni, "Garibaldi e la dottrina della dittatura," Rivista storica del Risorgimento italiano, II (1897), pp. 668-74.

[71] "I know the Italian masses better than Mazzini does," Garibaldi once said. "Mazzini knows only an intellectual Italy." Quoted in Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., p. 53.

peripheral attachments to the networks of intermediaries that represented the indigenous evolution, especially in southern Italy. His relations with both the Mazzinians and the moderates were less than satisfactory from time to time--but they were the relations that counted for his major contributions to the Risorgimento.

This interpretation should be consistent with the composition and activities of the volunteer army. However, it is as difficult to speak to these points as to Garibaldi's ideals, because the army was in a twilight zone of military organization. Most of those who joined it were sons of the intellectual and professional middle classes, often students, and largely north Italians.[72] During the course of the Risorgimento they came and went, in larger numbers when the adult population was sympathetic; in trickles when it was hostile or afraid. Because of their youth, the volunteers had no special social stamp. Most of them were patriotic and committed to the unification of Italy. Sometimes they were escapees from service in the Austrian Army; frequently they anticipated land as a reward. More than this, their youth precludes our knowing.[73]

Actually the nature of irregular warfare as pursued by Garibaldi was a better indicator of his standing with

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[72] _Ibid._, pp. 91-92.

[73] Garibaldi's staff, however, was more or less constant, and many of the same officers who served with him in South America directed volunteer units in 1848-49.

the forces for rationalization than was the composition of his army. For at the bottom of his military activities one finds a fundamental separation of soldiers from peasants. Unlike the intermediaries, the Garibaldians had few connections in the countryside or with the peasant population. From Garibaldi's autobiography, we learn of the peasants that:

> This stalwart and laborious class belongs to the priests, who make it their business to keep it in ignorance. I do not know a single instance of one of its members being seen among the volunteers. They serve in the army, but only when forced to do so; and form the most effectual tools of despotism and priestcraft.[74]

It should be noted, too, that on several occasions, beginning in South America, the Garibaldians sanctioned the repression of peasants by considerable brutality.[75]

The barrier which Garibaldi discovered between his forces and the peasantry was of the utmost importance to the democratic Risorgimento. It meant that a successful guerilla-type operation was impossible. The volunteers found the peasants difficult to requisition food or shelter from and more likely to be informers for the enemy than on it. As a result, volunteer units were all the more dependent on other sources of supply. Their irregularity, however, made other sources difficult to come by. Volunteers were

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[74] The Autobiography of Giuseppe Garibaldi, trans. A. Werner (London: W. Smith & Innes, 1899), II, 1849-1872, p. 147.

[75] Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., pp. 17-18.

not the immediate instrument of a state, as regular armies are. In fact, governments and regular armies lent their assistance to Garibaldi largely under the pressure of his immense popularity. In general, they preferred to absorb volunteers for their own purposes, training them as regular soldiers.[76]

The usual result of a crisis of supply was that it intensified the irregular qualities of fighting beyond the point where they could be useful. In contrast to a regular army, an irregular one relies for discipline less on military training than on morale. In any army, morale is vulnerable to short supplies, civilian hostility, or defeat. But, in an irregular army, the lack of experience and training increases the vulnerability. In the case of the volunteers, the best antidote seemed to be to keep the initiative through a series of small, but sharp, thrusts, even where this meant the sacrifice of broader strategies.[77] When they were not successful in major encounters, the raw young recruits had a tendency to panic or desert. Then the only means of discipline was the exemplary punishment or humiliation of cowards--a worthless gesture when supplies were short or victories not forthcoming.[78]

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[76] *Infra*, pp. 118-19.

[77] Mack Smith, *Garibaldi . . .*, pp. 18 and 23.

[78] For a description of Garibaldi employing this means of discipline, see Giuseppe Cesare Abba, *The Diary of*

The Failure

The military vulnerability of the Garibaldians indicated something quite fundamental about the limitations on rationalizing processes in Italy. If the peasantry had been apathetic, or unaware of the political struggle that transpired around them, then the absence of any coordination between their leaders and the volunteers would not have mattered. But the changes which had been occurring since the eighteenth century, and especially since the beginning of the French occupation, affected peasants too. Indeed, where communal lands were sold, or markets widened, or cash used more extensively than other modes of exchange (and credit harder to come by), peasants suffered greatly. Some were forced into landlessness, others into debt, and peasant risings against new landowners became, especially in the South, a not uncommon event.[79]

One of Garibaldi's Thousand, trans. E. R. Vincent (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 154.

> "There was a shudder as three officers, called by name into the centre of the square, came forth from the ranks. I don't know how they found the strength to take the few necessary steps forward and not fall struck down by shame. Under the General's eyes they were then stripped of their badges or rank by a Major acting as adjutant . . . . Garibaldi continued to speak to them as if he were saying farewell to the dead: 'Go, fall on your knees before your Commandant and beg him to give you a rifle, and when next you confront the enemy, see that you die.'"

[79] Infra, pp. 140-41.

Now, to the extent that the peasants were agitated, it was a serious matter not to have them on the right side. Hobsbawm, taking a cue from Lenin, suggests that "the peasantry never provides a political alternative to anyone; merely, as occasion dictates, an almost irresistable force or an almost immovable object."[80] In Italy, the forces of "reaction" were able to use the peasants with some effectiveness against the patriots, the Carbonarists, the democrats, and so on. Conservative forces included the policing and military arms of the Austrian Empire and the Bourbon Monarchy. In some areas, the most significant manipulator of peasant rebellion was the Church. Priests and bishops were frequently acquainted with popular heroes of the peasants--usually bandits who led "armies" of loyal henchmen. Members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy also organized secret societies, which they called by various names, but which became known generally as "Sanfedist" alliances. During periods of reaction, or restoration, the societies deliberately encouraged peasants to make holy and terrible war on Godless representatives of the Enlightenment.[81] Characteristic in southern Italy from the time of the French occupation, Sanfedism was also of general concern to all rationalizers. Especially did those under the yoke of Rome

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[80]Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution . . ., p. 63.

[81]Ibid., p. 81; Romani, The Neapolitan Revolution . . ., pp. 16-17; King, A History of Italian Unity . . ., I, pp. 141-43.

come to fear it. Rationalization was obviously difficult when the counter-revolution had the social base.

The peasants were not alone to rise in potential opposition to the Risorgimento. The same changes that had affected their lives made an impact in the cities too. There a stratum which Hobsbawm identifies as the "sub-proletariat" frequently rose, though not for the same reasons as the equally urban brotherhoods of the Carbonari, or the democratic clubs. In fact, like the peasants, people in this stratum were more easily directed by Church and King against the brotherhoods and clubs. As late as 1848, in fact, the Trasteverini of Rome and the Lazzaroni of Naples were loyal to the counter-revolution.[82] These particular sub-proletariats were sufficiently organized, on the basis of their respective neighborhoods, to riot periodically for charity from Pope or King and to riot definitively in favor of these figures when their courts were endangered by alien and Godless men.[83]

An interesting quality of peasant risings and risings of the urban poor was the extent of spontaneous coordination that they appeared to express. Rarely were they isolated events; indeed, the biggest explosions coincided with major European upheavals. There is a provocative interpretation of this, suggested by a French economic historian, Ernest

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[82]Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels . . ., pp. 108-25.

[83]Ibid., pp. 114-18.

Labrousse, and pursued by Hobsbawm in a discussion of social movements that covers Italy.[84] Both authors emphasize the effects of market fluctuations on subsistence populations in the pre-industrial world. Economic expansion, in particular, is held to radically impinge upon the underdeveloped poor.[85] Alterations in prices, or wages, or revenues, all of which are beyond their control and comprehension, are especially significant for affecting wide areas at the same time. A single cycle can result in "catastrophic and simultaneous increases in misery for most of the working population."[86] In contrast to a mature economy, where economic cycles are limited in their impact and unemployment can coincide with an adequate food supply and high wages, the pre-industrial cycle begins with a depression in agriculture which is instantly transferred to urban populations. They experience an inflation of food prices and a cut in the domestic market for their products. Wages are quickly reduced and workers laid-off. Marketing mechanisms break down and the peasants fear a famine. Regardless of the

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[84]E. J. Hobsbawm, "Economic Fluctuations and Some Social Movements Since 1800," Economic History Review, V (August, 1952), pp. 1-25. On Labrousse, see Tilly, Social Problems, XII, pp. 103-106.

[85]According to the analysis which Labrousse did for France, periods of economic expansion "usually squeeze the workers and small peasants unmercifully, while immensely profiting the holders of land and capital." See ibid., p. 104.

[86]Hobsbawm, Economic History Review, V, p. 5.

subsequent harvest, but especially if it is very good or very bad, the situation "almost compells rioting."[87]

The relationship between the poor and the Italian Risorgimento is a fascinating one and, it seems to me, extremely complicated. Because of their "increasing misery" peasants and workers were sometimes the initial stimulus for vast social and political events. Vast events could also "ignite" the poor, since they were generally "inflammable," in many places at once. (News from revolutionary centers travelled with surprising speed in those days.) The interaction between political movements and the poor therefore went in two directions. Each could force the other into action, depending on the state of the market and the configuration of political forces. One notes throughout the Risorgimento how carefully the democrats kept an eye on rural towns in Sicily--an area especially prone to risings.[88] Ironically, though, it was the democrats rather than the

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[87]Ibid., pp. 5-7. Also see Tilly, Social Problems, XII, p. 104.

> ". . . Labrousse is very much concerned with the social conditions . . . which can mobilize a large number of people simultaneously. . . . His analyses of the period 1750-1850 . . . identify economic crises as the essential animators of political disturbances. Furthermore, these analyses strongly imply that misery (especially a sharp increase in misery) tends to erupt directly into political disturbance . . . ."

[88]See King, A History of Italian Unity . . ., p. 146. "The stamina of the population, the hatred of the government which showed itself in almost yearly outbreaks, the distance from the Austrian garrison--all pointed to the island as a fitting starting point for revolution . . . ."

moderates, or the reforming monarchs, who had the greatest difficulty with the peasant population. They were the ones who were committed to social justice, yet when their representatives, on a few notable occasions, attempted to bring justice to the countryside, they were murdered by peasants.[89] It is necessary to emphasize this antagonism because, in 1848-49, it made a considerable difference. In those years, the democrats clearly had the initiative in insurrections. In the long run, however, they could not defend their conquests. This was true in spite of the special military talents of the volunteers.

As we noted earlier, the democrats inherited a tradition of insurrection from the secret brotherhoods of the Carbonari. The nature of these organizations and their methods of rising were indicative of a general, and serious, isolation from "the masses." The secrecy of the brotherhoods served several purposes, the least significant of which was to camouflage their activities.[90] Secrecy and ritual were

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[89] Salvadori, Cavour . . ., p. 42; Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution . . ., pp. 136-37.

[90] Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels . . ., p. 166.

> "Secret revolutionary organizations persecuted, for good reasons, by governments, must naturally take steps to preserve Security . . . . But it is reasonably clear that the requirements of illegality, as understood today, account only for part of the remarkable fancy-dress display which the classical brotherhoods put on . . . . The police agent De la Hodde observes in passing that the French brotherhoods only became genuinely secret when their membership became proletarian, that is from the policeman's point of view, anonymous . . . . The lengthy and elaborate rituals of the Carbonari . . . were standing invitations to policemen."

closely connected and constantly reinforced the bonds between men who had come together, as adults, by choice. In this way, the brotherhoods set themselves in radical opposition to all of those human associations that people belong to by birth. The Church could demonstrate to peasants that the Carbonari were not only against God, but family and community as well.[91] Furthermore, secrecy and ritual reinforced the exclusiveness of the brotherhoods. Communications were often made to depend on the ability to read and write, and insurrections were planned by a small elite. According to Hobsbawm, the classical rising took place when the exclusive and sworn minority, upon receiving "news" of a rising elsewhere, took over the center of administration in its city or town, hoping that "the people," known to be excited, would follow them, but prepared to enact certain constitutional reforms, regardless. Because the counter-revolt would invariably come from the countryside, their first moves included an effort to stimulate risings in the surrounding towns and to organize a civic guard for their own protection.[92] Beyond this, Carbonarism could not go, and its only successes--which were temporary at that--took place where the armies of the Restoration were honeycombed with brotherhoods of demoted "liberal" officers.[93]

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[91] Ibid., pp. 150-62.

[92] Ibid., pp. 165-66.

[93] Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution . . ., pp. 114-16.

The classical rising belongs within the context of European patterns of development in the sense that progress is made in the towns and smothered in the countryside. Whether or not this was always true of Carbonarism is an interesting question, because of the significant participation of non-bourgeois "middlemen" (who did have contacts with the peasants) in its early, and south Italian, branches. In any case, it became truer as one went north in Italy and as the upheavals of mid-century approached. In the rising at Bologna in 1830, the sworn minority consisted of intellectuals for whom the peasantry was the potential weapon of the priests.[94]

That insurrection, however, marked a turning point. The conspirators captured the Papal Legation in Bologna and captured towns as close to Rome as Terni. An "Assembly of the Free Provinces of Italy" was constituted before the revolt was finally repressed. By now the limitations of conspiracy and exclusiveness--forever bringing a few concessions and an intolerable police action--were obvious. As we have seen, Young Italy was founded in 1831 in part to contradict the brotherhoods of the _Carbonari_.

Yet Young Italy, for all of its attempts to create a more democratic structure--to form, infiltrate, perpetuate, democratic clubs; even to organize the artisans--remained

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[94]King, _A History of Italian Unity . . ._, pp. 72-85.

essentially in the Carbonarist tradition.[95] For one thing, its central committee was much of the time in exile--usually in London--responding to events when it was too late to control them.[96] More important, however, the Mazzinians had no connections with the peasantry.[97] And since the Garibaldians didn't either, they could not rely on their chief politico-military allies to bridge the gulf that separated town from country. The Mazzinians, too, had a problem of supply. There was a restriction on the quantity of men and resources that they could mobilize for the nation state. In a sense, their own associations were the virtual limit of the "associational life" that they were seeking.

The events of 1848-49 were stimulated by cumulative years of agricultural depression which "swept across the

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[95]Mazzini's account of how the Roman Republic of 1849 should have been defended against reactionary forces is indicative:

> "The idea of prolonging the struggle, so long as a man and gun remained, was to my mind so elementary, that I proposed, so soon as matters should become desperate in Rome itself, that we Triumvirs [executives of the Republic], accompanied by the ministers, the Assembly (or if not all of it, a numerous delegation), and such of the population as might choose to follow us, should issue forth from the city in company with our little army, by which means its movements would be given a legal authority and prestige in the eyes of the populations."

See Mazzini, Life, Writings, and Political Principles (New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1872), pp. 322-27.

[96]King, A History of Italian Unity . . ., pp. 136-37.

[97]Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels . . ., pp. 170-71. "The isolation of the urban Carbonari and the Mazzinians from the bulk of the Italian peasantry is legendary. They were rationalist--in ideology, if not in organization--at a time when the potentially revolutionary masses were held by traditional religion."

continent from the middle 1840s."[98] Harvests failed; the cost of living, rates of unemployment, prices of food, all rose. In January of 1848 (the month of the Communist Manifesto), Sicilians rebelled against the Kingdom of Naples, establishing a provisional government at Palermo under Mazzinian leadership. Liberals in Naples followed suit, exacting the promise of a constitution from the Bourbon, Ferdinand. Tuscany received a constitution in February, and the Piedmontese acquired one from their King, Charles Albert, in early March. Even the Pope granted one in that month.[99] Meanwhile, at the end of February, the Paris proletariat had gone to the barricades, to be joined by the national guard in the overthrow of Louis Philippe's bourgeois monarchy, and, shortly afterwards, the Second French Republic had been formed. As is well known, Paris was restored as a revolutionary center, and "combustible material" all over Europe responded accordingly.

In June, however, the universal suffrage established for the National Assembly of the Second Republic returned deputies who were more conservative (and Catholic) than the Parisians who had made the revolution. Social programs--especially for the unemployed--were undone and, when workers went to the barricades a second time, their demonstration was severely repressed. Louis Napoleon was elected to the

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[98]Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution . . ., p. 307.

[99]Salvadori, Cavour . . ., p. 50.

presidency of the Republic and within four years had undermined it by having himself, through a plebiscite, made Emperor.

Both the revolution and its reversals had a momentous effect on the rest of Europe. There, the chief symbol of reaction remained the Austrian Empire, which dominated over a variety of aspring national groups. When Italian patriots learned that Vienna had succumbed to a rising, they pushed for the expansion of what had already begun in the Two Sicilies, Tuscany, Piedmont, and Rome. Risings occurred in numerous cities and towns under Austrian control, the most significant being the ones which expelled Austrian troops from Venice and Milan.[100] In their wake, Charles Albert committed the Piedmontese Army to a war with Austria, and rulers in Tuscany, and even Naples, promised volunteers for the effort.[101] Moreover, the Pope--a "liberal" of sorts, elected by liberal cardinals in 1846--appeared to accept the pursuit of unification. Many Italian moderates, including several in his government, were not yet organized for autonomous political action and pinned their patriotic hopes on a papal, though national, government.[102]

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[100]In both of these Republics, a significant portion of the artisan population participated on the side of progress. See Delio Cantimori, "Italy," _The Opening of an Era, 1848_, ed. Francois Fejtö (London: A. Wingate, 1948), p. 119.

[101]Salvadori, _Cavour . . ._, p. 52.

[102]_Ibid._, pp. 44-47.

But the "June days" in Paris encouraged the Austrian Army--forced out of Milan and Venice in March--to regroup its forces. As it did so, the Pope, likewise aware that Catholics had "won" the French election, regrouped his. Volunteers were prevented from going to Piedmont from the Papal State.[103] The papacy announced that it could not support a war against a Catholic country. Other volunteers were subsequently restrained, first by the Bourbons in Naples, finally by the Tuscan Duke as well.[104] On August 6, Charles Albert signed an armistice that, for most purposes, ended the war. Whether this was because of a genuine defeat (at Custoza), perhaps caused by the lack of adequate volunteer forces, or because of a half-hearted commitment to begin with, depends upon one's point of view. The democrats were never convinced of the sincerity of monarchs and popes.

And, in fact, the democratic structure of the Italian liberation survived in certain key places for several months after the collapse of the war effort. In particular, the cities of Venice, Florence, and Rome--organized as republics under Mazzinian or quasi-Mazzinian leadership and defended by volunteers--refused to accept the Piedmontese surrender. As a result, they had to face the counter-revolution alone. In Venice, the last republic to fall, this meant a return to

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[103] _Ibid_., p. 53.

[104] _Ibid_. Leaders of the volunteers frequently crossed the necessary borders anyway, but with considerably reduced forces.

Austrian domination. In Florence, the Tuscan Duke was restored, also by Austrian soldiers. In Rome, the "liberal" Pope, who had fled at the end of 1848 when his constitutional government had fallen (by elections) to Mazzini and the democrats, came back in June of 1849, supported by the Austrians and, ironically, a contingent of 30,000 troops from France.[105] Although the Mazzinian government had lifted papal monopolies on salt and tobacco and attempted other programs of social reform, the _Trasteverini_ did not rise against the restoration of their Pope.

The overall pattern by which the republics of 1848-49 fell is marked by a kind of "Sanfedism." As one observer of the situation in Florence remarked, "the peasants are the sovereign people of Tuscany."[106] Volunteers who defended the republics discovered this to be generally true. They were called on to police the countryside but found their task impossible because of their lack of any viable relationship with the poor who lived there. Many volunteers deserted under the circumstances, and peasant invasions of the cities were always a possibility.[107] When the dukes and popes and Austrians returned, the peasants, like the _Trasteverini_, took the side of reaction. Not until Italian patriots could build some bridges to the countryside would the

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[105] _Ibid._, p. 56.

[106] Quoted in King, _A History of Italian Unity . . ._, p. 324.

[107] _Ibid._, pp. 324-26.

Risorgimento succeed. The construction work was done in the post-revolutionary period, but the democrats, as such, did not control it.

CHAPTER III

THE RISORGIMENTO AS A COMPROMISE: 1859-60

A Realignment of Forces

We emphasized, in Chapter 2, that the most general reason for the failure of the Mazzinians as revolutionaries was their lack of a "supply line"--of mobilizable resources, both human and material. This, almost by definition, precluded their "making a nation." It was related to the inability of Young Italy to get more than compromised military backing from the Kingdom of Sardinia (in command of the only regular army in the peninsula that could be counted on at all in the cause of unity). But it also indicated that the Mazzinians could not count on volunteer units, organized by Garibaldi, except in the short run. Here, the most telling limitation derived from the inability of the volunteers to live, either off of the peasantry or off of a regular army. Since the unification of a nation is most importantly a political event, the apathy and hostility of the peasantry was more serious than the apathy and hostility of regular army officers. Our twentieth century experience has made us keenly aware of the resources which a peasantry can provide to a revolutionary movement. In retrospect,

we see clearly that Garibaldi was a marvelous irregular--but hardly a guerilla--warrior. In the events of 1848-49, he too was bound to fail.

Stated very simply, the way out of the impasse of 1848-49 appeared as follows: Italian patriots--democratic and moderate--had to work together and not against each other or apart. Moreover, it was necessary that they create their nation not only as European-inspired reformers, organized in relatively exclusive associations, but as potential patrons of people with local power, who were themselves real or potential patrons of the peasant masses. To facilitate the necessary shift in alliances, the moderates had to assume an initiative in the struggle which theretofore they had shunned. This became feasible after 1849 because the Sardinian Monarchy emerged from the wars of that year with its constitution intact and with a new, more comprehensive orientation toward reform. For the first time it was possible, at least in Piedmont, to actively seek the liberation of Italians from Austrian domination and still be a monarchist.

The new alliances also required that the democrats accept a moderate formula. As it turned out, they had little choice. In the wake of failure, their organizational structure collapsed, so that only the most dedicated could remain true to republican principles.[1] Many who had

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[1]Salvadori, Cavour . . ., p. 67. "Mazzinianism never recovered in the 1850's the fascination it had held for the younger generation in the '30's and '40's."

participated in Young Italy were easy captives of new movements and, appropriately, new movements began to form. One of these, called the Italian National Society, was pivotal, and we shall deal with it at some length.

In discussing the new alliances, I have found it convenient to distinguish the unification of northern and north-central Italy in 1859 from the extension of the union to the rest of the peninsula in 1860. This is because the National Society was poorly represented in southern Italy until after unification, while its equivalents lacked something in viability. Furthermore, the incorporation of the intermediaries in the South was distinctive with the consequence first of opposing the South to the nation, later of setting the conditions under which this division could be overcome. These points will be clarified as we proceed.

The Piedmontese Initiative

In the risings of 1848, the Kingdom of Sardinia had granted a constitution--the *Statuto*--which, after 1849, survived to become an instrument in the acceleration of reform. Eventually it became the constitution of the Kingdom of Italy. The other constitutions of 1848 were quashed--as, for example, when a divine right monarch was reinforced at Naples and a pope at Rome. As a result, Turin became, in place of London and even Paris, the magnet for Italian exiles. Their presence further increased the impetus for

change in Piedmont.[2] Since this was a period of economic and administrative expansion, exiles from a variety of regions took up positions in what would become national institutions.[3] On these grounds alone, the Piedmontese initiative is not hard to understand.

The support for this initiative came especially from moderate nationalists who, after the failures of 1848-49, were glad to find a constitutional monarchy that they could back. The locus of the initiative was in the Council of Ministers, a body which had inherited the power to govern under the Statuto. Its members were moderate nationalists, responsible to the Crown, but responsive also to an elected Chamber of Deputies. The Statuto, copied from the constitutional monarchy of France, 1830, preserved certain privileges for the Crown, permitting it, for instance, to appoint loyal supporters to an upper house, the Senate.[4] (The Chamber and the Senate shared legislative powers.) The suffrage for the Chamber of Deputies was very narrow, but did extend to much of the middle class. It generally

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[2]Denis Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), pp. 21-22.

[3]Ramm, The Risorgimento, p. 18.

[4]Fried, The Italian Prefects . . ., p. 35. "The new constitution was virtually a direct copy of the French Constitution of 1830, which had been chosen as a model by the King and his ministers because it preserved much of the power of the King. . . ."

guaranteed a slim majority for the program which the moderate ministers pursued.[5]

What was that program? During the decade 1849-59, the Kingdom of Sardinia was transformed into the precursor of an Italian government. The biggest changes took place in three areas: education, administration--especially of internal security--and the economy. As early as 1848, an Education Act created the Ministry of Public Instruction with supervisory jurisdiction over state universities and indirect control over all secondary schools. It was "designed to promote a completely secularized and nationally uniform system . . . to compete with and possibly supplant the institutions of the religious orders."[6] By another act, in 1857, the Ministry's control was extended to cover the secondary schools more directly and the primary schools for the first time.[7]

Administrative reforms of the decade had the following overall complexion: they removed the responsibility for internal security from the War Ministry to the Ministry of the Interior; they supplemented the royalist police units of the regular army (the Carabinieri) with a "citizens'" National Guard, and restricted the former, on the whole, to

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[5] Ibid., p. 35. Salvadori, Cavour . . ., p. 69. Next to the moderates, "traditionalists" formed the second largest group in the Chamber, "and probably would have had an absolute majority with universal suffrage."

[6] Fried, The Italian Prefects . . ., p. 36.

[7] Ibid., pp. 48-49.

rural operations.[8] At the level of field administration, Military Governors were stripped of their powers, and finally eliminated, while representatives of the Interior (called Intendants) acquired not only the new police powers, but an increasingly important position in general. They were prototypes of the Prefects who were to become pivotal figures of the new nation. Already before 1860, Intendants could intervene between the field representatives of other administrative hierarchies and the government. They could also oversee the activities of these representatives and, in many cases, influence their appointments and careers.[9] At the same time they were the government's political arm and electoral agent in the field. This combination of activities never equalled the power which Prefects had in France, however, mostly because the Piedmontese Intendants were not responsible for imposing a revolution.[10]

The new relationship between the War Ministry and the Interior, between military and civilian power, was crucial to the initiative that Piedmont was assuming in the Risorgimento. The ancestors of the House of Savoy had left

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[8] Ibid., pp. 39-41.

[9] Ibid., pp. 39-42 and 48-51.

[10] See Fried's comparison of France and Piedmont, ibid., p. 70. "The stronger provincial head [the French Prefect] . . . was designed to reproduce in the province the absolute and concentrated authority of the head of state. A liberal regime of dispersed powers [the Piedmontese-Italian] may be less apt to create a set of provincial monocrats."

a legacy that was difficult to escape: an ambition to wrest "the goodly artichoke" of Lombardy from Austrian control.[11] Except for the moderates (and not all of them), Italian patriots were skeptical of the monarchy's intent.[12] To the extent that military administration gave way to civilian and political in the 1850's, the Piedmontese nationalists felt the spirit of republicanism begin to dissipate. Especially in the wake of failure, it grew difficult to oppose the monarch on principle alone.

At the same time, there were other reforms which made the House of Savoy more acceptable as a rallying point. The ministries were somewhat streamlined and reorganized; a new one for Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce was created; the government entered the areas of mining and land reclamation, planning and subsidation, with a new enthusiasm for economic growth.[13] Moreover, the enthusiasm

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[11]King, A History of Italian Unity . . ., pp. 41-51. King thinks Piedmont altogether unenlightened: "The people of the . . . Kingdom, like its princes, were stubborn, wary, serious . . . . They despised literature and art, and were happy in the mephitic dulness that stifled strangers in Turin." (P. 42.)

[12]In the long run, though, patriots would be more skeptical of Piedmont's moderates than monarch, and for good reason. Cavour, for instance, "preferred to write in French," and spoke an Italian which, in public, his secretary found "painful to hear." Meanwhile, the new King, Victor Emmanuel II, became almost popular, acquiring, among other things, the epitaph, Re Galantuomo, or King of the "Middle Class." See Mack Smith, Italy . . ., pp. 20-21; Salvadori, Cavour . . ., pp. 70-71. According to the latter, "Italia e Vittorio Emmanuele was the slogan on which wars and revolutions of 1859-61 were fought and won."

[13]Mack Smith, Italy . . ., pp. 21-24; Salvadori, Cavour . . ., pp. 71-72; Fried, The Italian Prefects . . ., pp. 36-39.

was directed away from mercantilism and toward the expansion of free trade. The government's contributions to the construction of telegraph lines and railroads, to the standardization of weights and measures and the elimination of archaic customs barriers, to the creation of the National Guard--which was an urban police force, were likewise impressive.[14] By 1859, Italy had more than 1,800 kilometers of usable track, over half of which was located in Piedmont.[15]

Behind these changes stood the ministers and, in particular, the Minister of Finance, Count Camillo di Cavour. As Prime Minister during most of 1859 and 1860, he would, as it were, orchestrate the Risorgimento. During the decade of the '50s, he was, among other things, an instrument in the diffusion of French capital and banking techniques to Italy.[16] He believed, at this time, that "the greatest of revolutionists" is the locomotive--it is "more powerful than the weight of armies in determining the course of events."[17]

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[14] Ibid., pp. 50-51. Fried also notes how changes at the state level were paralleled by a "growth of municipal services."

[15] Rondo E. Cameron, France and the Economic Development of Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 284-302.

[16] See, especially, Rondo E. Cameron, "French Finance and Italian Unity: The Cavourian Decade," American Historical Review, LXII (April, 1957), pp. 552-69. Also see Greenfield, Studi . . ., pp. 190-93.

[17] Quoted in Greenfield, Economics and Liberalism . . ., p. 230.

But Cavour was much more than a financier or devotee of railroads and, as it turned out, the Risorgimento could not be the work of the latter, however much they were a precondition for it. To the extent that they were grafted onto Italy by Frenchmen, Italians were denied their revolutionary implications.[18] In fact, events from the mid-50s on depended rather heavily on the "weight of arries," and it was in this context that Cavour's reputation was cemented. He is known to history especially as a masterful diplomatist.[19]

In 1855, as Prime Minister, he arranged for the Piedmontese Army to fight beside England and France in the Crimea, thereby exacting a promise of French support (and English sympathy) for a future Italian war with Austria. From this time on, the antipathy which the moderates had for social insurrection got transformed into concrete preparations for war. In 1858, Napoleon III was offered Nice and Savoy in exchange for actively assisting in the annexation of Lombardy and Venetia to Piedmont. By April of 1859,

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[18]Alexander Gerschenkron, "Notes on the Rate of Industrial Growth in Italy, 1881-1913," The Journal of Economic History, XV (December, 1955), p. 370.

[19]Francesco Crispi, the quasi-Mazzinian lawyer who, in the late nineteenth century, became Prime Minister, expressed this in often-quoted phrases: "Che cosa fece il Cavour? Niente altro che diplomatizzare la rivoluzion . . ." Quoted in Walter Maturi, Interpretazioni del Risorgimento: Lezioni di storia della storiografia (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1962), pp. 620-21. Also see Greenfield, Studi . . ., pp. 193-95 and 200.

Piedmontese and French maneuvers had more or less "provoked" the Hapsburgs into military action and a war began.

There are several reasons why the moderates accepted war as a reasonable form of violence, in addition to the fact that French support made it feasible. Wars, it appeared, were conducted by regular armies, in which the lower classes took orders from the upper. They were financed and equipped by legally constituted authorities (the Piedmontese state was currently floating bonds with French financeers). During a war, the state could utilize extraordinary machinery to ensure obedience and, afterwards, have at its disposal a citizenry disciplined as soldiers. Revolutions, on the other hand, "opened the flood gates" of sponteneity and chaos, deriving their energy from attacks on the state itself. Moreover, revolutions had been republican in the past, and at least by 1859 the moderates were convinced that they had found an honest monarchical solution to the problems of unity.

So it was that in the 1850s the moderates began to argue that the Republics of '48 had been an anti-national force. Each was isolated from the others, and its surrounding countryside, they said.[20] The criticism was not entirely fair, for Mazzini had fully expected that once the Church resigned its Temporal Power, the Roman Republic, like Paris,

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[20] Ibid., p. 188.

would be the source of national institutions.[21] But the moderates were significantly ambiguous about Rome, too. They felt they had to be for reasons of diplomacy. France, at the time, was in the midst of an illiberal reaction to the revolutions of 1848, in which Catholic opinion was increasingly vocal. Piedmont's dependence on the French Army presupposed that Rome be left a while longer to its Pope. In addition, the French troops who, in 1849, had restored this Pope were still garrisoned in the Holy City. It was instead of "taking Rome" that the moderates emphasized a Piedmontese initiative--military and diplomatic--to expell Austria from the peninsula.

Yet the moderates were to learn that even expelling Austria was impossible without a modicum of revolution. For one thing, the French position, precisely because of the "Roman Question," was compromised. In July of 1859, Napoleon III independently negotiated a premature and inconclusive peace with Austria. This occurred at Villafranca--thereafter a synonym for betrayal to Italian nationalists. By the treaty, Austria lost Lombardy but not Venetia, and, Lombardy being the "goodly artichoke" of Savoy's dynastic

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[21]The Mazzinians did, however, overlook the differences between Rome and Paris. Historically, the latter city had been an "authentic center" of economic, political, and moral life. For a long time, it had also been the capital of a nation state. Rome, on the other hand, had played only a minor role in the history of _Italy_ and, while an administrative capital, was hardly a center of economic or intellectual progress. See Maturi, _Interpretazioni . . ._, p. 632.

ambitions, the situation implicated the Piedmontese leadership.[22]

Meanwhile, the withdrawal of Austrian garrisons from the Duchies and the Romagna had permitted risings to occur in many cities and towns. They afforded Cavour the opportunity to take these areas, instead of Venetia, and without the help of France. Apparently with some reluctance, he "boldly resolved" to do so.[23]

The Vulnerability of the Moderates

The center of gravity for moderate nationalism was, as we have seen, in northern Italy. Increasingly, because of the new importance of the Piedmontese government, and because of the congregations of exiles in that state, Turin became the moderates' headquarters. The geographical concentration of the moderate forces, coupled with their relative social isolation (they were mostly from the upper middle class and liberal aristocracy) made it essential that they have allies. Under no condition would the French Army suffice, but especially after Villafranca. As leaders of a movement that would form the nation state, and subsequently as its first rulers, they too needed a "supply line" or a social base. In the decade of the '50s, the foundations of one had been laid by the patriotic exiles in Piedmont.

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[22] Greenfield, *Studi . . .*, pp. 195-96.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 196.

However, the risings in the Duchies and the Romagna, occurring in the wake of the Austrian withdrawal, indicated that, while resources (human and material) were available there, alternative movements might control them in opposition to Turin.

The moderates' approach to the problems of extending their social base was halting and insecure.[24] They had planned the war with Austria, but not its tendency to spread to the Papal State. Their direct contacts in the Romagna and the Duchies were few, and, not being organized as a party, or used to the instruments of propaganda, they were slow to acquire more. In addition, they were supersensitive to Catholic opinion in France, to the activities of the Mazzinians in Italy, to the chaos that they thought accompanied insurrections.[25]

As a matter of fact, the risings and demonstrations in the Duchies and the Romagna had been carefully planned by the National Society--whose composition and ideology were close to the moderates', and whose plans had been known in advance. Before we discuss these events from the "bottom up," however, it is necessary that we have a picture of

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[24]See, especially, Raymond Grew, "How Success Spoiled the Risorgimento," The Journal of Modern History, XXXIV (September, 1962), pp. 239-53.

[25]Ibid., pp. 240-41 and 246-50. ". . . The moderates tended to advocate representative institutions while remaining suspicious of politics and contemptuous of parties, for they had learned from Antonio Rosmini that parties are 'worms that devour the fabric of society.'" (P. 247.)

unification from the "top down." For the Piedmontese moderates did have behind them the experience of acquiring support in their own territory. When it came time to proceed from there, they could rely at least on this.

During the 1850s, governments in Piedmont depended upon narrow liberal majorities in the Chamber of Deputies in order to survive amidst the opposition of a reactionary clergy and aristocracy, sometimes supported by the Crown and also represented in the legislature.[26] Obviously, elections were a serious matter for the ministers. They counted on univocal support from the "enlightened" nobility and middle class, for they could not afford much factionalism within these ranks. In fact, the continued presence of the Mazzinians and quasi-Mazzinians in Piedmont (Genoa more than Turin) was considered to be a threat. Also, not being organized as a party, the moderates could not "campaign" for middle class loyalties. We have seen that, as ministers and diplomats, they took the initiative for rationalization in a number of significant areas. As political leaders, though, their records are less brilliant.

How did they carry out their roles as leaders? Significantly through the Intendants. These officials were the proto-Prefects who oversaw the administration of all government programs in the field; who could intervene in the appointments of officials (including teachers); who

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[26]Salvadori, _Cavour . . ._, pp. 68-70.

controlled the police and the National Guard; and who presided over elections. It is important to note that the Intendants, in their administrative capacity, had at least supervisory authority over public assistance programs, public health, and public works; over tax collection and conscription; over the use of water and mineral resources; over the use of the *Carabinieri*.[27] In short, they controlled, either directly or indirectly, more patronage, more protection and more privileges than any other official in the state. It is no wonder at all that they were, at least for elections, the political arm of the government.[28] By an act of 1848, they were expected to report on events of political relevance, to mediate between the government and local communities, to "negotiate," as Fried suggests, "on behalf of the government for the support of local *grand' elettori*."[29] Cavour, in fact, did not recoil from building coalitions in this way. He "actively used the Intendants to return his supporters upon becoming Prime Minister,

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[27]Fried, *The Italian Prefects . . .*, pp. 48-51.

[28]*Ibid*., p. 42.

[29]Fried includes a typical communication from an Intendant to important electors:

> ". . . In accordance with the communications and information I have received, I must inform you in all confidence and secrecy that the candidate proposed for the constituency of Casale is Baron Sappa, Councillor of State, from whom we can expect effective action to achieve the important objective of the triumph of order and the public weal. . . . Inform all those from whom assistance may be expected about this; exhort them to lend same energetically. . . ."

Quoted in *ibid*., pp. 43-44.

assuming the portfolio of the Interior expressly for this purpose."[30] As one might expect, the career of an Intendant depended upon the support he could muster for successful ministers. Intendants were powerful but not especially secure in their positions.

The political use of Intendants in Piedmont was reflected in those laws, passed in 1859, which regulated the extension of Piedmontese institutions to incorporated territories (at the time only Lombardy). The new law on local government divided the country into provinces, then districts, then communes. At the province level, it divided the Intendant's functions, giving the administrative ones to a Vice-Governor, the political ones to a Governor. (Shortly, a Prefect would assume both.)[31] As political representatives of the government, it was expected that the Governor-Prefect be powerful, though dependent--a dealer in patronage and a negotiator for votes. This circumstance derived precisely from the relative (social and geographical) isolation of moderate cabinets and from the fact that they had to compete--outside of Piedmont even more than in--with other patriotic movements. It betrayed much more their weakness than their strength; their lack of a committed basis of support. As a result, what from one perspective looked like a movement dedicated to the rationalization of

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[30] Ibid., p. 44.

[31] Ibid., pp. 65-72.

public life became, from another, an alliance of "approachable" politicians.

Yet this does not represent either the origin or the full extent of patron-client relations in Italy. In so far as it indicated the vulnerability of rationalization, it tells us something about their organizational potential. But one can find equivalents to the "political use of Prefects" in the liberal governments of many other countries.[32] Politicians are perhaps universally pleased to control some spoils, certainly where they control little else. On the other hand, it makes a considerable difference to the structure of a political system whether the bulk of the state's patronage becomes available to the relatives of the politicians, to a local elite, to voluntary associations and pressure groups, to institutions like armies and churches, or to networks of intermediaries, themselves organized by patronage relations.[33] In Italy, as one went south, the active political forces were increasingly organized as networks. This can be seen to a limited extent in the risings

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[32] Supra, pp. 33-34.

[33] There are undoubtably interesting differences between Irish and Italian relationships to the American political machines. See John S. and Leatrice D. MacDonald, "Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighborhood Formation, and Social Networks," The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, XLII (January, 1964), pp. 82-97. The authors discuss the spontaneous operation of patron-client relations in the first Italian-American neighborhoods. The patterns at this level derived from the old country through chain migrations and not from the American machine. They articulated with and influenced the latter but were not caused by it.

of the Romagna and the Duchies; to an overwhelming extent in the activities of intermediaries in the South.

In the present chapter, our concern is with the former. The popular myth notwithstanding, the establishment of provisional governments in the Romagna and the Duchies did not follow upon a great popular upheaval.[34] It was not, on the other hand, the work of conspirators, in the narrow sense. It derived, contrary to both of these alternatives, from the agitation of the Italian National Society--an organization which covered the distance between the Mazzinians and the moderates and whose local efficacy depended upon networks of friendship. To its contribution, as analyzed especially by Raymond Grew, we now turn.[35]

The Italian National Society

After 1848, the Risorgimento ceased to be revolutionary. In Paris certain democratic exiles led by Daniel Manin, a hero of the Venetian Republic of 1848, were encouraged by rumors of the impending Crimean War to abandon Mazzini. Most of them had been Mazzinians although, once the break was made, their faction became a magnet for some of Mazzini's enemies. As was true of the nucleus which founded Young Italy in opposition to the *Carbonari*, these

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[34]Grew, *The Journal of Modern History*, pp. 239-40.

[35]Raymond Grew, *A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

exiles first identified themselves negatively. They had no ideologist of Mazzini's stature, however, nor was their social role to be the propagation of any radical ideas.[36] Rather, they would be building bridges for the Italian nation state.

The heretical Paris exiles were soon contacted by a Piedmontese nobleman, Pallavicino, distrustful of Mazzini, but anxious to have Manin's name for the cause he represented. This was, in effect, to put the Piedmontese moderates in touch with veterans from the Republics--or, as he preferred, with "the opinion of Italy."[37] The exiles responded that they favored a popular initiative in the Risorgimento, although the Piedmontese king could lead it if he liked. They were even prepared to sacrifice their republicanism if, in a popular election, the king were voted head of state.[38] Manin, in other words, agreed to cooperate with Pallavicino, and together they founded a "National Party." As the alliance with the Piedmontese moderates took shape, many ex-Mazzinians became anti-republican and suspicious of "popular initiatives."

The National Party was a front for propaganda. It broadcast its continued commitment to a "democratic" Risorgimento but in practice defined this in the vaguest possible

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[36] _Ibid._, p. 21.

[37] _Ibid._, pp. 3-15.

[38] _Ibid._, p. 23.

terms. It agitated for the recognition of Piedmont's army and monarch as not only likely but also indispensible allies against Austria. It flung invective at Mazzini, whose position was that Piedmont could only betray Italy and whose tactics for armed insurrection were held responsible for "all past failures." Like Young Italy, though, it was militantly anti-clerical. After all, the Pope had withdrawn the Church from the Risorgimento in 1848.[39]

According to the National Party's program, insurrections were to be replaced by "agitation"--a "healthful gymnastic," according to Manin, "which reinvigorates the intellectual and moral forces of the future combatants . . ."[40] By the latter, he did not mean revolutionaries or volunteers, but soldiers. In his view, only the uniformed "regular" could justly kill or be killed for Italy. Manin himself died in 1857, but the movement which inherited his energies persisted in a decided preference for war over revolution. "Yesterday," wrote a subsequent leader (in 1859), "I was at the arsenal, and I assure you that tears of tenderness fell from my eyes, when I saw the immeasurable [goods] of war that are being prepared."[41]

Among those to desert Young Italy because insurrection had failed once too often was a veteran polemicist from

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[39] _Ibid._, pp. 34-67.

[40] Quoted in _ibid._, p. 37.

[41] Quoted in _ibid._, p. 159.

the Sicilian rising of 1848 who had been Mazzini's principal agent among the Paris exiles in the early '50s. His name was Giuseppe La Farina and, after 1856, he imposed on the National Party a journal, an office and staff, a central committee (of which he was secretary), and a new name: the (supra-party) Italian National Society.[42]

Because the National Society's program did not include insurrection, it had tacit permission from the Piedmontese government to establish headquarters at Turin; to organize and propagandize openly in Piedmont.[43] In doing so, however, it became a dependent of the moderates--to the extent, in fact, that when war broke out with Austria in April of 1859, the Central Committee of the Society dissolved itself in deference to Cavour.[44] After Villafranca, the Committee reorganized, but for no more independent a purpose than to conduct plebiscites in favor of annexations to Piedmont. After unification in 1860, the Society operated as a kind of political party, although largely for elections and not in parliament. Then it dissolved forever into other

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[42]Grew notes further that "with less interest in the prestigious leaders of 1848 [e.g., Manin], La Farina led the Society to recruit nationalists of more local influence. . . ." Ibid., p. 467.

[43]The relationships between the Society and the Piedmontese government, between La Farina and Cavour, are complex and variously interpreted. Grew concludes that what really counted was ". . . a general awareness that some relationship was to the advantage of both." Ibid., pp.116-17.

[44]Ibid., pp. 188-90. To appreciate this, one might imagine the Bolshevik Party dissolving its Central Committee during the First World War in deference to Kerensky.

political groups, many members channeling their anti-clericalism into a resurgence of freemasonry.[45] In contrast, the Mazzinians themselves ruled the republics of 1848 and, had their revolution been a success, they would have expected to govern the nation.

In its social composition, the National Society overlapped with Young Italy, although fewer students and almost no artisans joined.[46] Like Young Italy before '48, its very viability guaranteed a rank and file of shopkeepers and officials. These people had specific grievances against the prevailing tax structure and pervading priesthood, but they were not unemployed, and came to resent it when <u>pointless</u> barricading interfered with the course of business.[47]

In contrast to Young Italy, the heads of local committees of the National Society (and of the Central Committee as well) were usually "local notables" or "men of note." On the whole, they were less rich and powerful than the "men around Cavour," who, we should add, held themselves aloof from the National Society.[48] But they were not hostile to wealth and power. All of them were respected men in their

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[45] <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 257-59 and 456-68.

[46] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 233. Many artisans did contribute to the society, or support its subscription drives, without joining the local organizations. This was less true in Lombardy, however.

[47] <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 91-92.

[48] "The great nobles, even when nationalists, remained suspicious of the effort to appeal to the masses. . . ." <u>Ibid</u>., p. 468. Also see p. 233.

communities, sometimes of noble birth, often landowners and/or merchants and professionals.[49] In their interests and attitudes they sympathized more often with Cavour than with Mazzini, fearing, for example, that "the great figure of the people would again rise huge."[50] On the other hand, they were not removed from "the people" in their daily lives. Many of them--especially the landowners--were esteemed (or sought to be) by a following. As *mezzadri* tenants and clients, "the people" were in varying degrees under their control. This kind of relationship did not pertain for most of the Mazzinians, and it is not surprising that, as a social movement, local notables organized themselves rather differently. Almost by definition, the notables "knew men in nearly any city--and especially [through the exiles] in Turin. . . . Furthermore, they were likely to know each other. . . . Each of these men had dozens of contacts important to the Society."[51] The contacts made it unnecessary for the Society ever to be highly organized and, unlike the brotherhoods and clubs of the democratic movement, its local committees were loose gatherings of friends, friends of friends, friends of Pallavicino and La Farina.[52] The committees, of course, rarely included the poor, but, unlike

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[49]*Ibid.*, p. 233.

[50]Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 160.

[51]*Ibid.*, p. 134.

[52]*Ibid.*, pp. 131-32 and 232-34.

the Mazzinian organizations, their members were less divorced, as individuals, from them. The distinction is most clear in the case of the peasantry.[53]

La Farina wove the thickest web of friends and allies "along the Via Emilia through the Duchies and into the Romagna."[54] In Lombardy, economically more advanced than the rest of Italy, the Society never flourished. Lombard notables subscribed, paid dues, and made other contributions, but the classes below them either remained loyal to Mazzini's principles of revolution and republic or, in any case, refused to bow before the hegemony of Victor Emmanuel. On the other hand, in Southern Italy and Sicily where the Society found its greatest number of retrograde targets, and where Mazzini's penetration had been weakest, even fewer committees were formed.[55] La Farina's Sicilian origins and eternal sensitivity to rumors of another Sicilian rising made no difference, notwithstanding the fact that he had personal agents in Palermo and in 1860 went there himself as Cavour's representative.

But in the Duchies, and especially in the Romagna, the Society bore some hallmarks of a genuine popular movement. Here, in fact, it was at times a vector of the forces that contradicted the Cavourian policy. For if local

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[53] Ibid., pp. 273-77 and 386-87.

[54] Ibid., p. 133.

[55] Ibid., pp. 94-99.

notables, and hence the National Society, are to be distinguished from the Mazzinians, the differences were not in black and white. In the Romagna, for instance, the SNI locals had a tendency to leave the national when it, or the moderates, became too "moderate" in their pursuit of unity. The members were never unanimous in a defection, but those who supported one also advocated cooperation with the Mazzinians.[56] At the same time, it is important to remember that the SNI recruited many ex-Mazzinians. One could put the ambiguity this way: the Mazzinian lawyers and intellectuals, for ideological and political reasons, organized quasi-corspiratorial clubs and associations; the notables, for reasons of their position in the social order, organized networks of friends. Often, the same individuals could participate in either, depending on the configuration of forces that prevailed.

In any case, the National Society took something from Mazzini: without inheriting a little of his enthusiasm, it could not have given so much purpose or momentum to the notables and their friends. For if the notables understood the meaning of centralization and nationhood, they had had less opportunity to develop that interest in rationalization that had sent the moderates and the Mazzinians to London and Paris to observe. They stood closer to the Italian evolution in this respect. Opposing the Hapsburgs, the

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[56] Ibid., pp. 97-98 and 205-14.

papacy, the reactionary landowners and their peasant allies, to be sure, they nonetheless had some friends and friends of friends among the enemy.

Unification with the Romagna and the Duchies

As preparations were made for war with Austria in the early months of 1859, students and other youths from the divided states of Italy came to Piedmont in order to sign with Garibaldi. By March nearly 20,000 had done so.[57] When the war began, however, Garibaldi was given command of only 3,500 volunteers, with whom he was to disorganize the Austrian garrisons, alla partigiana.[58] But the partisan aspects of the war did not materialize. The Piedmontese moderates disliked the volunteers; regular officers in the regular army liked Garibaldi less. The National Society, which might have helped in getting the youths across the border, fed, and armed, was, at most, ambivalent.[59] As a result, many volunteers were siphoned off into the Piedmontese Army to be trained as regular soldiers. Garibaldi's men were the leftovers: too young, or too old, or incompetent.[60]

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[57]Grew, The Journal of Modern History, p. 240.

[58]Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., p. 74.

[59]Grew, The Journal of Modern History, pp. 240-41; Grew, A Sterner Plan . . ., p. 163.

[60]Garibaldi's own account is as follows:
"I was kept as a flag to attract volunteers; the volunteers flocked to the standard fast enough, but those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six

They were deployed on the periphery in "diversionary" tasks, while units of 60,000 Piedmontese and 120,000 French confronted the Austrians directly.[61]

The Mazzinians and their allies were also isolated during the war. From the perspective of the Piedmontese government, this was a time--war time--for the utmost unanimity. The rights of the opposition were a small price to pay for a success. Not surprising, the Italian National Society was itself none too secure. It was tacitly encouraged to prepare for risings in the Duchies and the Romagna, but it planned these with caution and then dissolved its central committee.[62] Local committees helped to staff the provisional governments, it is true, but these governments, like the Piedmontese, circumscribed or censored democratic forces. Proceeding without them they replaced a few laws, a very few officials, and hardly any institutions. The government at

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were destined for the line regiments. Only those who were too young, too old, or in some way deficient, were sent to me, on whom the obligation was laid not to appear in public--to avert a diplomatic scare . . . Once on the battlefield, moreover, when I might have been able to do something, I was refused even those volunteers who flocked to my call."
See Garibaldi, Autobiography . . ., pp. 125-26.

[61]Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., p. 75.

[62]Grew, The Journal of Modern History, p. 241. "The war plans of [1858] . . . had included local revolts both as the war's justification and as a device for extending it outside Lombardy. Yet these plans . . . became increasingly vague as the time came to use them. . . . When at last the National Society issued the call to revolt it was muffled and faint."

Bologna, for instance, adopted the Napoleonic code but removed hardly a man from the police force.[63] Cavour dispatched commissioners to oversee the governments and, in all regards, these personal emisaries retained the upper hand. They picked their own advisors on local affairs and, when the time came to implement Piedmontese laws and taxes, bureaucracy and judiciary, rules on local government, and so on, they assumed a nearly dictatorial posture. The new posts which they controlled went less to local leaders in general, than to those whose "loyalty" was known.[64] When the peace of Villafranca was announced, a worried Cavour withdrew the commissioners. But the local notables retained them or their friends and appointees regardless. They knew now, if they had not known before, the importance of a Piedmontese connection.[65]

Meanwhile the withdrawal of the Piedmontese Army made it necessary for the provisional governments to win a mandate from their people. Except in Tuscany, where universal suffrage did not pertain, this was accomplished by popular elections of provincial assemblies. Prefects "were instructed to take a 'beneficent initiative' in the naming

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[63]Ibid., pp. 242-43. Appropriately it was over a week before political prisoners were released.

[64]Ibid., p. 244; Salvadori, Cavour . . ., pp. 80-81.

[65]Cavour in recalling them requested that, "as private citizens, [they] . . . act in the best interests of unification." Ibid., p. 81.

of candidates . . . and to encourage the political dominance of reliable citizens."[66] The provincial assemblies, of course, betrayed their origins. Their members were almost all men of note and voted without discussion to "fuse" with the moderate government of Piedmont. According to Grew, they were not legislators but diplomats--"carrying out a demonstration rather than fulfilling a natural right."[67]

Fusion with Piedmont was embellished further in March of the following year. Under the leadership of Cavour (Prime Minister again since January), the Piedmontese moderates wished to present Europe with plebiscites that were unanimous for annexation--notwithstanding a universal manhood suffrage. The SNI contributed by sending its members to the peasants with promises and propaganda; by encouraging officers of the National Guard to obtain the votes of men in their command; by printing thousands of affirmative ballots in advance; by making a carnival of the balloting days. Committees softened their anti-clericalism and arranged for the _contadini_ to follow their "esteemed ones"--landowners, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, and so on--to the polls.[68] The result was a nearly unanimous _sì_ for annexation.

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[66] Grew, _The Journal of Modern History_, pp. 244-45. Still, ". . . the voting appears not to have been outrageously rigged."

[67] _Ibid._, p. 245.

[68] Grew, _A Sterner Plan . . ._, pp. 273-77.

In the elections and plebiscites described above, the moderates extended their contacts: from city to town, from the North to the Romagna and the Duchies, from friends to friends of friends, and to the local men of note. The same process was demonstrated in subsequent elections. The first laws on the subject placed the suffrage at around two per cent.[69] Since Catholics refused to participate in the new nation, and democrats had lost their initiative, patriotic notables were fairly easily elected. Indeed, most of them had friends, or seats, on the local election committees which made the nominations. However, if the notables had their election lists approved by the Turin committee of the SNI, or if they followed the advice of the (Turin-appointed) Prefect, they derived advantages from a wider range of contacts. Again, the Piedmontese moderates ignored local leaders _qua_ leaders in order to enhance the position of particular ones whose loyalty had been tested.[70]

Because the National Society, like the prefectures, functioned as a transmission belt in these matters, it came to be a channel of the government's patronage. According to Grew, "La Farina often encouraged members of the SNI to

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[69]See Neufeld, _Italy, School . . ._, p. 524.

[70]On several occasions, the Piedmontese government recommended its own men--candidates with national reputations--to run in several of the (single-member) districts at once. A system of multiple candidacies permitted them to choose the constituency they wished to represent, having invariably been elected everywhere they ran. Then "a reliable man of lesser note" would run on "the quieter second ballot." See Grew, _A Sterner Plan . . ._, p. 269.

believe he could find them jobs, or assure their advancement. . . ." Similarly, "the complaints which local committees forwarded to Turin centered heavily on questions of personnel."[71] The channel operated by no means only for elections; loyal clienteles had to be built between them.[72]

One can see from the above that at this juncture the burden of unification fell on local notables. Landowners with peasant clienteles were even pivotal. They alone were in a position to engineer unanimous plebiscites; they alone could be nationalists without irrevocably provoking the contadini. In this respect, the SNI had a critical advantage over Mazzini; its moderation and its contacts combined to save it from a counter-revolution. Reactionary priests and noblemen could not direct Sanfedist raids if their instruments of terror (the peasants) were bound to their "esteemed ones." For the moment, anyway, the notables had achieved a new synthesis in the Risorgimento.

In the Duchies and the Romagna, however, the unanimity of the moment was deceptive. Over a period of time, the notables would not have a basis of support so close to home. The poor with whom they were most firmly connected were the mezzadri tenants. But, in the years to come, this form of tenancy would decline in proportion to a growing

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[71] Ibid., p. 406.

[72] Ibid., p. 283. Grew notes, though, how "La Farina was anxious not to weaken his position with the government by asking for too many favors."

agricultural proletariat. The process, in fact, had already begun.[73] Landless laborers--the braccianti--would organize themselves independently of, and in violation of, the networks of face to face contacts that were important in 1859 and 1860. Picking up the thread of Mazzinian dissention, anarchist and socialist movements would assist them. Increasingly the struggle between classes would dominate the social life of these areas, obscuring the networks of relationships that cut across class lines.

It is also important that in 1859 and 1860, Mazzinianism remained viable, though much weakened by censorship and failure. Upon the conclusion of the plebiscites in March of 1859, La Farina had remarked, "now the people turn to me; later they will turn to Mazzini, to Garibaldi, even to the devil. . . ."[74] And he was right. After March, the spirit of clandestine activity and insurrection picked up. This was especially true of the Romagna, because of its proximity to Umbria and the Marches. These regions, also part of the papal domain, had produced risings during the war with Austria but had been subdued by troops from Rome. Now emigré committees from their towns congregated (not at Turin but) at Bologna. Here they made contacts

[73]Domenico Demarco, Il tramonto dello Stato pontificio: Il papato di Gregorio XVI (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1949), pp. 49-55 and 92-93.

[74]Quoted in Grew, A Sterner Plan . . ., p. 279.

with the Romagnole locals of the SNI, turning them around to face away from Piedmont and towards Rome.[75]

The more the liberation of the Marches and Umbria occupied the Romagnole SNI, the more "Mazzinian" it became. In May of 1860, Garibaldi landed in Sicily with a volunteer army of 1,000, and the heresy of the locals reached a climax. Garibaldi's move had been encouraged by allies of the Mazzinians in Turin. Their overall plan was that volunteers from the North should march through the Romagna, the Marches and Umbria, to Rome, in conjunction with a Garibaldian march to the same city from the South.[76] SNI committees in the Romagna, expressing tacit approval of the plan, voted in a regional meeting to leave the national organization.[77] The defection was not, of course, unanimously approved, and one suspects that notables who were especially favored by Turin did not endorse it.[78] Cooperation with the Mazzinians was rather more attractive to the lower middle and artisan classes than to the notables anyway. Furthermore, the defection was short-lived. Provoked by the threat of the democrats' plan, the moderates came back with one of their own: a march by regular troops designed to go through the Papal State, but around the city

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[75] Ibid., pp. 351-69.

[76] Ibid., pp. 291-95 and 307-309.

[77] Ibid., pp. 354-56.

[78] Ibid., pp. 352-54 and 357-60.

of Rome. When accomplished, in October, it was enough to neutralize the opposition and bring the National Society's dissidents back into the fold.[79]

The real importance of the defection, then, could not have been its consequences, although it should be said that without it the moderates might never have assumed responsibility for liberating Umbria and the Marches. That step, after all, handicapped their relations with Catholic France, and they even feared it might provoke a war. It was more fundamental, though, that the Romagnole defection underscored how superficial were the networks of that region. As long as the Risorgimento focused on them, it too was without depth--all the shows of unanimity notwithstanding.

Yet, the dissident committees _did_ return to the fold, the Risorgimento _did_ focus on the networks of this region, the new Italian government _did_ skim off the local notables and leave the rest of the social order on its doorstep. Local notables from the Romagna joined their counterparts from Piedmont, Lombardy, the Duchies, to share in those increments of nationhood that "the men around Cavour" controlled. One must question how this was possible when beneath them there was but limited support: few resources to be mobilized, no ready-made supply line, only the _mezzadri_, the indifferent, and an organizing opposition. Or--to make the question harder--why was it subsequently

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[79]_Ibid._, pp. 364-71.

possible for the notables to supplant the "men around Cavour" and then control the state into the twentieth century? By that time, the opposition was well organized and, in some of its manifestations, an advocate of violent revolution.

Very broadly, the answer to these questions has to do with the fact that everywhere south of the Romagna and the Duchies (except in parts of Apulia and to some extent in Sicily), the vast majority of peasants were at least potential captives of the intermediaries.[80] Here, in other words, networks had the capacity to become genuine instruments of integration, channels of supply, means for mobilizing men and materials for the nation state. The how and why of this development will be explored below.

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[80]The exceptions are suggested by patterns of south Italian labor organization which, in Apulia and to an extent in Sicily, have been more effective than elsewhere. See John S. and Leatrice D. MacDonald, "Agricultural Organization, Migration and Labour Militancy in Rural Italy," Economic History Review, XVI (January, 1963), pp. 61-75.

CHAPTER IV

THE RISORGIMENTO IN SOUTHERN ITALY: 1860

The New Intermediaries

The commercial expansion which began in southern and central Italy in the eighteenth century enhanced the numbers and positions of middlemen much more than of a middle class. In other words, it occurred within the context of what we have suggested was an indigenous pattern of evolution. One sees this especially in the case of latifundist culture, because there the relationships between town and country were most intricate. Moreover, the expansion was founded upon favorable market conditions for cereals and grain, involving the *latifondi*, where these commodities were produced, directly. The most important intermediaries to assert themselves in the early Risorgimento were the ones who operated between peasants and owners, harvest and markets, and so on.

The *latifondi* are the large estates that have dominated much of the land in the South, committing it to a tyrannical rotation of cereal and fodder, and the

inefficiencies of extensive cultivation.[1] Even where large estates as such do not exist, the same rotation system results in essentially the same culture.[2] The pattern of land use connected with it is centuries old and has the distinction of requiring but 90-100 days of labor for a given crop (usually grain, barley, or beans). It has been notably slow to absorb increases in population; to meet the exigencies of social change, without forcing many peasants out of work.[3] For centuries the southern peasant has scratched poor soils with a light plow and mattock, harvested

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[1]Ecological patterns in southern Italy fall into three categories. In the coastal lowlands of Apulia and Campania, where rainfall is adequately distributed over the winter months and summers are dry, a prosperous and intensive arborato economy persists. Vineyards, olive groves, almond and citrus trees are cultivated by small peasant proprietors and fairly secure tenants. In the mountains, frost and snow cover the ground for two or three of the winter months. The soil is rocky and thin, but on the growth which it supports, shepherds graze their flocks in the summer. After the fall harvest, animals are brought to more benign pastures, for a fee paid to landlords or communes. It is the "sub-mountain zone" which supports the latifondo. Consisting of the great inland plains and foothills, once wooded with beech and pine but today deforested, it is subject to uneven rainfalls (excessive in winter; insufficient in summer), and serious soil erosions. See René Dumont, Types of Rural Economy: Studies in World Agriculture, trans. Douglas Magnin (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 253-54.

[2]John and Leatrice MacDonald, Human Organization, XXIII, p. 115. "Italian agricultural economists have coined the term latifondo contadino (peasant latifundium) to highlight the fact that a latifundium subdivided and occupied by precarious small owner-operators is structually the same as a latifundium in tact. . . ."

[3]Gaetano Mosca, Partiti e Sindacati nella Crisi del Regime parlamentare (Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1949), p. 207.

with a cycle, threshed with a flail, transported himself on foot--reflecting in every case the paucity of capital investment in production. For centuries he has lived in "agro-towns," located to capitalize on a poorly distributed water supply, at elevations where malaria was less than a constant threat. The towns number several thousand in population and, in particular, have the effect of divorcing rural people from the land. Today they are known to development experts as rural slums--again reflecting the limited response which the _latifondi_ have made to change. An un- or under-employed population swells them in the twentieth century.[4]

While the _latifondi_ have been characteristically slow to adapt to change--to accommodate the thousands who depend on them for work--they have, at the same time, provided little else. Often granted as fiefs during the numerous invasions of southern Italy, they never constituted a basis for the administration of law and order.[5] Nobles who controlled the land were likely to live in the cities for at least a part of the year. They relied on clients

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[4]See, especially, Robert Eric Dickinson, _The Population Problem of Southern Italy: An Essay in Social Geography_ (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1955); Fredrick George Friedmann, _The Hoe and the Book_ (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960); Danilo Dolci, _Waste: An Eye-Witness Report on Some Aspects of Waste in Western Sicily_, trans. R. Munroe (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964).

[5]Elena Cassin, _San Nicandro: Histoire d'une Conversion_ (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1957), pp. 138-45 and 157-60; Hobsbawm, _Primitive Rebels . . ._, pp. 30-36.

or personal agents for the conduct of their affairs: managers and stewards (the _fattori_), chief tenants (the _grossi affitti di terre_), commercial and financial brokers (the _mercanti di compagna_), tenancy contractors (the _gabelloti_), and a variety of retainers.[6] The _gabelloti_ were of special significance. Named for an ancient salt tax, the _gabella_, also administered by middlemen, they had the closest relationship with the peasantry. In addition to arranging tenures and labor contracts, they more or less controlled the immediate conditions of work.[7] When there were expressions of peasant rebellion--which was often--they were administrators of "the law." As we will see, this task involved them in a variety of activities, ranging from the use of violence to the distribution of patronage. It made them among the most powerful figures of the countryside. It is important to note, in evaluating their position, that in the South even _mezzadria_ tenures were insecure and that people contracting for land did not anticipate permanent arrangements.[8] Landless laborers, the _braccianti_, were still less secure and, in contrast to their northern counterparts, slow to organize outside the patron-client framework.

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[6]Mosca, _Partiti e Sindacati . . ._, pp. 205-207; Demarco, _Il tramonto dello Stato . . ._, pp. 35-79; Raffaele de Cesare, _The Last Days of Papal Rome: 1850-1870_, trans. Helen Zimmern (London: Archibald Constable and Co. Ltd., 1909), pp. 89-92.

[7]Mosca, _Partiti e Sindacati . . ._, p. 206; Dolci, _Waste . . ._, p. 25.

[8]Demarco, _Il tramonto dello Stato . . ._, pp. 43-55.

To this day one finds the southern _braccianti_ struggling for solidarity--a minority possessing a little land, a few skills, or a reputation for never having organized a strike; the rest being divided by the number of days between 50 and 350 that they can get work in a year.[9] For all of the _braccianti_ a well placed friend or patron is desirable. Some of the more fortunate are connected to a _gabelloto_.

The _gabelloti_ had an interesting counterpart in the Agro-Romano, an area surrounding Rome which, because of malaria-infested marshes, was under-populated. This was the _caporale_, a typical intermediary for mobile laborers. Often he was a peasant or landless laborer himself, who, through good contacts or good fortune, had taken advantage of changing social and economic relations to become a small time patron.[10] He would be contacted by a landowner or manager and asked to supply a given number of workers for so many days. In turn he would choose among his clients, promising them a certain salary. The money which he received from the manager for salaries always exceeded the amount he promised to the workers. The difference, of course, was his fee.[11] In addition to the fee, however, each transaction might reward the _caporale_ with an increment

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[9]Reneé Rochefort, _Le travail en Sicile: Étude de Géographie sociale_ (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), pp. 151-54 and 177-78.

[10]Demarco, _Il tramonto dello Stato . . ._, pp. 68-69.

[11]_Ibid._, pp. 67-70 and 75.

of power. Ideally, at least, the braccianti whom he had favored now owed him their loyalty, which made him important in the eyes of the managers. Suppose one of the latter wished to hire workers under adverse conditions? He might seek out an important caporale who, for his part, would demand a larger fee.[12]

In periods of economic growth, the ranks of managers, contractors, brokers, that conducted affairs for the latifondisti, expanded. At no time was this more apparent than during the period in question. The multiplication of managers and contractors between owner or chief tenant and peasants was indicative. Similarly, the new layers of usurers between those with capital and those in debt, or of speculators between those who controlled crops and those who could influence the market.[13] In lieu of bureaucratic institutions for marketing and credit, networks of individuals introduced some order into the sudden broadening of opportunities. An important aspect of this had to do with the organization of the grain market, in which speculation on futures was critical and controlled by powerful intermediaries.[14] In speculative transactions, the price

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[12]Ibid., pp. 75-76 and 115-18.

[13]Ibid., pp. 46-49, 67-69, and 115-20; Raffaele Ciasca, "Borghesia e classi rurali del Mezzogiorno nell'età del Risorgimento," Il Movimento unitario nelle Regioni d'Italia (Bari: Giunta Centrale per gli Studi storici, 1963), pp. 64-69.

[14]Ibid., p. 65; Demarco, Il tramonto dello Stato . . ., pp. 46-49.

of grain was easily inflated--at the expense of the poor who had to buy bread, and of the system, when the market became competitive. That is why, during the Restoration, the *mercanti*, the managers, the new landowners, moneylenders, and contractors agitated for a protective tariff on wheat and for subsidies for the export market.[15]

It is not surprising, given the organization of Italian culture, that the expansion of commerce in agriculture was quickly reflected in the cities. For one thing, many brokers of the rural economy lived there, along with the *latifondisti*. At the same time, the new wealth which expansion made available to middlemen affected others in more strictly urban occupations. During the Restoration, especially, newcomers sought positions in the royal or papal bureaucracies. Usually they had studied law in the universities but, unless privileged or protected, could pursue only unauthorized or unworthy careers. In the papal court, according to Raffaele Cesare, a multiplicity of "unauthorized" employments prevailed among the educated laity.[16] His description of this group might also hold for the rural intermediaries:

> . . . Members . . . knew each other and helped each other mutually. The dominant spirit was patriarchal, though not free from spite and hidden

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[15] *Supra*, pp. 60-61; Romani, *The Neapolitan Revolution . . .*, pp. 21-22.

[16] Cesare, *Last Days of Papal Rome*, p. 87.

> jealousies . . . and it was always patronage that prevailed: there was no career without it. If there was little envy, nevertheless all were striving after more influential patronage.[17]

Striving for influential patronage, or for influence, had its most important social and political consequences in the mobility of the intermediaries. Periods of expansion were particularly suited to their personal capacity for exercising power. While this took many forms, and occurred at all levels of society, the most noteworthy example is suggested by the transfer of land.[18] During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a new layer of *latifondisti* inserted itself into the complex web of south Italian patronage networks. It was composed of newcomers variously secure, and known as the *galantuomini*--"gentlemen" or "men of honor." In Sicily alone, according to Denis Mack Smith, 20,000 non-noble families owned large estates by 1860.[19]

Like the nobility, the *galantuomini* administered their affairs through *gabelloti*, brokers, and retainers, keeping a considerable distance from the peasantry in the process. They usually outdid other kinds of middlemen in their display of prestige and status. For instance, they sought to live in the cities and insisted, at all cost,

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 88. Also see Ciasca, *Il Movimento unitario . . .*, pp. 66-67.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 69-72.

[19] Denis Mack Smith, "The Peasants' Revolt in Sicily," in *Studi in onore di Gino Luzzatto*, III, pp. 201-40.

that their sons and daughters escape the "blight" of manual labor.[20] Yet this much continuity over generations was difficult to come by, and one notices a certain weakness behind the displays of place and power. The *galantuomini* were, as one historian observed, "consolidated in the margins" of the old order, "more than in a frontal struggle against it."[21] Having no means of hegemony vis-a-vis the noblemen, they had to accommodate to them. One way was to marry into titled families, and appropriately they earned a reputation for intriguing in high places. Another was to acquire more land. Whatever the source of their capital, it was used for this purpose.[22] Land symbolized status and remained the only real source for social credit--a fact which the Restoration governments acknowledged in their refusal to tax wealth.

The rather tenuous position of the *galantuomini* was illustrated by their politics. Since changes in social relations (their remarkable mobility, for instance), did not indicate qualitative changes in the productive process, contractions or alterations in the grain market affected them instantly. In the early nineteenth century, new land-owners were important participants in the brotherhoods of

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[20] Mosca, *Partiti e Sindacati . . .*, pp. 188-90.

[21] See Villani's response to Ciasca, *Il Movimento unitario . . .*, p. 135.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 72-79; Demarco, *Il tramonto dello Stato . . .*, pp. 118-20.

the *Carbonari*, swelling them, in fact, when the Restoration brought an end to the Napoleonic blockades of Russian wheat.[23]

Carbonarism, however, moved away from its south Italian origins, becoming, by 1830, a movement directed toward rationalization, controlled to some extent from Paris. In the South, the intermediaries, and especially the *galantuomini*, their *gabelloti*, and their retainers, would contribute to the Risorgimento in more ambiguous and vascillating ways. In exploring them, we will concentrate on Sicily, because there social forces regularly came to a head, exhibiting some integrity apart from the networks that cut across them. Remember that Sicily had not been occupied by the French Army and, under British protection, had remained independent of the mainland until Napoleon's defeat. This circumstance was important because it made the subsequent Bourbon administration of island affairs more odious. Sicilian political life was enlivened by separatist movements, which engaged the participation of an unusually restless peasantry. The peasants were responding to Bourbon taxes, tax collectors, and policemen, whose presence on the island multiplied what, for them, were the disastrous effects of commercial expansion. Land sales, for example, affected their use rights on the communal domain, putting many of them in debt or reducing them to the status of the

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[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 219-26; Romani, *The Neapolitan Revolution . . .*, p. 22.

braccianti. The officials of the monarchy were less and less under its control during the Restoration; they absorbed for themselves the resources which were in transit to Naples or the goods and services that they were supposed to distribute. They frequently intervened in the vendettas and conflicts of local communities, attempting to manipulate them for the cause of reaction.[24] In a rising of the poor, they were among the first to be captured. The distinguishing factor in Sicilian politics was the frequency of these risings. In fact, one can reconstruct the island's Risorgimento around "crises of order" and their resolution.

The Social Forces of Sicily

The cities of Sicily harbored "rationalizing" forces, just as did the cities of northern and north-central Italy, but their predicament was rather different. The proliferation of intermediaries in the latifundist west and interior of the island, and the frequency of peasant risings, meant that they competed with other active forces quite overtly. This had the effect of weakening them. Southern moderates, for instance, were hard to find. If not living in exile in Piedmont, at least they were in no position to pursue the programs which moderates had undertaken in the North. The democratic movements did undergo an evolution in the South paralleling, though not duplicating, the northern

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[24] Mosca, *Partiti e Sindacati . . .*, pp. 195-96.

experience. After 1848, they changed their place of exile from Paris to Piedmont and relinquished their republican ideals.[25] However, they did not spend the Cavourian decade establishing contacts with the moderates, as ex-Mazzinians had done through the National Society in the North. Rather they directed the notables of southern cities more towards Mazzini than Cavour. Their leader, a Sicilian lawyer like La Farina, was Francesco Crispi.

The faction which retained the spirit of '48 in the South became more Jacobin than its northern counterpart. Its leaders criticized Mazzini for ignoring the land question and encouraged in peasants and artisans the conviction that it was legitimate to fight for land. Moreover, they believed that the sale of communal and Church property only enriched the rich, and some of them, anyway, rejected private property in favor of socialized forms.[26] After major risings, their place of exile was Malta, for which reason they have been called the "Maltese Committee," or the "Maltese Jacobins."[27] Through 1860, their efforts at social

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[25]The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, trans. Mary Prichard-Agnetti, Vol. I; Exile, The Thousand (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1912), pp. 142-45.

[26]Salvatori Francesco Romano, Momenti del Risorgimento in Sicilia (Messina: Casa Editrice G. D'Anna, 1952), pp. 171-92.

[27]Marxist historians of the Risorgimento are especially interested in this group, and have discovered that it was influenced by the European socialists, Fourier, Saint-Simon, and Robert Owen. One of its leaders, Pasquali Calvi, is noted for having concluded that if the term "communism" meant agrarian reform, then "la rivoluzione è

revolution were concentrated in Palermo. According to their formula a rising there would be supported in the countryside as Paris had been in 1789.

In other words, the rationalizing forces were not only weaker in the South but, in their democratic manifestations, somewhat more radical. There were moments in the Sicilian Risorgimento when they were both ascendant and supported by the intermediaries of the countryside. These moments, however, generally introduced (they did not cause) a "crisis of order." The resolution invariably involved a realignment, from which the rationalizers were excluded. Resolutions in the early nineteenth century had a "Sanfedist" quality, in which the Bourbons allied with the peasantry, using it against middle class and "middlemen" alike. By 1848, however, this was no longer likely, and the initiative for restoring order went to the "middlemen." From that time on, the pivotal force in Sicily consisted of the _galantuomini_ and their henchmen--their _gabelloti_ and retainers. In 1860 they would be as important to the moderates of Piedmont as the local notables of the National Society had been for the unification of the Romagna and the Duchies in 1859.

What was a "crisis of order"? Most generally, the outcome of a rebellion of the poor, which measured the

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nel senso del comunismo!" See John M. Cammett, "The Italian Risorgimento," _Science and Society_, XXVII (Fall, 1963), p. 445.

extent to which they could oppose, or attack, the rich. In the nineteenth century, such rebellions occurred among the peasants every decade or so, depending upon the harvest and other non-political factors such as a famine or plague. In some cases it is difficult to say what caused them but easy to identify the framework.[28] The expansion of commerce and consequent proliferation of intermediaries, especially in latifundist areas, narrowed the peasants' use rights on the communal domain; inflated the price of bread and pasta; lowered the returns that small operators could get on their crops. Peasants were forced into debt or out of work. They could borrow money on future harvests as the speculators did, but rarely did they earn enough to meet the climbing interest rates. During the restoration, the imposition of Bourbon taxes multiplied these disasters and, with them, the frequency of peasant risings.[29]

When risings articulated with major political events, as they did in 1820, 1848, and 1860, a variety of anti-Bourbon elements used them to acquire power. The new landowners of the interior, and the notables and democrats of the cities and towns, are the most obvious examples. However, an

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[28]Risings did not necessarily accompany bad harvests, and sometimes occurred prior to a good harvest following several years of bad ones. This was the case in 1860.

[29]Romano, Momenti del Risorgimento . . ., pp. 111-23. For the same developments in the Papal State and Neapolitan provinces, see Demarco, Il Tramonto dello Stato . . ., pp. 46-55; Ciasca, Il Movimento unitario . . ., pp. 87-89; Cassin, San Nicandro . . ., pp. 157-61.

important section of the island's aristocracy wanted independence for Sicily and also participated. In these contexts, the peasants remained a distinctive force only by organizing in their own terms. This meant the formation of "squads," often under bandit leadership, which, armed with knives, attacked the police and the tax-collectors of the Bourbon government.[30] The bandits were eccentric and individual rebels against authority, but they survived because of a symbiotic relationship with peasant communities. Hobsbawm, who has written about them in Mediterranean cultures, suggests that while a bandit can hide in the mountains, he has to be fed and clothed, protected and informed by friends. His existence depends upon the peasants' "shifty and stubborn" refusal to cooperate with "the law." In return, he is obliged to express the peasants' concept of justice--to "take from the rich and give to the poor." Bandits were rarely ideological about this, but most of them served the causes of the poor.[31]

Another aspect of the peasants' integrity is suggested by the fact that their risings got support from people at the _bottom_ of the social order. For instance, poor priests and poorly paid Bourbon soldiers sometimes

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[30] Romano, _Momenti del Risorgimento . . ._, pp. 127-28; Mack Smith, _Studi . . ._, p. 206. Other tactics included cutting telegraph wires and stealing horses from the postal service.

[31] Hobsbawm, _Primitive Rebels . . ._, pp. 13-30.

joined a general "conflagration."[32] In the Sicilian cities, including Palermo, there was no "mob" of the kind that Hobsbawm describes in Primitive Rebels. Not being court cities, they had no traditions of the city poor organizing to ensure that a monarch (or pope) sustain them.[33] But the artisans of these cities often rose. They shared many grievances with the peasantry, such as police brutality and the grist tax, which raised the price of staple foods. They suffered from the commercial revival as well. It gave impetus to the dissolution of their guilds and subjected them to the fluctuations of a wider market. It also curtailed the purchasing power of the peasants.[34]

Despite the convergence of the poor in a rebellion, it very often happened that they did not stay together. For one thing, peasant risings tended to go beyond attacks on the Bourbon police and functionaries, while risings in Palermo and the other cities did not.[35] This was because a real, if hidden, dynamic of the peasant squadre was their drive to take land from the galantuomini. In risings of

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[32] The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, I, p. 212. Examples are cited of the propaganda which the volunteers delivered to the Bourbon troops. Also see Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., pp. 93-95.

[33] Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels . . ., pp. 108-26; Mack Smith, Studi . . ., p. 205.

[34] Romano, Momenti del Risorgimento . . ., pp. 24-28; Demarco, Il Tramonto dello Stato . . ., pp. 79-94; supra, pp. 81-83.

[35] Romano, Momenti del Risorgimento . . ., pp. 192-205.

major proportions, the peasants invariably occupied communal holdings that had been usurped by advancing "middlemen." Furthermore, the occupations signalled a wholesale shift in alliances. The *galantuomini*, who might previously have supported the destruction of the Bourbon government, turned their *gabelloti* and retainers against the peasants.[36] The Bourbons also confronted new alternatives: they could join one side or the other. Bandits and priests made the peasantry accessible, so long as the landowners were the enemy. Priests believed the *galantuomini* to be godless; bandits were easily tempted by Bourbon offers of booty or protection.[37] For these reasons both could be used as instruments in the mobilization of peasants for a Holy War on "progress."

Before 1848, when the southern intermediaries sought or protected land through the brotherhoods of the *Carbonari*, and when they cooperated with the rationalizing forces of the cities, the Bourbon-peasant, or "sanfedist," alliance was not unusual. However, the revolution of 1848 marked a turning point. In it, the *galantuomini* prevented a Sanfedist coalition by themselves making peace with the Bourbons.[38] They were joined by businessmen of the cities--

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[36] *Ibid*., pp. 84-87 and 125-28; Mack Smith, *Studi . . .*, pp. 218-19.

[37] On the relationships between brigands and Sanfedists, see Cassin, *San Nicandro . . .*, pp. 161-76; Angus Heriot, *The French in Italy, 1796-1799* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1957), pp. 231-33 and 251-60.

[38] Romano, *Momenti del Risorgimento . . .*, pp. 100-109.

merchants, financiers, and owners of the island's sulphur mines, whose activities had been expanded with English capital and who subsequently found the Bourbon government stifling.[39] The rationalizing forces of the cities--the professional people, officials, engineers, surveyors, students, intellectuals; the Mazzinians, and ex-Mazzinians led by Crispi--considered the compromise a betrayal; a sell-out to the causes of reaction.

But, as a matter of fact, this was not quite true. Nor is the outline of Sicilian politics just presented. Behind the picture of rationalizing forces, making their way against a counter-revolution and the treachery of newly rich landowners, is another in which the relationship between those landowners and the peasantry is critical. It derives from the importance of intermediaries in the social organization of latifundist areas where, for many purposes, the class war coexisted with the vendetta.[40] There, for example, a peasant squad frequently comprised a kin group and its allies, avenging some personal injustice. In such instances, non-peasants were easily involved in the squads. In fact, the very structure of a vendetta invited interference from Bourbon officials (possibly through a bandit), or the landowners (through their retainers). Mosca, in

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[39] Ibid., pp. 78-84.

[40] Ibid., pp. 125-27. Intermediaries in the Papal State and the Mezzogiorno are discussed by Demarco, Il Tramonto dello Stato . . ., pp. 129-40; Mack Smith, Studi . . ., pp. 222-23.

writing about Sicily, acknowledged how peasant risings meant war by the poor upon the rich but emphasized equally the frequency of disputes over land, marriages, murders, and so on, among the peasants, and the interest which outsiders took in them.[41]

Among other things, the combination of "class war" and vendetta suggested the means for restoring order. According to Mack Smith, a peasant rising automatically resulted in the spontaneous formation of "committees" or compagni d'armi, by local governments and landowners, through which it was possible to play one peasant faction off against another.[42] In the course of the Risorgimento, this approach to crises of order developed considerably, resulting in 1848 in the formation of a "national guard" and culminating in 1860 with the use of still more effective private armies, called the controsquadre. Since all levels of society in the Sicilian interior depended upon the vendetta for insurance against injustice, most towns had more than one private army, and several alliances that pitched leading families, their retainers, and some peasants, against other leading families, also well supported.[43] When the

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[41]Mosca, Partiti e Sindacati . . ., pp. 195-97.

[42]Mack Smith, Studi . . ., p. 222; Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi in 1860: A Study in Political Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), pp. 9-11.

[43]Mosca, Partiti e Sindacati . . ., p. 197; Romano, Momenti del Risorgimento . . ., pp. 192-205.

galantuomini and the intermediaries of the interior made their peace with the Bourbons in 1848, it was only to get support for their hegemony over local government. They had already assumed an initiative in the restoration of order. After '48 it was as clear to them as to the Crispians that the Bourbon monarchy was a thing of the past--all the while less willing and less able to defend the _latifondi_. That is why, in May of 1860, they threw their strength behind the liberation of Sicily from the Bourbons, occasioned by the landing of Garibaldi and implemented by rationalizing forces on the island.

The Garibaldian Dictatorship

Garibaldi's invasion of Sicily was the product of a long and difficult planning stage in which forces sympathetic to, or in touch with, Mazzini approached and convinced the General that such a move could succeed. Outstanding among these was a group in Turin under the leadership of Agostino Bertani, another in Palermo under Crispi. Both leaders were lawyers who, like La Farina though less so, had relinquished the ideals of 1848.[44] Unlike La Farina, neither had any love for Cavour, and saw in particular a need for the democrats to recapture some initiative, if only to force the moderates to shake their fear of French retaliation and "march on Rome." Garibaldi more or less shared

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[44]Grew, _A Sterner Plan . . ._, p. 306.

their views but by this time had formed a rather firm attachment to Victor Emmanuel and a reluctance to pursue only the paths of failure.[45] It is important not so much that he had to be convinced to lead a volunteer army southward as that, at every juncture after his departure, his success was crucial to the alignment of social forces.

For example, as long as he succeeded, the Bertanians could safely try to get resources for him in the North. As long as he succeeded, his own Fund, called the Million Rifles Fund with some pretention, drew significant contributions.[46] More important, his success put the National Society to work, assisting the volunteers lest it lose its own friends to the Bertanians.[47] (The Society's locals in

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[45]The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, I, pp. 142-45; Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., p. 91.

[46]After Villafranca, Garibaldi was persuaded by La Farina to preside over the newly reconstituted Central Committee of the National Society. The arrangement was short-lived, because Garibaldi simultaneously engaged in recruiting volunteers for the liberation of Umbria and the Marches. The Million Rifles Fund grew rapidly after his resignation, late in 1859. It would staff, finance, and equip a major portion of his campaigns in the South. See Grew, A Sterner Plan . . ., pp. 226-31 and 296-99.

[47]To the one and a half million lire collected by the Fund, the National Society, next in amount, added only half a million. Moreover, according to Garibaldi, the rifles donated by the Society were rusty and would not fire. The accusation, understandably, led to speculation that the moderates had secretly planned to send the volunteers to slaughter. It is more likely, however, that Cavour had no set plans at this point, and the SNI, not too much enthusiasm. See ibid., pp. 294-303; Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., p. 91.

the Romagna were lost for the moment anyway.)[48] Finally, a successful Garibaldi forced the moderates' hand. Either they did nothing, in which case the volunteers took the Kingdom of Naples and held it, until Rome could be taken too, or they backed the Bourbons in a counter-revolution, thereby becoming traitors to the "opinion of Italy" and vulnerable to its retaliation. Or--and this was the only real alternative--they sought to take the South and the Papal State on their own terms, through their own alliances and with the regular troops of Piedmont.

Not surprisingly, the Cavourian alliances in the South were made with the galantuomini and sympathetic noblemen, many of whom had lived for years in Turin. Garibaldi's, on the other hand, were with the followers of Crispi. These people were chiefly local "men of note": lawyers and intellectuals, doctors, pharmacists, officials, sometimes medium landowners, but almost always residents of the cities.[49] They were interested in the French Revolution, but after 1848 had--much as in the North--become more "moderate." In their case, however, this happened largely outside the context of the National Society, even though LaFarina was a lawyer from Syracuse and had many friends there.[50] The SNI did poorly in the South until after 1860;

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[48]Supra, pp. 124-26.

[49]For their counterpart in the Papal State, see Demarco, Il Tramonto dello Stato . . ., pp. 164-68.

[50]Grew, A Sterner Plan . . ., pp. 363-66.

meanwhile, southern notables formed still looser kinds of associations in which they tried to preserve an identity from the Bourbons, the nobility, the peasants, the "Jacobins," and especially the treacherous compromises of the galantuomini and their henchmen. At the same time they anticipated unification, expecting that a secular government would recruit their sons and sell the Church domain.[51]

When Garibaldi landed with 1,000 volunteers at Marsala in early May, island representatives of the Bourbon police were already in flight. A rising of the poor had begun in and around Palermo in April, and because of it the Thousand were instantly successful.[52] The peasantry and Palermo poor attached themselves to Garibaldi, in whom they saw a liberator. The General, for his part, promised a land reform and began attending Mass.[53] From the perspective of the poor a Sanfedist alliance against him made no sense.

Neither did a "deal" between the galantuomini and the Bourbons. Again the Garibaldian intervention made a difference. If Garibaldi retained the loyalty of the poor, how could the Bourbons--further weakened by the liberation

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[51] Romano, Momenti del Risorgimento . . ., pp. 100-109; The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, I, pp. 102-105 and 140-42.

[52] Mack Smith, Studi . . ., pp. 216-17; The composition of the volunteer army was largely north Italian, Lombardy being the best represented. The Piedmontese delegation came largely from Genoa rather than Turin. The army was also very young. See Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., pp. 91-92; Garibaldi, Autobiography . . ., pp. 151-52.

[53] Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., pp. 93-97.

of Sicily--defend property against peasant occupations or a land reform? The galantuomini put their "national guard" and their retainers on the side of the liberation. If there were to be a land reform, they wanted to be in on it.[54]

It was important to Garibaldi's success that the poor were tumbling Bourbon authority but equally important that the rich were on his side. The latter, after all, were in control of local government, and no administration could ignore that.[55] In addition, they alone could guarantee an income to the liberation, which could not live forever on sack and the Million Rifles. Finally, the cooperation of the galantuomini helped legitimate Garibaldi to the northern moderates, making it harder for them to thwart or ignore his efforts.

Having at least the tacit support of rich and poor, Garibaldi set up a Dictatorship. Crispi was appointed "pro-dictator," or chief executive, and the spine of the new regime was peopled with patriotic notables. Its energies were directed toward rationalizing the Sicilian government. An attempt was made, for instance, to centralize the administration through the use of Governor-Prefects in the 24 districts of the island. At the local level they were to counter the power of the landowners or their agents. They

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[54]Mack Smith, Studi . . ., pp. 216-17.

[55]A Sicilian proverb, attributed to the Duke of Olivares, says "In Sicilia, con i baroni potersi tutto; senza i baroni, nulla." During the Risorgimento, this was increasingly true for the galantuomini. See ibid., pp. 236-40.

had authority to over-rule the councils of the towns and to recruit personnel for the police.[56] Crispi noted, in making these arrangements, that the revolution of '48 had collapsed "partly from failure to place between the State and the townships an intermediate authority, leaving the towns over-much to their own devices."[57] Early decrees of the new regime placed it in opposition to the Church as well. Some Church properties were nationalized; some religious orders taxed. Meanwhile, the odious grist tax was removed, and the government began its search for new sources of revenue.

In this search it confronted the latent opposition of Sicilian "middlemen." A tax was levied on proprietors, for example, but when it became clear that the government needed money to prepare an invasion of the mainland, tax-collectors could not make them pay.[58] In addition, the government was forced to sell land that it had nationalized in order to meet its creditors--often the _galantuomini_, who then increased their holdings in the land sales. Furthermore, they got permission from the government to sell communal lands in order to pay off the debts of the local governments--which they controlled. Here, too, they were

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[56] _The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi_, pp. 176-90.

[57] _Ibid._, p. 179.

[58] _Ibid._, pp. 179-88. On the tax revolt of the _latifondisti_, see Romano, _Momenti del Risorgimento . . ._, pp. 205-211; Mack Smith, _Studi . . ._, pp. 236-37.

both the creditors and the receivers of land.[59] The promised land reform, as one might expect, was of little consequence. In it, a few volunteers, not themselves peasants, got shares of the communal domain.[60]

Meanwhile, the government pursued its policies of rationalization. Crispi created six differentiated ministries, retaining for himself the top positions in Finance and the Interior. (A Piedmontese reformer would have done the same.) The biggest step, however, was launched in June, with a decree that established conscription. It was virtually impossible to enforce. "I wish to inform you in confidence," one of the district Governors wrote to his friend, Crispi, "that the edict concerning conscription has awakened dissatisfaction . . . the most loyal, the radicals, and the true patriots . . . entreat me to do everything to avoid a catastrophy."[61]

June also brought opposition from another quarter. Early that month, La Farina arrived in Palermo to represent Cavour. He and Crispi became engaged in a highly personal conflict in which each mobilized friends and friends of friends for competing policies.[62] The issue at stake

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[59] Ibid., pp. 238-40.

[60] Ibid., pp. 229-30; Cammett, Science and Society, XXVII, pp. 444-47.

[61] The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, I, pp. 273-74.

[62] La Farina's activities in Sicily were only partially supported by Cavour, and next to Crispi, who was pro-dictator of a new regime, he was disadvantaged. His friends and

(though much obscured) was whether Sicily should be annexed to Piedmont directly and by plebiscite (La Farina), or after Garibaldi's liberation of at least Naples and by constituent assembly (Crispi). The immediate annexationist position would eventually supersede, but not through La Farina's effort. Within a month, Garibaldi had expelled him.[63]

La Farina's failure in Sicily looked like a solid victory for Garibaldi over Cavour. Indeed, in spite of its superficiality, the Dictatorship was surviving. People were not convinced that it would fall, and Cavour was especially nervous. Garibaldi's charisma was largely responsible for this, if we understand by it a set of social relations that permitted him to be charismatic. Among the more vulnerable

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friends of friends were in Palermo and the very cities of the eastern coast that Crispi had visited in 1859. In 1860, La Farina was reduced to organizing piazza demonstrations against the Crispian government, and writing exaggerated accounts of its weaknesses and "Mazzinianism" to the Piedmontese press. See ibid., pp. 244-55. Also see Grew, A Sterner Plan . . ., pp. 343-63.

[63]The following is from a letter which La Farina wrote to Cavour:

> "Perhaps, owing to some scruples of delicacy, I have not insisted enough on Garibaldi's attitude to you . . . My greatest fault in his eyes is just that of calling myself your friend . . . If, therefore, you and your friends think you can win what I have not been able to win, you are quite wrong. Putting aside my modesty in the interests of the public weal, I tell you that outsiders would lack all my personal relations and knowledge of people and customs here, and also, I may say, that popularity which makes me (excuse the arrogance) a power with whom Garibaldi himself has to count. And do not think I say this out of personal ambition. You must know me well enough now not to harbour any suspicion of that."

Quoted in Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi . . ., p. 85.

outputs of his government were the rather eccentric reforms to which he himself paid personal attention--for example, the establishment of military academies for the poor.[64] Yet, the nature of the authority which his followers bestowed on him lay precisely in this: that he might indulge in irregularities with impunity.

The poor people who had risen in April, and who were chiefly responsible for expelling the Bourbons, could not claim Garibaldi as their representative. They had neither seen nor heard of him before the landing. Nor could they conclude that he represented the landowners. His government had, after all, claimed to shift the fiscal burden to latifundist shoulders and promised a land reform. Furthermore, while the Dictatorship was administered by notables, it did not appear to be based on them either, largely because the administration was so ineffective. Garibaldi's movement actually stood outside of the island's social structure--a fact which its "irregularity" made highly visible and which the rising poor legitimated by spontaneously seeing it in supernatural terms. Thus Garibaldi was believed to have descended from the patron saint of Palermo, Rosalia, and to be half a saint himself. The myth, incidentally, was spread by poorer priests and nuns.

In other words, the General was neither an ideologist nor in power because of relationships that involved

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[64]Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., pp. 98-99.

the guerilla capacity of the poor. Unlike Crispi, he did not terrify the rich, even though the poor worshipped him as their deliverer. The tacit acceptance which he got from both ends of the social scale was what insured his Dictatorship its (admittedly short) life. Similarly, the outbreak of a war between them spelled its death. In this respect, the "routinization" of Garibaldi's charisma was irrelevant--except in the sense that he had relied on the Crispians from the start. The General's charisma notwithstanding, his government deteriorated. Cavour, by the time that it did, was ready to pick up the pieces.

For, as a matter of fact, Cavour was not to be undone. As early as June, "the men around him" were in touch, not with Sicilian notables (through LaFarina or Crispi) but with latifundists--particularly those who had been exiled in the North. Key figures in the rudimentary conspiracy were "autonomist" aristocrats, who sought independence for Sicily. Others represented the _galantuomini_. Through the summer, Cavour's best efforts had been devoted to making annexationists of them. Behind the back of the Dictatorship, national patronage had been committed to one of its two props: the rich.

A Major "Crisis of Order"

The land occupations which erupted in July were predictable; they had been contained in the rising. Moreover, the rising itself contributed to them by, for example,

increasing the cost of living, interfering with the harvest, encouraging the distribution of arms to the poor.[65] At the same time, there was a tendency for the Dictatorship to reward its volunteers with small shares of the communal domain but to execute a land reform in no other terms. The conscription decree further contradicted the peasants' need for land and work, and Crispi's administration made it worse by attempting to control brigandage with the conscripted militia. ". . . Make all haste in getting the militia organized that we may rid ourselves of the armed bands," he had ordered, as early as May.[66] The bands, however, expressed the peasants' revolt, although Crispi linked them to certain "malicious persons . . . having nothing in common with the mass of the people . . . ."[67]

In other words, the Dictatorship was not based on the peasants' revolt, however critical it had been for its success. With a few exceptions, the integration of peasants with volunteers was transitory or non-existent.[68] When the land occupations broke out, neither Garibaldi's movement, nor its Crispian satellite, could sympathize. Indeed, the occupations struck the General as "communistic" and evil--

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[65]Mack Smith, Studi . . ., p. 221.

[66]The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, I, p. 197.

[67]Ibid., p. 206.

[68]Garibaldi, Autobiography . . ., II, p. 147.

as a dangerous interference with the Sicilian and Neapolitan war effort. Repressive measures were in order.[69]

Many people have been surprised at the severity of means which the Dictatorship used against the peasants, but this too was predictable. After all, the very premises of the new government--centralization, an extension of the liberation by new taxes and conscription--presupposed a break with them. Moreover, the Crispians had never been comfortable with the squads. According to Mack Smith, "it was the first object of Crispi to create a regular militia which would relieve himself of the embarassment of their support."[70] When the occupations began, he had only to accelerate a counter attack already launched against "malicious brigands." Its main instruments were the government militia, the "national guard" of the galantuomini, and later, special councils, tribunals, and firing squads. The "Maltese Jacobins" were also targets of the repression.

But the galantuomini were not satisfied. In 1860 the troops of their "national guard" could not be trusted to counteract land seizures, except in distant communes where they had no connections.[71] Still worse, Crispi's

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[69]Mack Smith, Studi . . ., pp. 231-35; Mack Smith, Garibaldi . . ., pp. 99-100; Romano, Momenti del Risorgimento . . ., pp. 184-92. Romano includes a message from the Mazzinian Committee of Genoa to its comrades in Palermo: "Vogliamo che il popolo rispetti la religione, la proprietà, la famiglia." (P. 191.)

[70]Mack Smith, Studi . . ., p. 218.

[71]Romano, Momenti del Risorgimento . . ., pp. 220-21.

militia was severely weakened by peasant resistance to conscription.[72] Nor could the volunteer army supplement it since Garibaldi was simultaneously preparing the Neapolitan invasion. Finally, fiscal difficulties handicapped the government in its "special" measures. Suddenly it seemed as dangerous to remain with the Dictatorship as to turn to the Bourbons.

Two things happened. The *galantuomini* turned instead to Cavour, seeking protection from the rural police of the Piedmontese Army--the *Carabinieri*. And they encouraged their *gabelloti* and retainers, now organized as *contro-squadre*, to fight the peasants for them.[73]

In neither case did the war between rich and poor necessarily predominate. The networks that crossed that barrier became important, while the cleavage between the galantuomini and the Crispian notables widened. According to Mosca, in fact, the homicides committed by peasants were ambiguous. He suggests that they could have been "almost always excited and directed by some galantuomo, who had an

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[72]Mack Smith, *Studi . . .*, p. 224. An uprising against conscription began in the sulfur mining areas of southwestern Sicily, spreading from there to the *latifondi*. In many respects the organization of the mines was like that of the large estates. Intermediaries controlled operations in much the same way, and workers were as severely repressed. See Rochefort, *Le Travail en Sicile . . .*, pp. 224-42; Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels . . .*, p. 36.

[73]Romano, *Momenti del Risorgimento . . .*, pp. 282-88. Also see Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels . . .*, pp. 39-42.

old account to square with his adversaries . . . . One of the more effective means of seduction was that of making the executors of the murders believe that the recent revolution rendered any excess possible, and insured impunity."[74] In other words, peasant violence was not necessarily directed at the _galantuomini_, but very often directed by them. This was certainly true of the violence committed by lesser intermediaries. Hobsbawm notes the significance, by 1860, of a "local network which enmeshed estate guards, goat herds, bandits, bullies, strong men, with local property owners . . . ."[75] His inclusion of bandits is at first misleading. Theoretically, they belonged to the "side" of the poor, opposed to the strong men who, after all, protected what bandits were supposed to steal. Yet a network by its very nature has no boundaries and no respect for "sides." If the peasants could be clients of the _galantuomini_ or the _gabelloti_, the bandits could too. A typical exchange might find a bandit informing on a peasant to a _gabelloto_, in return for protection from "the law."[76]

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[74]Mosca, _Partiti e Sindacati . . ._, p. 197.

[75]Hobsbawm, _Primitive Rebels . . ._, p. 39.

[76]_Ibid._ "We must bear in mind that the best chance the peasant or miner had of mitigating his oppression was to gain a reputation for being tough or a friend of toughs. The normal meeting-place of all these was in the entourage of the local great man, who provided employment for men of daring and swagger _and_ protected the outlaws . . . ." (Italics added.)

It is also necessary to understand that the "restoration of order" did not result exclusively from the use of violence. In the long run, the reason why these relationships worked was that they also supported the distribution of patronage. After 1860, many of the contro-squadristi--the gabelloti and retainers of the landowners--came to be called mafiosi.[77] The word derived from the patois culture of a suburb of Palermo and meant moral as well as physical superiority.[78] The mafioso assumed the galantuomo's posture of "honor," for which the capacity to dispense favors and protection, or to exercise influence on another's behalf, was essential. It is interesting that, in this case, the bandits were excluded. As Hobsbawm has elsewhere indicated, "the Mafia ideal, unlike that of the criminal, is not to live outside the law, but to become the law . . . to establish a position of de facto power and status. . . ."[79] We will learn in the following chapter how much the realization of this ideal involved networks of patronage.

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[77] Ibid., pp. 36-37. "The word itself, in its modern connotation, does not occur before the early 1860s . . . . On the other hand, by 1866 the word is already used as a matter of course . . . by the 1870s it is common currency in political discussion."

[78] Romano, Momenti del Risorgimento . . ., pp. 290-91; Gaetano Mosca, "Mafia," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. E. R. A. Seligman, X (1933), pp. 36-38.

[79] E. J. Hobsbawm, "Mafia in Sicily," New Society (April, 1964), pp. 11-12.

During August of 1860, the peasant occupations reached their limit and, as they did, the initiative for "restoring order" shifted definitively from Crispi to the _controsquadristi_. Crispi attempted to flank his government's faltering militia with the _Carabinieri_, but by this time the links between Sicily and Piedmont were monopolized by the landowners. It is true that the _Carabinieri_ came to the island, but it was in the service of the latter. This was the "coup" which Cavour had been cultivating since June, against Garibaldi and the Crispians. Actually, neither Crispi nor Garibaldi were opposed to annexation, and the latter was a devoted subject of Victor Emmanuel. Both, however, opposed the moderates, especially for shielding the Temporal Power at Rome. In addition, immediate annexation was correctly perceived by them as threatening. Its import was to exclude the southern notables from the nation. As we will see, their means of entrance would be the southern intermediaries--the _galantuomini_, _gabelloti_, _mafiosi_, for example.

The Risorgimento in Naples

In the long run the only possible way that the Italian peasantry could be neutralized--that is, kept from the arms of an anti-national counter-revolution--was through enlarging and encouraging the networks of intermediaries which, in the agricultural sector of Center and South, penetrated peasant life. In areas where the animosity between

rich and poor was intense, where restoring order, or getting protection, was forever an issue, a special type of broker--the *mafioso*--emerged. Elsewhere, the tasks of "becoming the law" were not so clearly defined. In any case, though, the need for brokers and intermediaries further enhanced their power and made them mobile in the social structure of the South. To the southern notables, who had been excluded from the 1860 alignment of forces, they became obvious potential allies. When these notables were finally admitted to the national arena, it was 1876, and the result of an election fight in which intermediaries backed them. This was when the moderates lost control of the government to the so-called parliamentary "Left." Afterwards, the suffrage began gradually to expand, and "election making" in Center and South became a fact of life for government coalitions of northern and southern notables. The bargaining power of the southern intermediaries increased accordingly and, from this, one traces their influence on the structure and processes of national government. One notes that the *mafiosi*, like the *galantuomini* who bred them, used their new positions to become respectable: to buy land, go into business, send a son to law school, live in the city or have friends there, and so on. In many cases they fused with the notables. Hobsbawm's observation is appropriate: the henchmen of the Risorgimento became Italy's near-victorian "men of honor."[80]

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[80] *Ibid*., pp. 11-12.

Now, most of these developments were more true for Sicily than for the mainland, and in our discussion of them we will often concentrate on Sicily. The reasons for the difference--which is not overwhelming--are obscured by the fact that the basic outline of the Risorgimento on the mainland parallels the island's.

Cavour attempted to anticipate Garibaldi's arrival in Naples by staging an anti-Bourbon rising of his own. It failed as well it might, having been arranged by a group of landowning exiles known as the "Committee of Order" (!), and following closely, as it did, Cavourian overtures of non-aggression to the Bourbons.[81] When the volunteers arrived in southern Calabria on August 20, peasant towns did rise. Along with the *Lazzaroni*, or lesser artisans, of Naples, they were chiefly responsible for the destruction of Bourbon police power and the subsequent defection of large numbers of Bourbon troops.[82] The *Lazzaroni* were in some degree parasites of the Bourbon Court, accustomed to forming, under their own elected leaders, a kind of "mob," which rioted for the king's protection.[83] Garibaldi was

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[81]Crew, *A Sterner Plan . . .*, pp. 366-70; Mack Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi . . .*, pp. 129-62; King, *A History of Italian Unity . . .*, II, pp. 155-56.

[82]*Ibid.*, pp. 163-65; Mack Smith, *Garibaldi . . .*, pp. 102-104; Mack Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi . . .*, pp. 204-22.

[83]Hobsbawm discusses the rioting mob in *Primitive Rebels . . .*, suggesting that it be understood, *not simply as a "casual* collection of people," but as a "permanent entity, although not permanently organized as such." Mobs,

particularly advantaged to have captured their imagination. By September 6, in fact, he was able to force the evacuation of the Bourbons from Naples and, on the following day, enter the city himself.

Garibaldi's Neapolitan Dictatorship, like its Sicilian counterpart, then fell to Cavour. By October, the latter had covered for his mistake at Naples, accomplishing what some historians have called his "master stroke": a liberation movement in which the regular troops of Piedmont made their way through the Marshes and Umbria (neutralizing Bertani, and the Romagnole committees of the National Society) and into the South. They did not, however, go through Rome. Subsequent governors of the _Mezzogiorno_ were nearly hand-picked by Cavour for their resistance to Garibaldi.

There were also some distinctive features of the Neapolitan Risorgimento. For example, it was not fueled by a separatist movement. As a result, there was less opposition to the Bourbons than in Sicily--whether on the part of

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in fact, were consistent about many things: they were always against the rich and powerful, and the non-townsman, or "foreigner." Their members were not necessarily the most destitute, although many of those were among them. The _Trasteverini_ of Rome, for instance, were "of the better sort of poor people, families long-established . . . and self-respecting . . . ." The _Lazzaroni_ of the Mercato Quarter of Naples were probably porters, and apprentices in the lower trades. In both cases, the attachment to a court enabled the mob to survive periods of famine or depression. It rioted periodically for a modicum of limited protection. See pp. 108-26.

nobles, the galantuomini, or the notables. During the Dictatorship, Garibaldi imported administrators and pro-dictators (including Crispi) from Sicily and the North. The Neapolitan notables were apparently less well organized than their island counterpart and not prepared to form a government. Cavour, for his part, could work through defecting Bourbon ministers and generals without alienating his anti-Bourbon contacts.[84]

Another difference between Sicily and the mainland was that, in the case of the latter, there was a much wider diffusion of non-latifundist culture.[85] The war between rich and poor nowhere developed to the extent that it had on the island. Nor was there, by 1860, a rural political order which approached the "brokerage firms" of the Sicilian gabelloti. In this context, it is not surprising that the center of gravity for the Neapolitan Risorgimento was not in latifundist areas, but in the city of Naples itself. Here, indeed, proprietors had their retainers--in particular, a criminal "fraternity" called the Camorra, which they patronized. Like the mafie, the Camorra organized "rackets,"

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[84]King, A History of Italian Unity . . ., II, p. 156. "Cavour relied more on conspirators in the heart of the government" than on any other kind of anti-Bourbon. Also see Grew, A Sterner Plan . . ., pp. 366-71.

[85]John and Leatrice MacDonald, The Economic History Review, XVI, pp. 68-70. In the nineteenth century, large estates in the South were confined to certain areas, and competed with a growing number of small and medium holdings. However, since the extensive cultivation of grain did not change with the redistribution of property, many aspects of latifundist culture remained intact.

specializing, for instance, in gambling and protection. During the revolutions of 1848, a Bourbon-turned-moderate Minister of the Interior ruled the city of Naples with the _Camorra_ as his police force.

Yet the _Camorra_ should not be confused with the _mafie_, for while the word "_mafiosi_" diffused in southern Italy as it had in Sicily, Neapolitan "men of honor" could not accumulate a comparable increment of power. The _Camorra_ was basically an urban "gang" with few connections in the countryside. Although it "had" Neapolitan notables elected, it never acquired the means of organizing a machine and entered the twentieth century largely underground.[86]

For the real differences in the South Italian, as opposed to the Sicilian, Risorgimento, one must look to the countryside. In the South in 1860 there was, quite simply, no "crisis of order." Note that the length of time between the departure of the Bourbon king (September 6) and the plebiscite (October 21) was relatively short compared with the May-to-October experience in Sicily. Garibaldi's one month stand on the mainland did not begin to affect the interior, if indeed it penetrated Naples. In one writer's view, it was a "complete novelty."[87] It is true that, in

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[86]On the _Camorra_, see Hobsbawm, _Primitive Rebels . . ._, pp. 53-56.

[87]Mack Smith, _Garibaldi . . ._, pp. 104-106. Decrees on education, communal and religious properties, railroads and the telegraph, and several directed towards the elimination of gambling and begging, did, however, reflect the Dictatorship's commitment to a more rational social order.

latifundist areas, proprietors controlled the peasantry through *gabelloti*. However, they did not have to organize these brokers specially as *controsquadre*. The Neapolitan *gabelloti* were therefore less likely to ascend the social scale than their Sicilian counterparts. The distinction is important, because once the mobility of the Sicilians was established, it seemed to be continually reinforced.

One source of power for the *gabelloti* was the state's patronage and protection. But since this came in partial exchange for votes, the Neapolitans, who controlled fewer people, were again disadvantaged. In addition, the Napoleonic occupation of the mainland, not experienced by Sicily, had dispensed with a considerable amount of the ecclesiastical domain. Its sale after 1860 therefore opened proportionately fewer opportunities to land-hungry intermediaries.[88] Often, instead of acquiring more power, the *gabelloti* of the Neapolitan provinces became small rentiers, in charge of only a portion of an estate and unable to accumulate or invest much capital.[89] Meanwhile, the Sicilian *gabelloti* entered a tremendous variety of economic pursuits.[90] Luigi

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[88]The importance of this should become more apparent in the following chapter. According to Mack Smith, "the dissolution of the monasteries and the sale at cheap prices of the nationalized ecclesiastical lands, was to be one of the most important factors in the growth of a newly rich class after 1860." *Cavour and Garibaldi . . .*, p. 390. Also see Romano, *Momenti del Risorgimento . . .*, pp. 233-45.

[89]John and Leatrice MacDonald, *The Economic History Review*, XVI, p. 70.

[90]Luigi Barzini, *The Italians* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1964), p. 259.

Barzini describes, for instance, the following kinds of contemporary *mafiosi*:

> . . . cattle and pasture Mafie; citrus grove Mafie; water Mafie (who control the scarce springs, wells, irrigation canals); building Mafie (if the builder does not pay, his scaffolding collapses and his bricklayers fall to their death); commerce Mafie; public works Mafie (who award contracts); wholesale fruit, vegetable, flower and fish markets Mafie, and so forth.[91]

The differences discussed above are overdrawn for the purposes of emphasis, but nonetheless should indicate that the course of "upward circulation" of social etiquettes and organization would have a special Sicilian component. It is not surprising that Barzini shows how "every Italian quality and defect [is] magnified, exasperated and brightly coloured," in Sicily, citing Goethe's warning that "without seeing Sicily one cannot get a clear idea of what Italy is."[92]

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[91] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

[92] Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 252.

CHAPTER V

PIEDMONTESE HEGEMONY AND ITS LIMITATIONS

The Risorgimento and the French Revolution

In the closing months of 1860, plebiscites were held in Sicily and the South, the Marshes and Umbria. The National Society, local notables, and especially landowners, produced the required show of unanimity for "fusion" with Piedmont.[1] In the meanwhile, Garibaldi departed from Naples, leaving southern Italy to Victor Emmanuel and the Piedmontese Army (now to become national). When the first elections for the national Parliament were held in January 1861, only Venetia, still under Austrian jurisdiction, and Rome, still under the papacy, stood out as noticeable

[1]On the plebiscites in Umbria and the Marches, see Grew, A Sterner Plan . . ., pp. 386-89. "In preparing the vote itself, the Society . . . followed the techniques developed by the SNI in the Romagna the year before. The cities were to lead the way for the countryside." Again, landowners assumed the heaviest burden. "They were not only to instruct their peasants . . . but to lead them to the polls exerting 'every influence'. . . ." For Sicily and the South, see Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi . . .. As in the North, the suffrage for the plebiscites was universal--a degree of democracy which, the moderates acknowledged, not even England had achieved. They knew, however, that the "general ignorance" of the people "made a popular vote safe." (P. 387.)

unredeemed territories. Venetia would become Italian in 1866; Rome in 1870. The Italian nation had been made.

"But not Italians," as the moderate, Count d'Azeglio, put it, turning a phrase that caught on instantly.[2] Democrats and radicals may have been neutralized by the moderates, but all the more did they oppose the new regime. In Parliament, the Mazzinians, Bertanians, and Garibaldians sat to the extreme left of the new government majorities, from which they were excluded. Hence their label: "the *Estrema*." The Crispians, who represented many shades of southern notables, sat there too. Part of the *Estrema* would be a source of brains and organizing talent for Italian socialism. Meanwhile, the peasants of southern Italy waited hardly a month to demonstrate their misery to the nation. Their squads and bandit heroes were supported in attacks on its officials by the deposed Bourbon monarch and the papacy. The Pope, not at all sure that counter-revolution was impossible, and aware that French and Spanish Catholics were sympathetic, eventually decreed that Italian Catholics might not participate in national institutions.[3]

Who, then, were the Italians of the new Italian nation? Of a population of 22 million, the suffrage extended to roughly half a million in 1861. Of them less than

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[2] Mack Smith, *Italy . . .*, p. 67.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

300,000 voted.[4] A broad consensus supported moderate forces: either Cavour's following on the Center Right (the *Destra*), or the followings of northern notables like Rattazzi or Depretis on the Center-Left (the *Sinistra*). Friends of La Farina, on the whole loyal to the Cavourian "party," controlled approximately a third of the seats in the first legislatures.[5] Thanks to them, the *Destra* retained an upper hand, although Cavour died unexpectedly in June of 1861. In the early 1860s, however, the National Society as such dissolved.[6]

Neither the *Destra* nor the *Sinistra* constituted a political party in any orthodox sense. Both were more accurately shifting coalitions, sometimes advantaged, sometimes not, by swings to the left or right. The character of all governments discouraged the evolution of collectively responsible cabinets, or clearly defined oppositions. Even the *Estrema* was in danger of being compromised by the approach which the moderates took to organized opposition. Governments rose and fell on the basis of personal and

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[4]Neufeld, *Italy . . .*, p. 524.

[5]Grew, *A Sterner Plan . . .*, p. 407.

[6]*Ibid.*, pp. 437-42. In 1863, La Farina was elected to the vice-presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, but, shortly after, died, leaving his followers without the personal leadership that had kept them together. In Umbria and the South, the Society had expanded significantly after Cavour's death; it offered local notables a belated opportunity for participation in the Risorgimento, and access to national spoils. However, after 1863, it declined there as elsewhere. By mid-1864, it was "near extinction."

factional disputes; parties were disliked, distrusted, or irrelevant.[7]

The governments of the Destra were not so unusual as governments of inexperienced liberals. After all, some of their ministers had believed that the locomotive was the "greatest of revolutionists."[8] But they were uninspiring. Where the French Revolution left an indisputable myth of greatness in its wake, the heirs of the Risorgimento could look forward to disillusion. The compromises of the moderates often worked, but were they honorable? The consorteria was practical but destructive of ideals. The Cabinet ministers--the ministeriali--thought they were saving their nation from the radicalism, or dogmatism, of parties. But what did they permit it instead besides hypocrisy?[9]

One of the most interesting intellectuals to debate the Risorgimento (and there have been many) was the twentieth

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[7]Mack Smith, Italy . . ., pp. 30-35.

[8]There is a tendency on the part of some scholars, among them Mack Smith, to see the moderate governments in terms of a characteristic Italian inability to lead or govern. I wish to emphasize the similarity between the moderates and laissez-faire liberals elsewhere. Support for this view comes from an Italian historian of the Risorgimento, Adolfo Omodeo, whose interpretation of Cavour places him in the tradition of English liberalism. See Maturi, Interpretazioni . . ., pp. 537-44, and infra, pp. 233-34.

[9]For a comprehensive discussion of the disillusionment with unification, see John A. Thayer, Italy and the Great War: Politics and Culture, 1870-1915 (Madison and Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 3-40.

century Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci. Ironically, he appreciated the governing class and its possibly "brilliant solution" to its own vulnerability.[10] Having excluded the democrats from their many and shifting coalitions, the Italian liberals nonetheless maintained a stable regime. The practice of transforming opposed factions into allies, later dignified by the expression trasformismo, made it possible for the upper classes to stay in power, without mobilizing a substantial social base.[11]

Gramsci's purpose was not, however, to justify the liberals. Rather, he sought to understand them in the context of a comparison between the Risorgimento and the French Revolution. He used the latter as a model against which to explain and judge the former. In a sense we have done this too, especially in evaluating the "rationalizing process" and its limitations in Italy. Gramsci's central argument is that the Risorgimento owed its distinctiveness to the absence of an agrarian revolution--to una rivoluzione agraria mancata.[12] The alternative was exemplified by

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[10]Gramsci's essays on the Risorgimento have been collected in the volume, Il Risorgimento (Turin: Einaudi, 1949). A short presentation of its contents appears in Maturi, Interpretazioni . . ., pp. 617-27. For a sympathetic discussion, see Cammett, Science and Society, XXVII, pp. 433-57. A critical discussion is presented by Rosario Romeo, Risorgimento e Capitalismo (Bari: Editori Laterza, 1959), pp. 17-52.

[11]Cammett, Science and Society, XXVII, pp. 437-38; Gramsci, Il Risorgimento, p. 70.

[12]Romeo, Risorgimento e Capitalismo, pp. 19-21; Gramsci, Il Risorgimento, pp. 85-86.

France, where the Jacobins showed an interest in the peasants' demands for agrarian reform, and where the peasants, for their part, were willing to accept "the hegemony of Paris." Gramsci argued that, without the agrarian politics of the Jacobins, Paris would have had the Vendee (the counter-revolution) at her gates.[13]

Notwithstanding some of his critics, Gramsci nowhere insisted that the democrats in Italy were, or could have been, Jacobins or that the Italian peasants--with a few exceptions--would have followed Jacobin leaders.[14] He did suggest that France had a real advantage in "going first." Italy entered the modern world without even nationhood, and under the watchful eye of an increasingly conservative Europe.[15] Moreover, the Italian peasants, except for the *mezzadri* tenants of the Po Valley, were better off under titled latifundists than under the new "capitalists" of the countryside. They could be persuaded, where many French peasants could not, that nationhood was evil.

According to Gramsci's thesis, it was because "an action on the peasants" did not materialize that the moderates

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[13]*Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

[14]The frequently cited exception to these generalizations is Gramsci's argument that the Italian bourgeoisie did not "extend its hegemony over the vast popular strata," for subjective rather than objective reasons. The argument concludes with the pronouncement that "*l'azione sui contadini era certamente sempre possibile*." See *ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

[15]*Ibid.*, p. 87 and pp. 150-51.

were able to manipulate and demoralize the democratic forces. If the latter had been able to organize a social base, they could have retained their initiative after 1849. The result of their having lost it was that Piedmontese hegemony "was presented as a necessary historical condition for an indeterminate time."[16] The difference between the hegemony of Paris and the hegemony of Piedmont was partly quantitative. In our terms, both approached a rationalization of the social order. In Gramsci's, the Piedmontese did this without at the same time being able to "incorporate new economic zones," to resolve the contradictions in Italian culture, to create a viable relationship between the state and the "national-popular" forces of society.[17] In the twentieth century, with the work of the Risorgimento still undone, Gramsci sought an alliance between northern workers and southern peasants against the bourgeois state.

The Hegemony of Piedmont

It is not unusual in either Marxist or non-Marxist interpretations of the Risorgimento to emphasize the "hegemony" of North over South; the economic development of

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[16] Ibid., p. 210.

[17] If the hegemony of the North had occurred as a process of industrialization in which other economic zones were incorporated, it "would have been the expression of a struggle between the old and the new, between progress and backwardness . . . . It would have been an economic revolution of national character even if its motor remained temporarily and functionally regional." Ibid., p. 210.

the North at the expense of the South; the disruption by northern institutions of southern society; the complicity of the southern latifondisti in the ruin of peasant life. The argument can take many forms. For example, one of Gramsci's critics, the economic historian Rosario Romeo, argues that a period of Piedmontese hegemony was essential to the development of Italian capitalism. The construction of railroads and a national market could not have proceeded without a sacrifice of rural to urban, or southern to northern, forces.[18] Romeo also insists that the political consequences of the French Revolution contradicted the French potential for rational economic development. For instance, because of the Revolution peasants emerged as petty proprietors, avoiding the inhumanity of acts of enclosure, or their equivalent, to which English peasants had been subjected. However, the rural population in England had subsequently been the source of farmers, entrepreneurs, and proletarians--of modern economic categories--while, in France, petty proprietors were powerful enough to sustain their pre-industrial way of life.[19] The implication is that a Jacobin Risorgimento would have inflicted on Italy what has been called in the case of France, "an impregnable citadel of small and middle proprietors," antagonistic to the further development of free labor, the home market,

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[18] Romeo, Risorgimento e Capitalismo, pp. 17-49.

[19] Ibid., pp. 29-31.

industrial capitalism.[20] According to Romeo, whatever economic growth the Italians achieved, they owed to the <u>rivoluzione agraria mancata</u>--or the hegemony of Piedmont, which was its necessary counterpart.[21]

The "hegemony of Piedmont" is also reinforced by dualistic theories of Italian development, in which the more legal-rational culture of the North is held to confront and clash with the more traditional culture of the South.[22] Development proceeds insofar as the former expands against the latter. However, because of the discontinuities in culture, or antagonisms between traditional and modernizing

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[20]Hobsbawm, <u>The Age of Revolution . . .</u>, p. 69. Hobsbawm's evaluation of the French Revolution is not unlike Romeo's, in this respect, although he has been accused of obscuring its retrograde economic consequences with a concept, "the dual revolution," which forces the industrial revolution of England, and the political revolution of France, into a single developmental framework. See p. 70 and pp. 177-80.

[21]Romeo, <u>Risorgimento e Capitalismo</u>, pp. 35-38. This was especially the case because the process of capital accumulation had not progressed significantly in the absence of national institutions. Romeo argues that in France agricultural stagnation was in part compensated for by the industrial and commercial development of finance capital which was accelerated in the eighteenth century. In Italy--never a mercantilist <u>nation</u>--capital had to be formed "essentially in the countryside . . . and at the expense of the poorest peasants."

[22]See, for example, LaPalombara, <u>Interest Groups in Italian Politics</u>, pp. 55-63. ". . . The new regime came into existence without the substantive participation of the masses, despite the virulent hostility of the Catholic Church, and with only the half-hearted support of those south of Rome, who little understood that the ballots they cast in the plebiscites would help to usher in a period of Piedmont hegemony over the entire peninsula." (P. 55.) Also see <u>supra</u>, pp. 6-7.

spheres, it is also argued, in dualistic theories, that an overly "rapid" modernization is self-defeating. It disorganizes the traditional population, making it impossible for the integrative structures of kinship or community to function, but replacing them with no alternatives. What Gramsci recognized to be the "increasing misery" of southern peasants, social scientists in the Weberian tradition record as anomie. In the first case, alienation demands the integration of southern peasants with northern workers in a revolutionary movement. In the second, a total disorganization of society suggests the vulnerability of its members to agitators and "extremists." These ideological perspectives are poles apart, but sociologically they are not so very different.

The sociology of Piedmontese hegemony is, for Marxists and non-Marxists alike, heavily influenced by the experience of other countries. Gramsci took many leads from Lenin. Moreover, he believed that the Russian Revolution belonged to the same order of phenomena as the Revolution of 1789. He even suggested that Machiavelli's principles of centralization and political creativity were rudimentary forerunners of the revolutionary party, exemplified later by Jacobinism and, in more developed form, by the Bolsheviks.[23] Sociologists in the Weberian tradition have been more

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[23]Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings, trans. Louis Marks (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 1957), pp. 135-76.

exclusively influenced by the experience of Western Europe and no less prone to understand the developmental process elsewhere in terms of it.

Before proceeding with the description of an alternative and competing evolutionary process, it is necessary to insist that a wealth of evidence supports the assumption of a Piedmontese hegemony. For instance, much of the statistical data on Italy demonstrates a widening gap between North and South after 1860. In the areas of literacy, health, population pressures and unemployment, standard of living, number of people employed in agriculture, and so on, the South is to be found on much lower scales than the North well into the twentieth century.[24] There is also evidence of an economic decline in the South after unification. It is noteworthy, for example, that the South was disadvantaged by the nationalization of public debts after 1860, having had a negligible one compared to, in particular, the Piedmontese.[25] At the same time, the Piedmontese moderates extended the institutions of the free market throughout the peninsula, expecting that there should be immediate advantages from the "unencumbered movement of goods." Southern industries, accustomed to being protected,

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[24]Shepherd B. Clough, _The Economic History of Modern Italy_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 8-9, 133-35, and 138-42; Dickinson, _The Population Problem . . ._; Neufeld, _Italy, School . . ._, pp. 78-80, 145-49, and 307-309.

[25]Cassin, _San Nicandro . . ._, p. 186; Clough, _The Economic History . . ._, pp. 42-44.

suffered and in some cases were forced to surrender to northern competition. The industrial development of the South hardly measured Piedmont's or Lombardy's before 1860. But the discrepancy would not shrink.[26] The so-called "persistence of agriculture" in the Italian economy was more a southern than a national phenomenon.

More telling, however, are the comparisons between northern and southern agriculture. According to Renée Rochefort, the Sicilians got almost twice as much wheat from a hectare as the Lombards in 1870. Today the yield in northern Italy is three times what it is in the South.[27] Similarly, the South maintains over two-thirds of the country's goats and sheep but only one-third of its cattle. In 1952, less than 9,000 of 66,000 tractors were in use south of Rome.[28]

Other evidence of a Piedmontese hegemony is suggested by the grist tax--the _macinato_--instituted by the moderates in 1869 as a major source of revenue for the state. Because it raised the price of bread and pasta, it was particularly

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[26] _Ibid._, pp. 163-69; Neufeld, _Italy, School . . ._, pp. 79-80 and 563-68; Cassin, _San Nicandro . . ._, pp. 186-87; Richard Eckause, "Il divario Nord-Sud nei primi decenni dell'Unità," _La formazione dell'Italia industriale_, Discussioni e ricerche a cura di Alberto Caracciolo (Bari: Editori Laterza, 1963), pp. 115-20 and p. 127.

[27] Rochefort, _Le travail en Sicile . . ._, pp. 122-24.

[28] _Ibid._, pp. 124-25; Dumont, _Types of Rural Economy . . ._, pp. 229-31; _Post-War Italy: A Report on Economic Conditions_ ("Fabian Publications: Research Series," No. 143; London: 1949).

harsh for the subsistence population, constituted largely by southern peasants.[29] The tax (along with others on salt and tobacco) multiplied the effects which land sales had on the peasantry and followed by only a few years the withdrawal of national troops from the South. Between 1861 and 1865, 120,000 of them had participated in a "pacification" of brigands and their peasant allies. According to one report, over a thousand rebels had been caught with arms and shot by 1863. More than two thousand were killed fighting and nearly 30,000 put in jail.[30]

The Brigand War of the early 1860s was superficially a counter-revolution. Some of the bandits, for example, travelled with Bourbon officers and this message from the deposed King of the Two Sicilies (asylumed and nurtured at Rome): "The King wishes to have done with the *galantuomini*; he will give their lands and their houses to the peasants. [We] are charged to bring you the benediction of the Pope and to absolve you of your sins."[31] Very shortly after the plebiscites, peasants in many of the rural towns had turned on new landowners and patriotic notables. Sometimes there

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[29]On the *macinato*, see Thayer, *Italy and the Great War . . .*, p. 17. "As it turned out, the macinato failed to deliver the anticipated revenues until 1872, when it brought in 60,000,000 lire." Also see Mack Smith, *Italy . . .*, pp. 85-87. The tax quickly resulted in riots: "After two weeks there had been 250 deaths, 1,000 people wounded, and 4,000 rioters were in prison."

[30]*Ibid*., p. 73; Cassin, *San Nicandro . . .*, p. 182.

[31]*Ibid*., p. 178.

were executions, sometimes property was burned or pillaged, sometimes there were occupations of the land. One of the peasant slogans was said to have been "Long live Francesco II and the poor people." And some of the peasants' bandit heroes were "employed" by the King for this end.[32]

Counter-revolutionary aspects of the brigand war were also suggested by a simultaneous extension of the Piedmontese Statuto in the South. For the official policy behind the military "pacification" was a "severe but just application of the [national] law."[33] Its representatives were not only the armed forces, but the judges, bureaucrats, policemen and Prefects, whose appointments and careers were approved in Turin. Insofar as the peasant rising confronted them, one can describe its impact as a Sanfedist or counter-revolutionary brake on enlightened, or rationalizing forces. In this sense, the peasant rising embodied a traditional alliance against the rationalization of southern society. The more the moderates rejected ideas for regionalism, federalism, administrative decentralization, in the decade of the '60s, the more, it would seem, this was true. One of the pressing realities behind their many rejections

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[32] Ibid., pp. 178-80.

[33] The expression derives from a pronouncement of Cavour that "Naples can rise again only by a severe but just application of the law." Quoted in Mack Smith, Italy . . ., p. 236.

of these alternatives was the potential for attacks upon the nation from the South.[34]

Hegemony and the Intermediaries

If a Piedmontese hegemony is implied by dualistic approaches to social evolution, it also contradicts them. For, in the long run, one of the most striking consequences of hegemony was that it accelerated the proliferation of intermediaries in the South. It is perhaps obvious that the extension of the Statuto multiplied opportunities for employment which, under the Bourbons, had been monopolized by monarchists or their allies. Similarly, the administrative and political integration of the state indicated an expansion of governmental services and activities. The moderates, for instance, pushed for the construction of railroads in areas where they had been undeveloped and sought to enter the field of education to compete with the facilities of the Church. However, it was a long while before the spoils inherent in these extensions of the state became available to local structures of power. A significant evolution of the networks of intermediaries preceded the transformation and gave it some particular characteristics.

Ironically, southern intermediaries were created and assisted by the very policies that took a rationalizing

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[34]See Fried, The Italian Prefects . . ., pp. 72-93.

form. For example, in 1867 the government passed a law calling for the suppression of monastic orders, the expropriation of their property and much of the Church's that was not used for religious purposes. The land was said to be worth 1,700 million lire and was sold to raise revenues for the state at numerous local auctions.[35] Supposedly the units were small enough for peasants with credit to afford. Many auctions were administered illegally, however, and even where the peasants bought land they frequently had to sell it back to meet their debt.[36] But it was not the latifondisti who benefited from the irregularities. In Sicily, nearly 40,000 of 100,000 hectares to be sold by 1883 went to medium proprietors. The remainder were monopolized by the galantuomini, and especially their gabelloti, who were fast becoming gentlemen of status and honor themselves. In addition, local notables in professional occupations and some of the better-off peasants got land as a result of the sales.[37] Similar patterns were reported for

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[35] In addition, the state put railroads on the market, and sold a portion of the communal domain, which it nationalized. See Neufeld, Italy, School . . ., p. 78, and Clough, The Economic History . . ., pp. 47-51.

[36] Ibid., p. 50; Mack Smith, Italy . . ., pp. 87-88; Cassin, San Nicandro . . ., pp. 186-87.

[37] Clough, The Economic History . . ., p. 390, note 25; Neufeld, Italy, School . . ., p. 78; Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels . . ., pp. 37-38.

other parts of the Mezzogiorno. There, in fact, the *latifondi* tended not to survive as large estates at all.[38]

While the redistribution of land provided the greatest opportunities for individuals with credit, or capital, or connections, it did not, in itself, enhance their role as intermediaries. What is more important in this respect is the fact that the old, extensive mode of production was perpetuated by the new proprietors.[39] Like their predecessors, they sought friends and contacts (and hopefully residences) in the cities and supported layers of brokers between themselves and the peasants. Their frame-work, in other words, was consistent with the past. Now, however, it rewarded more readily the personal exercise of power. The last decades of the nineteenth century were marked by a considerable mobility, up and down, in local

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[38]John and Leatrice MacDonald, *The Economic History Review*, XVI, pp. 68-70. In Campania, the Basilicata, and Calabria, some of the large estates remained, but in the Abruzzi-Molise, there are almost none. "In central Italy small owner-operated holdings are less common than in southern Italy." These small holdings are, however, unstable operations--a fact which is "accentuated by the sub-division of the land among heirs, and by the giving of dowries . . . ." The direct cultivator must jockey for position in a "highly competitive society," and has little advantage over tenants or the *braccianti*.

[39]According to one observation, the south Italian "entrepreneur" continues to "maximize unit profit by mini-mizing production." Quoted in Leonard W. Moss and Stephen C. Cappannari, "Estate and Class in a South Italian Hill Village," *American Anthropologist*, LXIV (April, 1962), p. 294.

hierarchies of the South.[40] The towns were each dominated by a handful of families--usually the gabelloti turned galantuomini--who competed for control over mayors and councilmen, deputies and the provincial Prefect. In the process they built and used competing clienteles. Whereas earlier, local clienteles attained a fair degree of stability, now they were inclined to shift, revealing their true composition and extent only in political crises.[41]

The development further accentuated the "openness" of peasant life. It has been said that, in the Mezzogiorno, the simultaneous quest for power or privileges, and respect for hierarchy, are universal. "All political life is based on personalities and clienteles; on lines of interest and fidelity."[42] All social relations imply gradations of privilege, distinguishing not so much the boundary lines of social classes as the small differences between families

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[40]Mosca suggests this in emphasizing the tenuous position, especially from one generation to the next, of the galantuomini. See Partiti e Sindacati . . ., pp. 188-92. According to Pitt-Rivers, who is a student of Andalusian Spain, partible inheritance is an important contributing factor in this regard. See supra, p. 24, note 32. Also see Joseph Lopreato, "Social Stratification and Mobility in a South Italian Town," American Sociological Review, XXVI (August, 1961), pp. 585-96.

[41]Cassin, San Nicandro . . ., pp. 187-91; supra, p. 40.

[42]Paul Lengrand and Joseph Rovan, "Il Costume," La Calabre: Une région sous-développée de l'Europe mediterranéenne, ed. Jean Meyrait ("Cahiers de la fondation nationale des Sciences politiques, relations internationales," No. 104; Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1960), p. 210.

and their "friends." When William Foote Whyte studied the Sicilians, he found, for example, that a shepherd was superior to a laborer in the vineyards, who was superior to a laborer in the fields. A peasant with cows was above a peasant with swine; a herder of sheep above a goatherd, and so on.[43] Corollaries of these distinctions are the variety of cultural forms for supplication and deference; and a variety for appropriate exercises of personal domination. In the latter connection, the capacity for using words to manipulate or humiliate is important, both in real political life and in the symbolic games which south Italians play to express it.[44] Similarly, the use of titles (and nicknames)

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[43]William Foote Whyte, "Sicilian Peasant Society," American Anthropologist, XLVI (January, 1944), p. 66.

[44]Lengrand and Rovan, La Calabre . . ., pp. 219-20. For a fictional account of politically oriented games in southern Italy, see Roger Vailland, The Law, trans. Peter Wiles (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958). A slightly different, and more sociological, account is offered by J. Davies, "Passatella: An Economic Game," British Journal of Sociology, XV (September, 1964), pp. 191-206. Although the game which he describes is played in a wine-shop used exclusively by peasants and laborers, relations of dominance and subordination are its most striking attribute.

> "The Master (Padrone) of Passatella is the centre of a . . . complex of ideas and obligations. Not only is he furbo [cunning, skilful] because he won the card-play, but he is also the controller of the drink and can do what he likes with it--but in his own interest he should distribute it to his intimates. The Master therefore stands in a relationship which is structurally identical to that of the still-powerful landlord and his clients . . ."

In other words, "the basic relationships of the Passatella are common forms associated in everyday life with the acquisition and distribution of wealth; and the same moral values are applied in each situation." (Pp. 202-203.)

underscores the distinctions which games, or life, establish. The artifacts, and the relationships that they imply, are especially significant for appearing at all levels of society. They are not confined to the rich and serve in many instances to link the rich and poor.[45]

The basic unit of peasant society in southern Italy is the nuclear family, a structure which is appropriate to the system of land tenure in latifundist areas and to the residence of peasants in large towns which are cut off from the land.[46] Beyond the confines of the nuclear family, people participate in a multitude of relationships, most of which are structured in terms of individual, or "dyadic," contacts rather than solidary collectivities. The bilateral extended family, for instance, is important not for emotional sustenance, or economic organization, or solidarity. These functions belong exclusively to the nuclear family. Rather, it designates certain individuals on whom claims may be placed by the "client" in need of a "patron."[47] Jeremy Boissevain, who has written about this in the case

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[45]Lengrand and Rovan, La Calabre . . ., p. 220. "La parole est ainsi privilège ou consolation des sous-privilégiés." F. G. Friedmann, The Hoe and the Book, pp. 104-107.

[46]Leonard W. Moss and William H. Thompson, "The South Italian Family: Literature and Observation," Human Organization, XVIII (Spring, 1959), pp. 35-41; Donald S. Pitkin, "Land Tenure and Family Organization in an Italian Hill Village," Human Organization, XVIII (Winter, 1960), pp. 169-74.

[47]Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics . . .," pp. 11-12.

of Sicily, notes how the obligation which people have to exercise influence on behalf of their kin "makes persons in authority vulnerable and gives a strong personal content to decisions." However, "besides being vulnerable through the demands of a large circle of kinsmen, [authorites are] invariably part of a network of reciprocal obligations shared between patrons and clients."[48] In other words, there is no significant qualitative difference between their relations with kinsmen and non-kinsmen. Patronage networks cover both. They also cover relations of pseudo-kinship, or Godparenthood, through which southern Italians acquire patrons for themselves and their children.[49]

It is not true, as is sometimes suggested, that there are no "associations" in southern Italy. They are, however, of a particular kind. For instance, many men belong to clubs of one kind or another which fill their leisure time. While they are generally exclusive to "class" or occupational groups, they are not necessarily consolidated in opposition to another class or group. Moreover,

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[48] Ibid., p. 39.

[49] Ibid., pp. 12-13. Under the Roman Catholic faith, the Godparent "sponsors" the religious training of the child, and oversees his education, well being, and entry into adulthood. For obvious reasons, both the child and his parents benefit from a Godparent who is better connected, or more influential, than they are. Hence the tendency to seek Godparents in another town, or from a higher status group. Those who are sought out do not refuse, because they acquire a political advantage as it becomes known that they were "sought." Also see Whyte, American Anthropologist, XLVI, pp. 66-67.

they are primarily centers of political maneuvering and game-playing, or gambling--activities in which the exercise of individual dominance over other individuals is important.[50] Labor organizations are more likely to be solidary and cooperative in structure, but it is significant that, with a few exceptions, labor has had great difficulty organizing in southern Italy. Only in the Apulian wheat belt, where cash cropping developed on a large scale after unification, and to a lesser extent in Sicily, have working class organizations been strong and militant.[51] In Apulia, unions of the _braccianti_ negotiate contracts under which members work the land collectively in the hope of one day expropriating it. The cooperatives conduct trade and contract for public works projects. In these, and other respects, Apulia resembles the rural culture of Emilia-Romagna.[52]

Sicilian labor is more "advanced" than the rest of the South but less well organized than in Apulia. In the 1890s, major risings resulted in the spontaneous growth of peasant "leagues," sometimes led by heirs of the "Maltese Jacobins," the Sicilian _fasci_. The leagues sought to bid for collective contracts against the _gabelloti_ and their

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[50] _Supra_, p. 188, note 44. Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics . . .," pp. 37-38.

[51] _Ibid._, pp. 35-37 and 64-68; John and Leatrice MacDonald, _Human Organization_, XXIII, pp. 113-18; John and Leatrice MacDonald, _The Economic History Review_, XVI, pp. 67-68 and p. 73.

[52] _Ibid._, pp. 67-68.

retainers. Cooperatives bid for the control of credit and commerce, largely against the piccolo borghesi of the towns. The government's response to the risings was to declare a state of siege on the island which, in contrast to repressive policies elsewhere, wrecked the leagues and the fasci. In the Romagna and Apulia, labor organizations survived repressions; in Sicily, even the underground went under.[53] To this day, Sicilian communists are in and out of the patron-client networks, for, permanently out, they do not have the means to survive. Similarly, leaders of the Sicilian lower classes are not often martyred. Persecution generally results in humiliation, demoralization, or terror; it does not renew the revolutionary spirit.[54]

In the rest of the South, the pattern is similar. Reviewing the political structure of Calabria, one author concludes that a person has no rights against those in power unless he has, as a protector, someone with more power. "From whence comes the necessity for clienteles: without a patron, the little man is lost, but the patron, if he consents to protect the little man, wishes to be served."[55] According to F. G. Friedmann, the peasants' protection

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[53] Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[54] This point is made repeatedly in the interviews collected by Danilo Dolci. See, especially, Waste . . ., and The Outlaws of Partinico, trans. R. Munroe (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1960).

[55] Lengrand and Rovan, La Calabre . . ., p. 212.

against high interest rates, difficult credit, scarce employment, and oppression is still channeled through networks of intermediaries more successfully than through labor unions.[56] Appropriately, political parties are of little independent significance either. A contemporary Calabrian puts it this way: "I would rather be a socialist, but my patron is a fascist, so that I have taken the card of the fascist party in order not to lose my place, and since my brother-in-law who is a Christian-Democrat loaned me money, I vote Christian-Democrat."[57]

The Catholic Church organizes certain activities in the South, especially festivals, and events related to important ceremonies of the life cycle. However, the Church has little influence over men in the communities, except insofar as Bishops and priests become their patrons.[58] Some students of Mediterranean cultures, on the basis of the personal way in which people beg favors of their saints and the Virgin, have observed that the hierarchy of Catholic immortality might constitute an extension of, or ideological

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[56]Friedmann, The Hoe and the Book, pp. 102-108.

[57]Quoted in Lengrand and Rovan, La Calabre . . ., p. 210.

[58]Women, on the other hand, are very much involved by their religion. See Friedmann, The Hoe and the Book, pp. 36-37.

justification for, existential networks of patrons and clients.[59]

The extensive participation of peasants in clienteles, suggested by the above description of contemporary southern society, was particularly reinforced by the pacification aspect of Piedmontese hegemony. While the 120,000 troops seemed to epitomize the hegemony, particularly insofar as they confronted Sanfedist, or counter-revolutionary, peasants, on closer examination, it becomes apparent that the Brigand War of 1861-65 was not won by regular troops so much as by the _gabelloti_, the _mafiosi_ and _camorristi_, and numerous other "private armies" of the new landowners at first ignored, but finally backed, by Piedmont.[60] These people could both terrorize and patronize the poor; buy off their bandit heroes as well as have them killed. Moreover, in the process they recruited their own "lads" or henchmen, called the _picciotti_, usually from the peasant population.[61] In other words, the Brigand War did not produce a clear confrontation of forces--a fact which the interpretation of rising peasants as an anti-national opposition, or potential

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[59] Lengrand and Rovan, _La Calabre . . ._, pp. 220-22; Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics . . .," p. 40; Kenny, _A Spanish Tapestry . . ._, p. 135.

[60] Mack Smith, _Italy . . ._, p. 73; Hobsbawm, _Primitive Rebels . . ._, pp. 36-42.

[61] _Ibid._, pp. 40-42.

rank and file for modern socialism, obscures.[62] The increasing penetration of peasant ranks by the intermediaries would eventually result in their tenuous inclusion in the state.

Where intermediaries became responsible for the pacification effort, they enhanced their own importance in relation to the state. Hegemony encouraged this not only with respect to pacification, though, and not only for intermediaries in the latifundist areas. One kind of mediator to assume a pivotal position in the South was the lawyer. He stood between the new bureaucracy and codes of law and the people who had to deal with them. It is possible that the greater the discrepancy between the law--"severely and justly applied"--and the facts of local life, the more powerful the mediating lawyers. There is at least some indirect proof for the hypothesis. According to Mack Smith, it was noted as a "morbid sign" in Italy that "even in 1900 there was one lawyer for every 1,300 people . . . and in Sardinia . . . one lawsuit pending for every three inhabitants."[63] Prior to unification, 40 per cent of the students in the universities were studying law. Afterwards,

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[62]A review of both Marxist and Catholic-apologist theories of the Brigand War is presented by Vittorio Frosini, in "Ragioni e miti del meridionalismo," Annali del Mezzogiorno ("Centro di studi e ricerche sul Mezzogiorno e la Sicilia;" Catania: Università di Catania, Instituto di Storia Economica, 1961), pp. 78-82.

[63]Mack Smith, Italy . . ., p. 261.

the universities held their own against technical schools, doubling their student body where the latter increased by half.[64]

The multiplication of lawyers was more pronounced in the South. Mosca has described how, in Sicily, it became essential for the galantuomini and the gabelloti to send at least one son to law school. It was a means of demonstrating their distance from the laboring poor and of ensuring a continuity of status to the next generation.[65] The inheritance laws required that the land be divided equally between all offspring; a lawyer in the family meant some continuity anyway and at the same time provided possibilities for circumventing the law. If the son could get established in Palermo, or Rome; if he could manage friendships with high officials of the state; or, best of all, if he could become an official himself, then the family might survive the restrictions on its patrimony and the ups and downs to which, as an intermediary, its patriarch was subject. The power of the lawyer had no small part in this, and it is not surprising that the legal profession was quickly inflated; or that the universities--especially in the South--were subjected to intimidation and political pressure, applied by anxious parents and their important friends.[66]

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[64]Thayer, Italy and the Great War . . ., p. 13.

[65]Mosca, Partiti e Sindacati . . ., pp. 188-92.

[66]Mack Smith, Italy . . ., p. 261; Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics . . .," p. 46.

In other words, the professional classes, and the new landowners, along with their retainers, were similarly advantaged by the hegemony of Piedmont. One of the most interesting results of this development was a reconciliation between them. Recall that, before 1848, the brotherhoods of the *Carbonari* had expressed the anti-Bourbonism of middle classes and middlemen alike, being vehicles for lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists, officials, and for the new owners of land. In 1848, the latter were pulled into the orbit of the latifundists, whose retainers, or managers, or tenants they had often been. The professionals and intellectuals, on the other hand, stuck to their rationalizing course, which was largely shaped by the democratic movements of the Risorgimento. They made some modifications, of course, particularly in the direction of accepting the Piedmontese monarch as a rallying point for national unity. Under Crispi, in 1860, lawyers and other notables staffed a regime which attempted to assert itself against the landowners and their clienteles--old and new alike. In the last weeks of the Garibaldian dictatorship the contradictions between forces became intense, especially since, by then, the moderates had encouraged the landowners to support an immediate annexation to Piedmont. What is significant about developments after 1860 is that they encouraged the integration of both parties to these contradictions--the landowners and the lawyers, or the intermediaries and the local notables--in the same sets of networks. We will explore

this in the case of Sicily, and for the South in general, in the following sections.

The Mafiosi

Serious discrepancies between national law and local life are probably best known for Sicily, because there the "crime of passion"--the vendetta for the honor (the *onore*) of the family--survived the contradictory justice of the nation state. Its preservation was the work of intermediaries and, while not the only focus for their activities on the island, one of the most convenient to trace. In the indigenous Italian culture, a man's prestige and power in the community depend in part upon the honor of his family and his own reputation as a "real man"--an *omu*.[67] The foundation for *onore* consists in the fidelity of his wife and the chastity of his daughters. *Onore* is protected because theoretically the husband or father will kill the seducers of his women, and them too, if they have been dishonored.[68] At the same time, however, a "real man" is the potential or actual seducer of many women. He is permitted, even encouraged, to brag about his *machismo* (his masculine exploits) in the *piazza*, though the price may be another

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[67]Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics . . . ," pp. 13-15 and 42-43.

[68]*Ibid.*, pp. 14-15 and p. 43; Mosca, "Mafia," pp. 36-37. These relationships are described for southern Italy by Carlo Levi, in *Christ Stopped at Eboli*, trans. F. Frenaye (New York: Ferrar, Strauss, 1947), pp. 56-57 and 101-104.

man's honor. Moreover, it is widely believed that the unprotected woman will submit to him.[69] While illegitimacy rates are low in the South, there is a constant tension between the preservation of onore and the demonstrativeness of the "real man."[70]

The tension has often led to violence, usually in the form of a vendetta. For, in latifundist areas of the South, it is, even today, widely believed that "blood washes blood."[71] Acts of violence by no means originate only with "crimes of passion." However, as will be shown, the "crime of passion" became a mask for dealing with the law. The criminal code of the new nation did not recognize a relationship between certain kinds of homicide and family honor, but southern lawyers cultivated the art of distinguishing honorable from ordinary crimes. The former are reviewed in local courts with appropriate sympathy and always draw a lighter sentence.[72]

In the Sicilian interior, where the gabelloti and their clients assumed an increasing responsibility for law and order in the course of the Risorgimento, lawyers were

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[69] Ibid., pp. 101-102; Whyte, American Anthropologist, XLVI, pp. 69-71; Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics . . .," p. 14.

[70] Ibid., p. 15.

[71] Ibid., pp. 14-15. Also see Lengrand and Rovan, La Calabre . . ., pp. 213-15.

[72] Two films directed by Pietro Germi--Divorce Italian Style and Seduced and Abandoned--illustrate this perfectly.

supplemented in their efforts at mediation with the new codes of law. A special type of gabelloto, the mafioso, was prepared to be a broker for acts of violence. He had emerged from the months of revolution and Dictatorship in a rather special--if ambiguous--position. The state needed him because its pacification could not proceed in the interior by a "severe but just application of the law." Yet if he forced a certain order on the peasants, he also represented them to the state. Out of this circumstance came a set of relationships linking him to the prefecture and permitting him to protect, among other things, crimes of passion from the state.[73] One can see how a mafioso might cement his image as a "man of honor" in the process. His clients were often people who, after unification, found it unwise or unsafe or even distasteful to "settle their own accounts." For the price of reciprocal services, shows of deference, political fidelity, and so on, they "hired" the mafioso to perform (or have his "lads" perform) the necessary vendettas.[74]

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[73] Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics . . .," pp. 45-46.

[74] Ibid., p. 46. "The services which the mafioso renders to his 'friends', who are often influential persons occupying positions higher than his own in the socio-economic hierarchy, are many. They may vary from collecting a long outstanding debt to regulating a family feud, and from seeing that the son of a respected lawyer receives passing marks at school (by threatening the boy's teacher) to protecting a large landed estate against the inroads of an agricultural cooperative seeking to take it over."

As brokers of violence, the *mafiosi* represented local justice against the state. Their moral code, enforced in the towns of the interior, and identified by the word *omertà*, was closely related to the concept *omu*. According to Mosca, it "describes the attitude which assumes that recourse to legal authority in cases of persecution by private enemies is a symptom of weakness, almost of cowardice."[75] The code, however, was not monopolized by the *mafiosi* and, as exercised by the peasant community, it almost justified uprisings, or land occupations and attacks on the *galantuomini*. When witnesses to a crime refused to volunteer information to the authorities, it was not only because they feared reprisals, but also because to do so would involve them "in active cooperation with the [law] against a neighbour or kinsman."[76] Among the criminals to be protected for this reason were the brigands. Mosca argues that the code of *omertà* "facilitated the formation and activities of bands of malefactors."[77] One can see how it might therefore give comfort to the poor against the powerful and rich.

Yet however much the code of *omertà* suggests a foundation for guerilla warfare, in which a "state within a state" exists outside of the major cities, the differences

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[75]Mosca, "Mafia," p. 36.

[76]Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics . . .," p. 43.

[77]Mosca, "Mafia," pp. 36-37.

are crucial. *Omertà* is the code of the *mafioso*, too, and he cannot be assumed to have supported peasant risings or the bandits in their capacity as leaders of them. It was rather in the prevention or control of risings that the *mafiosi* built their peasant and brigand clienteles. Hobsbawm concludes that the relationship between the *mafiosi*, their "lads" and retainers (often peasants or ex-peasants and always poor), and the brigands, was like this:

> As property-owners [seeking to define the law] the *capi-mafia* had no interest in crime, though they had an interest in maintaining a body of armed followers for coercive purposes. The retainers, on the other hand, had to be allowed pickings, and a certain scope for private enterprise. The bandits, lastly, were an almost total nuisance, though they could occasionally be made use of to reinforce the power of the boss . . . .[78]

And in a note: "*Mafia* maintained public order by private means. Bandits were, broadly speaking, what it protected the public from." The more bandits, of course, the more "business" for the *mafiosi*.[79]

Not really representative of any cause, including confrontations with the state or the upper classes, the role of the *mafiosi* is more precisely one of mediation. Their spirit epitomized the personal exercise of power; their activities the manipulation of patrons and clienteles. This is the view of Jeremy Boissevain, whose study of a

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[78]Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels . . .*, pp. 39-40.

[79]*Ibid*., p. 40, note 1. For a description of protection rackets in Calabria, see pp. 53-56, and Lengrand and Rovan, *La Calabre . . .*, p. 213.

contemporary Sicilian town has been important to this discussion. He argues that "the Mafia with a capital M does not exist as a structured, corporate body . . . . What clearly does exist, however, are _mafias_, or more correctly, _mafie_." These are gangs of men with "exclusive, non-overlapping groups of colleagues and henchmen [or "lads"], who are also called _mafiosi_." Each of the latter has his "network of patrons and clients."[80] We are already aware that the _mafiosi_ performed certain services for the latifundists, especially as the guardians of property and order. In similar ways they served the representatives of the state. Their capacity, in both respects, depended upon the extent and composition of their clienteles, while the rewards that they received--from both ends of the social scale; from the community and from the state--were instruments in their personal mobility.[81]

As the _mafiosi_ became more powerful, they enhanced the emergence of the _gabelloti_ as magnates of local political life. In fact, Hobsbawm suggests that, in the West and

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[80]Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics . . .," p. 47.

[81]_Ibid._, p. 46. "The network of powerful patrons for whom he has performed services provides the _mafioso_ with a zone of influence, a circle of 'friends' to whom he can turn should he need to obtain an unimpeachable alibi for a client, a job for a poor relative, or a lucrative business deal for himself. These contacts enable him to become a patron in his own right, providing services and contacting his patrons and friends on behalf of clients from all social classes . . . . He does not charge for his services; they are performed for 'friendship'. But in return he does expect protection and help, that is, reciprocal services, when he asks for them."

interior of the island, virtually all of the _gabelloti_ were _mafiosi_ and, after unification, became an "agrarian capitalist," or rural, bourgeoisie.[82] While it is misleading to think of these brokers as a "social class," it is nonetheless important that, in Sicily, they frequently did go into business, not to acquire political power as a result, however, but because they had acquired political power to begin with. According to Boissevain, the _mafioso_ "begins by turning power to economic advantage . . . inserting himself as a broker or intermediary between buyer and seller, supplier and consumer."[83]

> . . . He fastens himself to the principal economic activity of the locality. In the inland _latifondo_ zones it is land and its management, in fishing ports it is the marketing of the catch, in the citrus belt around Palermo it is the control of water. In Palermo itself it is the building trade and organized vice. . . . As he accumulates wealth and power, his occupation changes and he raises his relative position in the socio-economic hierarchy of his locality. Thus the successful _mafioso_, who often starts his career as a _contadino_, sometimes ends it as a respected and powerful landowner or local entrepreneur.[84]

Now, the _mafioso_ described above is a contemporary. He could also have been a _gabelloto_ of the nineteenth century, except that then his relationships with urban people and activities were less developed. They grew with the reconciliation of southern middlemen and middle classes

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[82]Hobsbawm, _Primitive Rebels . . ._, pp. 37-38.

[83]Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics . . .," p. 47.

[84]_Ibid_.

that transpired after 1860, bringing the *gabelloti* into contact with lawyers, teachers, entrepreneurs, would-be politicians. They were crucial because they paved the way for political alliances by which the Italian Left would come to power. How, then, did they develop?

Undoubtably in a multiplicity of ways, some of which are easier than others to determine. For one thing, the *gabelloti*, like all Sicilian intermediaries who got control of land, wanted to live in, or have friends in, the city. This was the only way to maintain the necessary contacts with brokers in domestic and export markets, and it also signified one's status, or one's distance from the peasants. The *gabelloti* were rarely that wealthy or secure, however--at least not from one generation to the next.[85] One of the outstanding ways that they hedged against the future was by acquiring a legal education for their sons. In establishing why the *gabelloti* got linked with Palermo, Hobsbawm clarifies these points:

> In Palermo lived the lawyers who settled major property transfers (and were as like as not educated sons and nephews of the rural bourgeoisie); the officials and courts which had to be 'fixed'; the merchants who disposed of the ancient corn and

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[85]Mosca, *Partiti e Sindacati*, pp. 187-93. Mosca uses a word which means "men of honor"--*galantuomini*--to designate the political bosses of the rural towns. He indicates that the son of the man of honor who fails to get a degree, and returns to live in the town, is considered *un uomo mancato*, a failure. He spends his time in the casino, or, through a 'friend' of his father's, gets a job in a municipal office. As a rule, municipal offices are grossly over-inflated with personnel in the South.

> cattle and the new cash crops of orange and lemon. Palermo was the capital in which . . . the fundamental decisions about Sicilian politics were . . . made. Hence it is only natural that the local threads of *Mafia* should be tied into a single knot there, though--for obvious reasons--the existence of a Palermitan 'high *Mafia*' has always been suspected rather than demonstrated.[86]

If that is what Palermo held for the *gabelloto*, he in turn had an increasing increment of bargaining power to deal with when he went there. It is perhaps unnecessary to suggest that, potentially, this man controlled a lot of votes. If the hegemony of Piedmont was to be reversed--and I think that it was--one of the fundamental reasons lies here.

Hegemony Reversed

The *mafioso* spirit and type was not restricted to the Sicilian interior, but only better developed there. The word *mafioso* diffused widely in southern Italy after 1860 and in general characterized the "etiquettes" of all the intermediaries.[87] This was especially true for the *gabelloti*,

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[86]Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels . . .*, p. 38.

[87]*Ibid.*, pp. 33-37, *passim*; Mosca, *Partiti e Sindacati*, pp. 201-202. According to Mosca there is a word--*u currivu*--which is "somewhat peculiar to Sicily," and not translatable in Italian. It is generally used to mean "the profound wish to dominate at any cost, especially in order not to show oneself less powerful and cunning than one's adversaries, and sacrificing to this end any . . . consideration [except] one's own personal interest." The sentiment exists in lesser degree in southern Italy, where it has no special designation. Also see pp. 215-23.

who, in the agro-towns of the Mezzogiorno, were entirely familiar figures.[88] It was largely as members of cosche or gangs, which controlled distinct and specialized economic activities, that the Sicilian gabelloti were distinguished.[89] They were not alone to be facile in the exercise of power or good at wielding clienteles.

An important result of the growing need for these talents in the decade after unification was that the "talented" took on an increasing political significance in the eyes of the southern "men of note." These were the politicians, led by Crispi, who had been short-circuited in 1860 and whose representatives sat in the Chamber of Deputies on the Estrema. In the election of 1874, the Estrema increased its seats in the Chamber, largely because of successes in the rural communes of the South.[90] Two years later the Center-Right government of Minghetti fell, and the King called upon Depretis, the Piedmontese leader of the Center-Left, to form another. New elections returned

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[88]Cassin, San Nicandro . . ., pp. 186-87; Lengrand and Rovan, La Calabre . . ., pp. 212-16; Lopreato, American Sociological Review, XXVI, pp. 585-96.

[89]A relationship between the "peace keeping" role of the Sicilian gabelloti and their economic success was suggested earlier. See supra, pp. 166-69.

[90]Neufeld, Italy, School . . ., p. 81; Thayer, Italy and the Great War . . ., pp. 45-46. "Most of the opposition's strength lay in the South and in the Islands."

the first left-of-center majority in the nation's history, again reflecting successes in the South.[91]

There are many reasons for the change in governments which occurred in 1876--notwithstanding that the moderates had just balanced the budget. Their relations with the Estrema had deteriorated badly since 1860, especially as the latter, inspired by Garibaldi, pushed for more forceful and uncompromising confrontations with the Temporal Power at Rome. When, in 1870, the moderates finally "marched on Rome," they did so in such a way as to leave the "opinion of Italy" singularly uninspired.[92] Their reputation as the "compromisers" of national ideals was one factor in their defeat. However, the aspect of defeat most relevant for the evolution of national forces was less the "failure" of the moderates than the emerging alliance between notables and gabelloti in the South.

The change in governments did not produce many significant changes of policy; yet it reversed the dominance

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[91] Ibid., p. 46. "In the elections of 1876, which were called after the vote ending the rule of the Destra, the Sinistra's power in the South was shown to be overwhelming. Of the 200 southern deputies returned, only four were in the Destra." Also see p. 175. "The Sinistra was able to capture the South for itself after 1876."

[92] Ibid., p. 9. Thayer quotes the novelist and essayist Alfredo Oriani, who described the "march on Rome" this way: "The King arrived in the afternoon. There were very few waiting to meet him, and these were more a common crowd than the people, because all were concerned by the hardships and dangers of the [recent] flood. When the King stepped down from his carriage at the entrance to the Quirinal, turning to La Marmora like a traveler bored by the trip, he murmured in Piedmontese, 'Here we are at last.'"

of the Piedmontese in favor of an "upward circulation" of more indigenous patterns of social organization.[93] Depretis, it is true, was a Piedmontese; his coalitions drew strong support from the notables of northern Italy. Those coalitions also "transformed" the _Estrema_ into a "tame" backbone for government majorities. But the fact is that southern notables were crucial to the majorities--so much so that between 1887 and 1896, Crispi, the notable from Palermo, dominated them. Crispi, incidentally, was groomed for the premiership as Minister of the Interior--as "patron," in other words, of the nation's Prefects.[94]

There were a few areas in which the governments of the Left did act to reverse the policies of the moderates, at least on paper. For example, they reduced the salt tax and in 1880 eliminated the hated _macinato_, or grist tax.[95] Subsequently they deflected the moderates' emphasis on free trade, launching an extensive tariff policy that was protective, in particular, of cereals and grain. Once again the prices of bread and pasta rose, but this time to the benefit of those who controlled the land.[96] In contrast, the _macinato_ had directly fed the treasury of the state,

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[93]_Ibid_., pp. 47-54.

[94]See _supra_, pp. 106-108.

[95]Thayer, _Italy and the Great War . . ._, p. 50.

[96]Gerschenkron, _The Journal of Economic History_, XV, pp. 366-70.

which, in turn, was committed to spend for a "severe but just application of the law."

Departing from the balanced budget of the moderate formula, the governments of the Left considerably increased the patrimony of the state. Deficit spending produced a "boom" in the construction industry; a vast amount of log-rolling and local public works projects; many new jobs for the supporters of the *ministeriali*.[97] These governments also extended the franchise, though very gradually. In 1882, Depretis initiated the process (which would not culminate in universal manhood suffrage until 1911) with a law that lowered the voting age from 25 to 21 and the poll tax from 40 to 19 lire. The enfranchised population, still restricted by property and literacy qualifications, increased from roughly two to seven per cent and, in the 1890s, climbed again to nine.[98]

Areas of expansion--the national patrimony and the franchise--were felt locally, especially at that juncture, in the South, where the Prefects and their subordinates made contacts with the local structure of power. In the latifundist areas, the local structure was controlled by the *gabelloti* and in cities by resident landowners and local men of note. A somewhat simplified description of the resulting

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[97] Thayer, *Italy and the Great War . . .*, pp. 56-57; Mack Smith, *Italy . . .*, pp. 154-69, *passim*; Neufeld, *Italy, School . . .*, p. 82.

[98] *Ibid.*, p. 84 and Appendix A, Table 8, p. 524.

configuration is as follows: the deputies from the South, most of whom were notables, depended upon the gabelloti and their clienteles to get elected. After 1876, southern deputies had an important voice in the national government--hence in the appointment of Prefects and the distribution of patronage. The Prefects and, through them, other state officials, were influenced by the deputies and ministers to favor certain local electors.[99] As in the North, circles were completed which drew local and national authority, local and national resources, into one orbit. The difference was that, in the South, the circles had the potential to include many more than "men of note." Important to them were the brokers of the countryside who, it must be emphasized, controlled a considerable portion of the laboring population. In the North, many notables were patrons of their mezzadri tenants and, in family businesses, of industrial workers, too. But they did not have many connections with the braccianti, whose numbers would expand as fast as the suffrage, and who, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, began to organize themselves independently as a class.[100]

In the South, notables and their rural allies drew still closer together after 1876. The circumference of a circle was frequently closed when notables seeking votes or

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[99] Mosca, Partiti e Sindacati . . ., pp. 197-99.

[100] John and Leatrice MacDonald, The Economic History Review, XVI, pp. 61-75.

clienteles interfered in the competitions between families or gangs of gabelloti. Backing one side against another with national patronage or protection, they could themselves construct machines of some extent.[101] Officials of the state had to participate. Mosca notes how, after 1876, the Prefects learned that their careers were vulnerable to mistakes in the allocation of public works contracts, mistakes in the compilation of electoral lists, mistakes in the supervision of communal mayors and councils. "Prefects and magistrates depended on the ministers who exercised most benevolently the recommendations of the deputies, who for their part . . . did not disdain the recommendations of their grand electors . . . ."[102] The power of the latter was obvious in the fact that "it sufficed to have a conversation with a few heads [of families] in order to gain several hundred votes."[103] Officials of the state bureaucracy who favored the wrong families, or attempted a strict neutrality, might find themselves a topic of conversation in Rome.

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[101]Mosca, Partiti e Sindacati . . ., pp. 197-98 and p. 201. For an excellent description of how interventions in local feuds were managed, especially after the turn of the century, see Gaetano Salvemini, Opere IV, Il ministro della mala vita, e altri scritti sull'Italia giolittiana, ed. Elio Apih (Milan: Feltrinelli Editore, 1962), Vol. I, pp. 55-59 and 73-142.

[102]Mosca, Partiti e Sindacati . . ., p. 197.

[103]Ibid., p. 198.

As one might expect, the circles we have been describing were most intricate in Sicily, where the gangs of *mafiosi* made obvious "grand electors." Here the Prefects were also wary lest they make a mistake in the enforcement of the law. Mosca argues it was partly a myth that, in Sicily, public law did not exist. Tax laws, and the commercial and civil codes, were as vigorously enforced there as anywhere else.[104] But that bore no small relation to the fact that, on the basis of their expanding contacts in the cities, and growing access to national patronage, the *mafiosi* were going into business. Like businessmen everywhere, they demanded a certain regularity from officialdom and approved of taxes that did not fall on property or profits. It was more often in their capacity as brokers of violence, grand electors, or dispensers of public contracts that they sought to be protected *from* the law.[105] Under these circumstances, the networks that connected them to powerful friends in Rome were quite fantastic. Passages from a novel by the Sicilian author, Leonardo Sciascia, provide us with an example.[106] The following is a conversation between a clever and dedicated north Italian captain of the *Carabinieri*, serving his tour of duty on the island,

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[104] *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

[105] *Ibid.*, p. 200.

[106] Leonardo Sciascia, *Mafia Vendetta*, trans. Archibald Colquhoun and Arthur Oliver (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964).

and his Sicilian subordinate, a corporal. Their task is to discover who murdered certain people in a town of the interior and whether or not the murders were "crimes of passion." The links between the suspects and the dead could go in one of two directions and, depending upon which, resolve the mystery in terms of one man's unfaithful wife or the lucrative monopoly of construction contracts that several others were committed to protect. If one suspect can be made to talk, he "joins to his chain" another--the grand elector, Don Mariano. Then, according to the captain, two further things might happen:

> 'either the chain ends with Mariano, or Mariano, old and ill as he is, decides to tell his beads . . . In that case, my friend, the chain gets longer and longer, so long, in fact, that I and the minister and God Almighty get caught up in it . . .'
>
> 'You're talking like a skeleton at a feast . . . Don't you know what kind of a man Don Mariano is? Silent as the grave.'
>
> 'Yes, when he was young; now he's old with one foot in that grave . . . . What I'm getting at is this: in a moment of weakness Mariano may break down and confess his sins, which, between ourselves, are not exactly few . . . I had his dossier in my hands in 1927, it was thicker than that'--he pointed to one of Bentini's tomes--'a kind of criminal encyclopedia . . . a for arson, b for battery, c for corruption . . . the lot. Fortunately the dossier vanished . . . No, don't look at me like that . . . . Other friends, bigger fry than me, did the three-card trick with that dossier. From this office to that, from that to the other, until it vanished under the very nose of the Public Prosecutor, a terror, I recall. He flew right off the handle, I remember, threats right and left, and those who were under the deepest suspicion were those who had nothing to do with it, poor things. Then the Public Prosecutor was transferred elsewhere and the storm passed. The truth of the matter is this:

> Attorney-Generals, Public Prosecutors, judges, officers, chiefs of police, corporals of the carabinieri, they all pass . . .'[107]

Seen from the captain's perspective, there is much more complicity than conflict between national and local levels of power in Italy. Similarly, there is more continuity than chasm between South and North, rural and urban, traditional and modern, sub-cultures. The networks of intermediaries that are responsible for this cannot be said to stand for _either_ traditional, or modern, or even "mixed" relationships. Their importance in the organization and integration of the Italian political system is what leads us to say that the hegemony of Piedmont, while real, did not exclusively dominate the evolution of the country. After 1876, it was more or less reversed. It is now necessary to make this argument in terms of the total political system.

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[107] _Ibid._, pp. 90-92.

CHAPTER VI

THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Traditionalism and Political Systems

The Italian political system has many distinctive characteristics which are highlighted by comparison to what contemporary social scientists consider is the apogee of modernization: the "Anglo-American democracy." The differences are considerable, but not, I think, for the reasons usually put forth. In the Parsonian analysis of political development, variations are generally explained in terms of the relationship between traditional and legal-rational cultures: the relative importance of each to the total configuration and the particular way in which they are "mixed." In contemporary theories, there are basically four alternatives to development, none of which is based on a _spontaneous_ evolution at variance with the Western experience. That experience is considered to have been fulfilled in the twentieth century by England and America.

"Anglo-American democracy" represents the alternative which is called "fusion." Basically, fusion means that primary identifications--kinship, community, ethnicity, class--provide a foundation for all of the secondary

institutions of the society, but one that is considerably restricted and functionally specific. All members of the society are participants in the secondary structures, but all of them also belong to families and communities, a social class and ethnic group. The secondary sphere is larger than, and penetrates, the primary, yet each is relatively distinct. The office is one thing and the home another, and so on.[1]

There is general agreement in the Parsonian tradition that Anglo-American institutions represent not only the modern end of a developmental continuum, but also a good solution to the problems of modernization. In England because the aristocracy was generous and unafraid, in America because there was no aristocracy, traditional structures were, in the course of time, permitted to persist and to contribute. It is considered a real achievement, for instance, that in England the aristocracy was one of the first pressure groups.[2] Similarly, Parsons values rather highly the fact that in America people vote on the basis of ascribed loyalties.[3] The modernization of these cultures

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[1]Gabriel A. Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," The Politics of Developing Areas, ed. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 24-25; Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture . . ., pp. 6-8 and 29-33.

[2]Ibid., pp. 24-25.

[3]Talcott Parsons, "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," American Voting Behavior, ed. Eugene Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 91-97.

is held to have avoided social disorganization; it involved only the evolution of new structures simultaneous with a contraction of the old.

Now, development in other parts of the world is understood in terms of the same categories, so that an unstated, but nonetheless powerful, direction is imputed to the process. Not surprising, the second, third, and fourth alternatives apply to "lower levels" of development. One, called "isolative," describes the case where traditional and modern structures coexist as antagonistic subcultures of a larger system. Where in the fused society, traditional structures are spread evenly and lightly over the entire foundation and that is all, in an isolative society they also organize the social life of an entire subculture.[4] Usually, in fact stereotypically, the traditional subculture is "rural-agrarian" and the modern one "urban-industrial."[5] Examples of isolative political systems come from continental Europe: France, Germany, Italy. The results of isolation are to be seen in such characteristics as the inability to agree on constitutions, the multi-party system, structural

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[4]Almond, "A Functional Approach . . .," p. 25; Almond and Verba, _The Civic Culture . . ._, pp. 8-9 and 25-28.

[5]_Ibid._, p. 35. "The fragmentation of the political culture is also associated with general cultural fragmentation--for example, a sharp division of modern urbanizing society and the traditional countryside; the industrial economy and the traditional agrarian economy."

instability, an alternation of democratic and authoritarian regimes.[6]

Another characteristic of the isolative type is the survival of an "old middle class," almost as a third subculture. Evaluations of this class measure its role against the bourgeoisie of rational capitalism. The latter is credited with having met, in a steady progression, the exigencies of supplying manpower and resources to a central bureaucratic authority, of secularizing the great institutions of society, of fostering and furthering the industrial revolution. Outside of England, presumably because of the greater resistance from traditional quarters, the resolution of these problems was more halting.[7] One must assume the single continuum of development to understand this point. The position of the "old middle class" in any given "mix" of traditional and legal-rational forms depends upon how much it was able to accomplish in the direction of modernization before the developmental process was stifled by traditional pressures. In the isolative systems of continental Europe, old middle classes characteristically got no further than the problem of secularization. Anticlericalism and the demise of private schools became fixed as their ideological center of gravity. Industrialization resulted

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[6] Ibid., pp. 25-28; Almond, "A Functional Approach . . .," pp. 42-43; Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, XVIII (August, 1956), pp. 407-408.

[7] Ibid., pp. 406-408.

from other stimuli and fostered a complex of legal-rational values that were in partial opposition to their own.[8]

The third alternative for development is "transitional," but generally involves the disorganization of traditional structures. It pertains to the underdeveloped countries as they undergo "rapid social change" or modernization and in part to the underdeveloped sectors of continental Europe. Unlike the case of fusion, where traditional structures contract because their functions are increasingly absorbed by expanding legal-rational ones, disorganization results when the modernizing subculture (possibly supported by a colonial power) makes it impossible for traditional groups to maintain themselves, failing, at the same time, to take over for them. One outcome of social disorganization is the emergence of a charismatic leader and, in the long run, possibly a fourth alternative: revolution and totalitarianism.[9]

Now, the political system in Italy is neither adequately nor efficiently explained in terms of any one of these alternatives. Even the "isolative" model, which is explicit to continental Europe, is misleading. In particular, it emphasizes an antagonism between traditionalism and modernization, which, for most practical purposes, is an antagonism between town and country, nation state and

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 406.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 400-405.

peasant community, North and South. These, however, are precisely the antagonisms which networks of patrons and clients have rendered secondary. The isolative model also ties the "old middle classes" to a continuum between traditionalism and modernization, which makes it impossible to consider the relationship of these classes to a distinctively Italian pattern of development. In terms of the evidence presented here, the "old middle classes"--in particular the local men of note--survived into the twentieth century because of the social base which they were able to construct through intermediaries between town and country in the South. There is no reason to believe that this development should not have colored their means and mode of exercising power. For this reason it makes less sense to interpret their position in terms of a survival of traditionalism, which prevented them from becoming, like the middle class in England, progressively more modern. Rather than traditionalism, it was the networks of intermediaries that made the difference.

One of the chief difficulties with the Parsonian analysis of political development derives, in short, from an over-use of the concept "traditional." One notes how easily it is assumed that the concept covers not only all of the pre-literate societies of the world (varied as they might be) but certain entire subcultures in complex societies as well.[10] Invariably the subcultures in question

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[10] Supra, p. 36, note 54.

have a peasant base. In fact, the word "peasant" generally implies distinctively traditional social structures: the local community, the neighborhood, the extended family. Since the days when Robert Redfield's "folk community" was greatly overworked as a proto-type for peasants, it is accepted that traditional structures in complex societies cannot exist in isolation.[11] Parsons notes, for example, that all human societies have to organize force in territorial units larger than the village, which is not, in itself, defensible. Therefore, peasant villages have characteristically been overlaid by a form of state. It organizes and stabilizes the use of force, but permits the local community to remain relatively self-contained and, in other spheres, self-sufficient.[12] As a result, the "organic" integration of state with community is minimal--a circumstance which, Parsons suggests, has "much to do with the striking fact that the communist movement has had so much more success in peasant societies than in industrialized societies . . . ."[13] It took only the breakdown of the local community--an easy event when modernization began elsewhere--for the revolution to proceed.

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[11]Criticisms of the concept "folk" are discussed by George M. Foster, "What is Folk Culture?" American Anthropologist, LV (April, 1953), pp. 159-73, and Horace Miner, "The Folk-Urban Continuum," American Sociological Review, XVII (October, 1952), pp. 529-37.

[12]Parsons, The Social System, pp. 161-62.

[13]Ibid., p. 163.

Parsons' examples of the peasant community are drawn from Eastern Europe and China, but the pattern which he describes has been almost indiscriminately applied--if not by himself, then by others. The reason, I think, is that a vast extent of traditionalism in the underdeveloped cultures and subcultures of the world is almost indiscriminately assumed. As we have seen, the Italian peasant community is characterized by its relatively limited support of traditional structures, not only in the period since modernization, but historically as well. Neither the extended family, nor the manor, nor arrangements which might have protected the community from its environment, were viable aspects of social life. On the contrary, except for the nuclear family, social relations were characteristically "open" to the world.[14] Modernization did not destroy traditionalism so much as reinforce the structures that had always, though in varying degrees, maintained this openness.

These, of course, were the face to face networks of middlemen who in turn exerted their influence over the process of modernization. The importance of that influence is suggested by the fact that the hegemony of Piedmont was more or less reversed in the decades after unification. The reversal encouraged an "upward" as opposed to "downward" circulation of social forms. Like the Parsonians--though more for convenience than from any theoretical premise--we

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[14] *Supra*, pp. 22-24 and 187-93.

shall identify the points at which the political system in Italy differs from the "Anglo-American democracy." Unlike them, we will seek an explanation of the differences in that "upward circulation" and the particular kind of social structure--neither traditional nor modern--that it brought into the national arena.

Trasformismo

Many characteristics of political life in Italy are subsumed by the expression trasformismo, an expression which, for most purposes, implies something more than the compromises to which all liberal governments are accustomed. Specifically, it involves (a) compromises which result in virtual reversals of position; (b) a consequent reluctance to take any position at all; (c) an absence, therefore, of not only political parties and well defined voluntary associations, but of programs, ideologies, and often policies as well; and (d) cabinets that rise and fall on personal as opposed to policy questions, shifting very little in their reconstitution.[15] Pareto's comparison between transformist governments and liberal governments in England and America should amplify the meaning of trasformismo:

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[15]Vilfredo Pareto, The Ruling Class in Italy before 1900, ed. Giuseppe Prezzolini (New York: S. F. Vanni, 1950), pp. 22-37. ". . . The politician from whom the greatest advantages can be expected attracts the greatest number of deputies, who abandon him without scruple for any other leader who seems better able to serve their interests; and sometimes they abandon him for mere love of change." (P. 32.)

> In England and in the United States a certain connection is established between the names of public men and the ideas they represent; so that it is sufficient, for example, to learn that Mr. Gladstone has obtained a majority at the elections in order to know that he will propose to solve the Irish question; or to learn that the Democratic Party has triumphed in the United States under the leadership of Mr. Cleveland in order to infer that the country will not continue to increase its customs duties. With Italian politicians nothing of the sort is possible. For example, Sig. Minghetti fell from office because he proposed that the control of the railways should be given over to the state . . . . He considered it absolutely indispensable for the good of the country to take away the railroads from the plutocracy who owned them . . . . A very few years later, Sig. Minghetti was seen supporting a ministry, the chief point in whose program was the abandonment of the railways to private control. . . . Facts like these occur occasionally everywhere, but what is remarkable in Italy is that they are the general rule and that they seem quite natural.[16]

Trasformismo is also distinctive for its effects on the opposition. First, no independently organized opposition is encouraged and, in Italy, energy has been consistently directed against working class organizations, peasant leagues, and socialism. In the twentieth century, at least since the fascist period, these forces have been more or less accommodated, but have not, to this day, been permitted much access to the centers of national power. In Pareto's words, "the people must end by understanding that it is not by resisting the government that they will obtain its favors."[17]

Secondly, though, any opposition which does not (or cannot) seek independence is *relatively easily*

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[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

accommodated. A Pope's comment on the political system is revealing: "When one of our followers gets into parliament, we lose him."[18] This is because transformist governments characteristically courted the opposition. It was unnecessary to ruin the enemy so long as he had no means for independence; it was necessary, on the other hand, to make some friends in his camp.[19] The tendency reflected certain characteristics of Italian society. "The fact that [Italians do] not participate in the life of the community or the state," Gramsci noted, "merely means that, rather than joining political parties and trade unions, [they] prefer joining organizations of a different type, like cliques, gangs, camorras, mafias."[20] The structure of the latter, as opposed to that of parties and unions, rendered their members much more likely to be "courted."[21]

The expression trasformismo originated in the period after 1876 when the Center-Left government of Agostino Depretis "transformed" a faction of the Italian Right into loyal members of the governing coalition.[22] Those who

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[18]Quoted in ibid., p. 21.

[19]Ibid., pp. 55-56.

[20]Quoted in Barzini, The Italians, pp. 217-18. Gramsci makes clear that "this tendency can be observed both among the lower and the higher classes."

[21]Pareto, The Ruling Class . . ., pp. 55-56. "There is no place in Italy for a citizen who, to preserve his independence, refuses to be a party to political patronage." Also see pp. 63-64.

[22]Mack Smith, Italy . . ., pp. 109-12.

shifted their loyalties were not as a rule the moderates who had directed the Risorgimento--the "men around Cavour." Rather they were the local notables of northern or north central Italy, earlier represented by the National Society and hardly anxious to be excluded from national power. (Their local power after all depended on it.)

These people had already been advantaged by their close relationship to the moderates and were, as crucial components of electoral clienteles, on the receiving end for national spoils.[23] Some of them had also been in a position to benefit from the moderates' efforts to raise revenue for the state. For instance, those with access to capital gained from the sales of land, railroads, mines, and other public properties, just as did the intermediaries in the South. Similarly, they made good on the transfer of the national capital from Turin, to Florence, to Rome, each move of which stimulated the construction industry.[24]

Another source of power for local notables derived from the circumstances under which the state borrowed money. In exchange for loans at low rates of interest, the moderates permitted certain banks--especially the National Bank of Turin--to issue supplies of incontrovertible notes.[25]

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[23] _Supra_, pp. 122-23.

[24] Clough, _The Economic History . . ._, pp. 94-96 and p. 125.

[25] _Ibid._, pp. 52-56. "By a curious omission, the . . . law establishing the [incontrovertibility of banknotes] failed to place any limit on the banknote issue of the National Bank."

Gradually, other banks did the same--legally until 1884; illegally after that date. Because of their connections, the directors of the privileged banks were able to finance investments in new industries in which local notables had stakes. The most important of these included railroad construction in the South, the construction industry, and a steel works at Terni (not far from Rome).[26] In all three cases, government support, protection, and privileges were important, whether in the form of public works contracts, naval contracts (for which the Terni plant was built), subsidies, tax exemptions, or "friendship." In lieu of a unified market for capital in which stocks and bonds might be traded, the bank which loaned money to the government while itself investing--possibly unbacked notes--in investors and in industries, dominated the evolution of Italian capitalism into the twentieth century.[27]

In 1874, several companies which had been launched by speculating bank directors collapsed, and a depression, furthered by the competitive advantage of American over Italian wheat on the world market, began.[28] It was an

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[26]*Ibid.*, pp. 119-20.

[27]*Ibid.*, pp. 55-56 and 124-32; Gerschenkron, *Journal of Economic History*, XV, pp. 371-75.

[28]Clough, *The Economic History . . .*, pp. 119-20. "This depression, *like the others*, was preceded by heavy investment in railways and building, and an over-extension of credit, but was worsened by speculation in government bonds, by fear of a new war with Austria, and by crisis conditions in England and in America, following the war between North and South."

obvious and important factor in the rise of the Italian Left, which two years later began forming cabinets in place of the Right.[29] The importance of trasformismo in this context was that it enabled local notables, many of whom were becoming capitalists, to retain their connection with national centers of power. As we will see in detail later, Italian capitalists could not survive without political connections.

Now, these connections had to be with politicians who were successful, and success depended above all upon elections. These in turn had little to do with organized political parties; much to do with building clienteles. The electoral machinery consisted of local committees, staffed with notables who were connected to the ministeriali, usually through the Prefects. The latter received notification of the favored candidates from ministers (on whom their careers depended) and campaign funds, the unused portion of which they might pocket should their intervention in the election be successful.[30]

Prefects were ordinarily in a good position to intervene since, for a long time prior to an election, they dispensed the patronage of the state.[31] In the North,

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[29]Ibid., p. 122.

[30]Fried, The Italian Prefects . . ., pp. 122-23.

[31]Ibid., pp. 123-24. "The basic principle . . . was summed up in the following formula: 'It is necessary for our ministers to have complaisant Prefects, for complaisant Prefects to have corrupt voters, and corrupt voters to have productive deputies.'"

however, they could not meet the challenge of an expanding suffrage by this means alone. Here, in fact, the working population organized itself increasingly outside of, or in opposition to, official clienteles. It was rather in the South, where notables were not the only ones to receive the state's patronage, that the political system actually made a penetration. Unlike the notables of northern Italy, intermediaries were in command of large, and growing, clienteles--clienteles that included poor families, landless laborers, the _coltivatori diretti_, and even some bandits (who also had impoverished clienteles). After the Left came to power in 1876, the intermediaries were able to turn the state's favors and protection to great personal advantage, enhancing thereby their own positions. It was they who made party organizations unnecessary for the Italian notables; they who kept those notables in power despite expansions of the suffrage. Ultimately, it was their exercise of power that rendered _trasformismo_ both distinctive and a success. Few of the _ministeriali_ dared to discount them; many encouraged their subordinates to purposefully solicit their assistance.

Because of the intermediaries, the electoral process in Italy could not possibly develop the way it did in many other countries. It is sometimes suggested that Italian elections reflect political "underdevelopment." After all, the pork barrel is "still" important in American politics, and parties did finally emerge in Italy. In other words, there is a continuum between clienteles and parties so that

the former will develop into the latter.[32] The suggestion also implies that traditionalism dominates Italian elections, at least in the South. LaPalombara makes this point when he argues that "the Southerner votes particularistically for the man--the notable of whose clientele he is a part--while the Northerner votes for the political party as such. One could multiply these indirect indexes of southern traditionality."[33]

I would argue, on the contrary, that participating in a clientele is not necessarily the same thing as engaging in a set of traditional relations. This can be true even where ties of kinship and friendship are involved.[34] Both the effectiveness and the long life of clienteles in the South are related to the fact that they have generally been much more than the kind of "lord-serf" relationship usually associated with feudal or traditional societies. As we have seen, patron-client networks reflected, on the contrary, contracted traditional structures: a less than developed feudal system, nuclear as opposed to extended families, shifting as opposed to secure tenures, and so on.

Ironically--if the Parsonian description is correct--there is more traditionalism in American voting behavior than in southern Italian. According to the description,

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[32]On this continuum, see <u>supra</u>, pp. 34-37.

[33]LaPalombara, <u>Interest Groups in Italian Politics</u>, pp. 61-62.

[34]<u>Supra</u>, pp. 189-90.

people in the "Anglo-American democracies" vote on the basis of ascribed loyalties--kinship, community, ethnicity, and class.[35] The dangers of rigidity inherent in this kind of behavior are overcome because many voters are "cross-pressured." The pressures, however, still involve ascribed relations. One of the most significant intersections in American society is that which is produced by the overlap of ethnicity or religion and social class.[36]

Italian voters experience cross-pressures, too. But the pressures come from individuals who, on the basis of earlier exchanges, are owed a show of fidelity in political crises. The relationships involved are negotiated and, while highly personal, are structured in terms of contracts and not status.[37] One can only equate them with traditionality by maximizing what is personal and short-shrifting what is

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[35]Almond, "A Functional Approach . . .," p. 20; Parons, "'Voting' . . .," pp. 91-97. Political attitudes are stabilized "in terms of association with other members of the principle solidary groups in which the voter is involved. In terms of party affiliation, this may be called 'traditionalism'." (P. 92.)

[36]*Ibid.*, pp. 97-99. "The potential [swing] voter is, *by his solidary associations*, being pulled two ways at once." (P. 98; italics added.)

[37]Recall the confession of the Calabrian: "I would rather be a socialist, but my patron is a fascist, so that I have taken the card of the fascist party in order not to lose my place, and since my brother-in-law who is a Christian Democrat loaned me money, I vote Christian Democrat." The class identification barely survives, and the tie which is based on kinship functions only because an exchange of favors is involved.

power. The point is clarified by Wolf, though for a somewhat different set of circumstances:

> Some writers idealize the hacienda, as others idealized the slaveholding plantation of the ante-bellum South. But there exists a distinction between personal relations, such as those familiar to anthropologists from the study of closely knit small primitive tribes, and personalized relations, in which the relationship bears the guise of a personal relation, but serves an impersonal function.[38]

The word "traditional" ought not to cover both.

Another characterization of the Italian political system that I wish to avoid is that which attributes *trasformismo* and the electoral clienteles to something like an "Italian" defect of character. There is a strong suggestion of this in the work of Denis Mack Smith, an English historian of liberal leanings on whom we have frequently relied in the preceding pages.[39] Mack Smith traces the origins of *trasformismo* to the Piedmontese moderates. In 1852, Cavour cemented an alliance--his famous or infamous *connubio*--between Center-Right and Center-Left in the Piedmontese parliament in order to widen the foundations for

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[38]Wolf, *Sons of the Shaking Earth*, p. 207. "Neither the hacienda nor the slave plantation existed to provide satisfactory relationships between persons. They existed to realize returns on invested capital, to produce profits, functions that take no account of kinship or friendship, of personal needs or desires." In Italy, it seems to me, the clienteles existed to enhance the power of those who controlled them--a function for which "personalism" offered excellent opportunities.

[39]See Cammett, *Science and Society*, XXVII, pp. 434-40. The author criticizes Mack Smith's evaluation of Italian liberalism from a Marxist perspective.

moderate nationalism. As a by-product, he removed his chief competitor, D'Azeglio, from the premiership. The same kind of maneuver showed up in the new nation, and Mack Smith concludes (as though he was describing, say, Depretis):

> Cavour was not a party man, but rather an opportunist who took care never to be very far behind or ahead of public opinion. If no well-articulated parties were to appear before the time of socialism and fascism, this was largely because principles were thus discounted and opportunistic fluctuations deliberately encouraged. Any group not adopting these coalition tactics was out of the game, and any major challenge of principle was thus rendered impotent . . . . The government majority was perpetually being modified as the many small groups rallied for tactical reasons around one strong personality after another.[40]

I think Mack Smith's conclusion imputes to Cavour what developed after unification--and for very real sociological reasons. The moderate governments, as we have several times suggested, were not so very different from the first governments of liberals elsewhere. Poorly developed parties and a heavy reliance on patronage went together and had much to do with the fact that liberals as a general rule did not represent the masses. What is distinctive about the Italian liberals is that they found a way to preserve their power from, among other things, the challenge

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[40]Mack Smith, <u>Italy . . .</u>, p. 31. Also see p. 110. ". . . Depretis was merely exploiting what already existed, and the word <u>trasformismo</u> was coined merely to express that absence of party coherence and organization which had itself brought about the fall of the Right. Transformism was only the rationalization of Cavour's practice. None of the prime ministers since 1852 had been strictly party men, and all of them had been willing to accept support from anywhere except the two extremes."

of the socialists without exercising it in "modern" terms. The opportunity arose because of the fairly high level of organization achieved by networks of intermediaries in the South. This opportunity, though, like so many others in the history of social organization, exacted a price. In subsequent sections we will suggest how it retarded the economic development of Italy and, in the concluding chapter, how it distorted the socialist movement and abetted the fascist.

Bureaucracy and Prefectocracy

In the "Anglo-American democracy," bureaucratic organizations only approach Weber's ideal type. For a long time it has been the argument of social scientists that Weber's bureaucracy is impossible--and, what is more, unnecessary and unwanted. Nonetheless, the legal-rational arrangements distilled so beautifully by Weber remain the pole toward which modernizing societies are held to be moving.[41] What then are the characteristics of bureaucracy in the world's most modern societies--according to the theory, England and America?

In the political system, the bureaucracy functions to execute rules. While it performs many other tasks as well, this one predominates. Moreover, other structures in the political system do not execute rules, except insofar

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[41]LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics, pp. 254-55.

as is necessary to fulfill other functions: legislation, adjudication, "interest aggregation, articulation, communication," and so on. In other words the modern bureaucracy belongs to a "system" in which specific structures fairly well match specific functions.[42]

More generally, the modern bureaucracy emphasizes criteria of achievement in the recruitment and allocation of personnel. This does not mean that it ignores other criteria. In England, top civil servants--the "administrative class"--"achieve" less in the technical-scientific than in the humanistic sense. Moreover, their chance to prove themselves derives from an ascribed relationship. Their fathers were upper middle class, so they could go to Eton and Oxford. According to the theory, this is all to the good; it is an indication of the extent of "fusion" in English society--and a contributing factor to another characteristic of the modern bureaucracy: its political neutrality.[43]

Finally, modern bureaucracies are inevitably honey-combed with friendships, cliques, patron-client networks, since, after all, they are staffed by human beings. An index of their modernity, however, is that these relationships are interstitial: confined to some extent to subterranean channels such as coffee breaks and coat rooms.

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[42]Almond, "A Functional Analysis . . .," pp. 9-26.

[43]Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture . . ., pp. 6-7 and 28-33.

Cliques in one organization have no necessary political connection with cliques in another. Moreover, they do not dominate the organization. On the contrary, bureaucratic organization tends to dominate society. Without assuming the rigid form of Weber's typology, bureaucracy in a variety of institutions fills almost all of the space that is left when ascriptive groups contract.[44]

Again, the Italian case is rather different. First, the presence and powers of the political Prefect defy the requirement that specific structures correspond to specific functions. Political and administrative functions are nowhere entirely separate, but the distinctive thing about the Italian Prefect is that he must combine them.[45] Secondly, careers are made and ruined in the Italian bureaucracy for reasons that have more to do with political influence or patronage relations than with "merit." The typical bureaucrat is trained in jurisprudence and hostile to the specialist.[46] More often than not, he is also a

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[44] Supra, p. 36, note 54.

[45] Fried, The Italian Prefects . . ., pp. 120-27. Fried presents Crispi's dictum that "there must be harmony between the one who legislates and the one who administers." The idea is not Italian, but Jacobin. However, in Italy it had no particular ideological significance:

> ". . . Prefects could perform the necessary partisan roles as dependably as politicians. Successive governments did not find it necessary . . . to turn out of office the Prefects of the former government. . . . They found the career Prefects to be sufficiently reliable, agile, and responsive to changing political circumstances."

[46] LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics, pp. 369-72.

southern Italian. Yet unlike the civil servants in England (also not necessarily technical specialists) he shares in no tradition of political neutrality and is not protected from the pressures of the politicians. LaPalombara, writing about contemporaries in Italy, reports the following interview response from a pressured bureaucrat:

> Although I do not like to have to admit it, the truth is that there are some groups that are increasingly active in the determination of promotions . . . . As a matter of fact, I personally know a significant number of persons within the ministry [the General Accounting Office] who have in recent years joined the D.C. [the Christian Democratic Party] for purely opportunistic considerations. Often these same individuals thoroughly detest the party . . . .
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> . . . .
>
> In my own case, I experience a great amount of pressure from my wife, who insists that I should stop being so idealistic and join the D.C. . . . I will bide my time and wait to see what may be the personal consequences of not joining the parade . . . .[47]

What is true for the present reached its height under Crispi's administration. Then the prefectures were expanded or potentially expanded to the point of supervising the provincial and local administration of virtually every governmental service. Legislation which took this direction was devised as a response to the rudimentary beginnings of the "welfare state" and even included a plan to have the Prefects appoint lower grade personnel in every state bureaucracy.[48] At the same time, the Ministry of the

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[47]Ibid., pp. 327-28. Also see p. 319.

[48]Pareto, The Ruling Class . . ., pp. 47-53; Fried, The Italian Prefects . . ., pp. 131-44.

Interior was excessively centralized, giving its chief (often also the Prime Minister) a pivotal position in the distribution of patronage. Influenced by the recommendations of ministers and deputies, he could approve appointments of "even the porters of the prefectures and police stations" or rule on "decisions to award a gratuity of 10 lire to an employee."[49] Obviously, he controlled the appointments, transfers, and promotions of the Prefects. "In the long climb from the lower ranks of the prefectoral career, aspirants were constantly reminded of the need for discovering the pleasure of ministers and deputies if they were to secure a prefectural appointment before retirement . . . ."[50]

While these qualities are especially true for the state bureaucracy, they also appear in other "wider" institutions. For example, the sacrifice of "merit" considerations to political influence was a not uncommon occurrence in Italian education. In fact, the structure of education might be said to have derived from its overall socio-political meaning. The Italians to this day have not democratized their schools, and for the poor, particularly in the South, educational opportunities are extremely limited.[51] At the

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[49]Quoted in *ibid*., p. 135.

[50]*Ibid*., p. 126.

[51]LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics*, pp. 50-51. As late as 1950, "only 5 percent of Italy's southern young people managed to complete high school training."

same time, however, Italian universities have characteristically been inflated, especially as centers of jurisprudence and professional training. According to Mack Smith, Italy had "not only more illiterates but also more university students than many other European countries."[52] A university education was, in effect, the entrance ticket to even the lowest rungs of the bureaucratic ladders and to all of the free professions.[53]

That the universities were subjected to political pressures was, as we have seen, related to the fact that an administrative or professional career (hence an education) became the guarantee of status and security for intermediaries in the South. If one member of the family could not pursue this path--perhaps to Rome--then the family, given the system of inheritance and its precarious position as a broker, jeopardized its future.[54] Local notables also depended upon the universities for continuity of status. In many instances, they intervened in admissions procedures, the selection of texts and curriculum, the administration of examinations. Many professors held their posts through patronage, and some sat periodically in the Chamber of

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[52] Mack Smith, Italy . . ., p. 261.

[53] Ibid., pp. 260-62.

[54] Supra, p. 196; LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics, p. 375.

Deputies.[55] The extent of "corruption" in the schools became a subject of bitter controversy when, at the turn of the century, the journals of a budding intellectual movement began an exposé. They castigated, without mercy, "worthless and meaningless university theses," charlatans and pedants, artistic and literary shams. They exaggerated, it is true, but did not have to manufacture evidence.[56]

An interesting corollary to the relation between the universities and the political system in Italy is the nature of the legal profession. In theories of the "Anglo-American democracy" the profession is understood almost exclusively in terms of its role as a "mediator," particularly between the legal tradition and social interests; between laws and human affairs. In fact, along with lobbies and interest groups, the profession is held to be "probably the most important mechanism for mediation."[57] Yet, in theory at least, its members are quite unlike the mediators of southern Italy. The profession is in a position of dependence with respect to the state but, "at the same time, and at least equally important, the profession is independent of political authority."[58] Judges "are treated as a special

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[55]Mack Smith, _Italy . . ._, p. 261; Pareto, _The Ruling Class . . ._, pp. 46-47.

[56]Peter Michael Riccio, _On the Threshold of Fascism_ (New York: Casa Italiana, Columbia University, 1929), pp. 64-71, 85-92 and 124-36.

[57]Talcott Parsons, _Essays in Sociological Theory_ (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 373-74.

[58]_Ibid._, pp. 374 and 379.

class with special immunities." Lawyers are paid by their clients and not the state. The bar associations are private; the law schools "integral parts of the universities"--which are also "independent" of political influence.[59] Professional authority, like other elements of the professional pattern, is characterized by "specificity of function . . . . Specificity is essential to the professional pattern no matter how difficult it may be . . . . A professional man is held to be 'an authority' only in his own field."[60]

There are several aspects of the legal profession in Italy which suggest that a comparative study would be interesting. One is the predominance of lawyers in the Chamber of Deputies--in itself not unusual, but in terms of "the system" distinctive. While Italian lawyers have contributed to a variety of political movements, their outstanding political role has been the combined national and local exercise of power, typical of notables, and described with some profit in terms of circulation networks, or "circles." As we have seen, the structure of the notables' political community depended upon face to face relations and patronage. This was the more true, and the more permanent, because of the connections which notables made with intermediaries in the South. Everywhere, however, it was politically relevant that the men of note commanded limited

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[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 374-75.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

clienteles. On these grounds alone, it is difficult to conceive of the lawyer with an "independent" professional career. Suppose some of his clients in the professional sense were "grand electors": powerful landowners or industrialists or political "bosses." The relationship might be used to favor a friendly minister, a deputy, or Prefect--or, more directly, his own political career. Clients with less power and position could be "courted," too, for votes.[61] Conversely, the connections which a lawyer had with politicians, officials, even judges, could result in favors for his "professional" clients that would make them political clients as well. "It is not true," someone once remarked, "that in Italy justice does not exist. It is on the other hand true that one must never seek it from a judge."[62]

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[61]One of the resources which lawyers control in their relations with the poor is documents. The following is Roger Vailland's perception of the importance of documents in the Mezzogiorno:

> "To obtain a passport you had to present between ten and fifteen documents. [To emigrate you had to present a passport.] In the cities there were rackets which specialized in the procurement of documenti--a prosperous business. In the main square the unemployed felt their pockets from time to time to make sure they had not lost their documenti: identity card, unemployment card, army-record card, employers' certificates, and many others . . . . A man who had lost his documenti no longer had rights, no longer a legal existence . . . ."

Unless, of course, his patron were a lawyer. The Law, p. 36.

[62]Quoted in Riccio, On the Threshold . . ., pp. 186-87. Justice ought to be sought "from a deputy, minister, journalist, or influential lawyer." Also see Pareto, The Ruling Class . . ., pp. 47-50.

Another distinctive quality of the Italian legal profession was its heavy contribution of manpower to officialdom. One can speculate on the consequences: networks of friends and friends of friends must have penetrated the more freely into bureaucratic organizations. It was probably relevant, too, that a disproportionate number of bureaucrats were educated in the South. That meant more access and influence for the Southern intermediaries and possibly a greater absorption of their personal ways of exercising power.[63] At the same time, the emphasis on jurisprudence apparently had an opposite effect: it encouraged a high degree of formalism in the application of laws.[64] Yet, on another level, one can argue that the more rigidly laws are presented to a society (especially laws for which the model is foreign) the more powerful are the intermediaries. Indeed, the very bureaucrats who represent the formality of the law might, in another capacity, benefit from its incompatibility with social life.

In pre-War Italy, for instance, the communes were considered for many legal and administrative purposes to be uniform regardless of their ecological properties. The

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[63]LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics, p. 375. During the period covered by LaPalombara's study, "22,622 of the 33,169 students studying jurisprudence were located in southern universities . . . . Southern university graduates confronted with an economy that [could not] absorb all the budding lawyers [entered] the bureaucracy in droves."

[64]Ibid., p. 372.

chief administrators at the provincial level--especially the Prefects--attempted to deal with them in these terms.[65] At the same time, they were _personally_ advantaged because to do so was impossible. When concessions were made to real social differences, grateful men of note (and grand electors) in the communes heaped credit on the Prefect, indicating that "friends" were more reliable than the law or, as some have put it, that the meaning of the law depends on _who_ applies it.

Now, the characteristics attributed to the Italian bureaucracy and legal profession are acknowledged to some extent by contemporary theories of political development. It is recognized, for example, that the distinction between "the sphere, powers and obligation of office and those which are 'personal' to the particular individuals is difficult to maintain."[66] All complex organizations therefore have "systems of cliques." Moreover, "since in the society generally the patterns of personal loyalty and friendship are prominent and deeply ingrained, it is easy for these considerations gradually to come to predominate over the main pattern."[67] The result is a "serious impairment" of the older occupational order; an impairment which indicates disintegration.

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[65]Fried, _The Italian Prefects . . ._, pp. 132-34.

[66]Parsons, _Essays . . ._, p. 47.

[67]_Ibid._, pp. 47-48.

Note that, in the context of the political struggle, networks of friendship and patronage were treated by Parsons as forerunners of other structures, such as parties.[68] In bureaucratic and professional organizations, however, the proliferation of networks indicates something else: a level of decay. Rather than being a developmental stage, excessive personalism in a bureaucracy--like excessive formalism--is called a "deviation."[69] Furthermore, personalism, in the bureaucratic context, seems to have only one dimension--a traditionalist one. Systems of cliques and networks of friendship are particularistic instead of universalistic, diffuse instead of specific, and so on. However, as we have seen, patronage networks in Italy are much more than this. For, while based on face to face relations, often approaching patterns of kinship and friendship, they have nonetheless _encouraged_ criteria of achievement to outweigh ascribed categories and a fair degree of specialization to emerge. It is true that achievement is not based on scientific expertise; it is more likely to be evaluated in terms of the exercise of personal domination over men, or manipulation of situations. But to equate personal power with personalism is to make light of the mobility, the shifts, the complexity of relations in which, for instance, the _mafiosi_ were involved. Examples of functional specialization

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[68] _Supra_, pp. 34-36.

[69] Parsons, _Essays . . ._, pp. 376-77.

are especially prevalent in their case, too. On the whole, they "specialized" in law enforcement, keeping order, regulating violence and protection. In addition their many _cosche_ pursued specialized economic activities such as road construction, water control, or marketing.

Another difficulty with the Parsonian theory of development is that it fails to allow for the possibility that face-to-face relations in the bureaucracy and professions can be part of an _integrated_ system. It was not only that networks of friendship and patronage predominated in the ministries, the universities, the professions. If this were all, then perhaps we could conclude that Italian government was simply "underdeveloped" (or in a state of semi-decay.) What is much more important, it seems to me, is the fact that all the networks in these various institutions were interconnected. Notables and educated sons of the intermediaries were key figures because their contacts crossed all boundaries: any given network of their friends and friends of friends easily and simultaneously infiltrated the bureaucracy, the professions, the local elites, the Chamber of Deputies and cabinet, and the structures that expressed the political struggle. The distillation of the Italian political system is therefore better attempted in terms of these networks than in terms of bureaucratic organizations, professionalism, and functionally specific political institutions. When one begins in the latter vein, everything appears to be in a state of semi-integration.

From the perspective of the networks, however, the system takes on the qualities of integration.

The "Political Class"

Yet, while the Italian political system was relatively integrated, the economy could not be called advanced. In fact, the relationship between political and economic forces was somewhat different for Italy than for countries developing in terms of the Western European experience. What Weber called "rational bourgeois capitalism" underlies the basic economic features of the "Anglo-American democracies," but can hardly be applied to the Italian evolution. The differences are quite instructive. According to Parsons, economic values in American society are "plural": there is a multiplicity of goals "with unity in the *direction* rather than the specific content of the goal-states."[70] Pluralism is in harmony with industrialization and science; with instrumentally oriented organizations, with a progressive expansion of the division of labor, hence differentiation of occupational roles; with achievement criteria and universalism in human relations. It also provides for the "dynamic development" of the economic sector. For most purposes, continued economic growth--to a large extent unfettered--is built in to the foundations of the society.[71]

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[70]Parsons, *The Social System*, p. 183.

[71]*Ibid.*, pp. 182-84.

This in turn suggests the predominant (though not exclusive) reasons for social change: "the main autonomous processes of change in the United States operate not through government but through the economy."[72] At the core of these processes one finds businessmen. Government adjusts the impact of change, but from a position of dependence in relation to it.

The pattern described for the United States might apply to the so-called "Milan-Turin-Genoa triangle" of Italian industrial complexes, were it not that, in Italy, industrial development depended heavily upon the political system. This was true in Germany too, but there governments were dedicated to the furthering of rational economic organization. When the German investment bank was introduced in Italy (1894), however, it was denounced as a symbol of "foreign penetration" by newspapers representing notables and their bank-director friends, even though its potential contribution to economic growth was acknowledged.[73] The investment bank was designed not only to launch and support new industries, but to encourage credit relationships among them and, moreover, "discipline" their production. It has been described as a "universal bank" or a real "department store" of credit.[74] The industries which it advanced in

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[72]Parsons, "'Voting' . . .," p. 93.

[73]Clough, The Economic History . . ., pp. 129-32; Gerschenkron, Journal of Economic History, XV, p. 374.

[74]Ibid., p. 375.

Germany assumed monopolistic structures through which they freed themselves from bank control. The German government encouraged both the banks and the industries that they created. In Italy, on the other hand, politicians sought to restrict investment banking and divert its resources (often German and Swiss capital) to established but inefficient industries. One of these was iron and steel (the Terni works); another, which in Germany had been untouched by the banks, was cotton textiles. Both were industries in which local notables with powerful political connections were well established.[75]

One of the striking things about the Italian notables was that they had little enthusiasm for a "dynamic development" of industrial capitalism. Nor were they overtly concerned with a rational structure of profit-making, though some of them were profiteers and liked to speculate and most of them lived comfortably or better. In Marx's sense they never became a true bourgeoisie, perhaps because of the overwhelming impact which intermediaries had upon their political lives. Like the intermediaries, their "vested interests" continued to reside as much in their positions at the peaks of various clienteles as in their relationship to the means of production. One could argue that whereas in England the process of industrialization resulted in "economics absorbing politics," in Italy, the

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[75] Ibid., pp. 374-75.

effects were reversed: politics absorbed economics. This would indicate why the outstanding social theorists of Italian modernization--Mosca and Pareto--were not Marxists, but "elitists"--analysts of the "political" as opposed to the economic class.[76]

The Italian "political class" consisted of national politicians--the *ministeriali*, deputies, and Prefects--and of their friends, patrons, and immediate clients, who were local notables and represented landowners, bankers, industrialists, and members of the free professions. Because the class organized itself in terms of networks of personal contacts, it had no clearly defined boundaries, although its social position was an authoritarian one. In the South it included many local figures who controlled votes: intermediaries or political bosses like the *mafiosi*.

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[76]From different perspectives, however. An overriding concern for Mosca was "good government," and the political system, as it developed under Crispi, did not qualify. He linked its more obvious faults to the democratization which, through an expanded suffrage, it pretended to enhance. Government had deteriorated since 1876. Pareto, on the other hand, judged the Crispian governments from the standpoint of a laissez-faire liberal. He was above all antagonistic to their propensity to "intervene":

> "Two facts chiefly strike the observer who studies the politico-social condition of Italy. The first, which manifests itself on the most superficial examination, is the almost entire absence of political parties. The other, which to be thoroughly understood requires minute observation, is the enormous extension of the functions of the state, which reduces almost to nullity the private initiative and economic independence of the citizens."

See *The Ruling Class . . .*, p. 12.

The political class derived its power in the first instance not from controlling the means of production but from being well connected. The networks of contacts that counted most were anchored in the state. For it was the state which could mobilize the resources of the nation, drawing upward in the form of, for instance, taxes what would subsequently be distributed downward as patronage. "Spoils," Pareto noted, are "wrung from the taxpayers" and divided up by powerful "coteries."[77] Or the state enforced policies, such as protective tariffs, that enabled the political class to circulate increments for itself. In the case of the tariff, the masses paid more for their bread and the landowners got more for their wheat. More goods and services had to move downward, through the landlord's intermediaries, as a result. Either way, exploitation did not consist in the appropriation of surplus value by a factory owning bourgeoisie so much as in the state on the one hand exacting from its people and in the patrons on the other holding the promise of favors, protection, rake-off, or simply jobs, over their heads. The political class was

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[77] Ibid., p. 64; Mack Smith, Italy . . ., p. 86. "The rich who monopolized politics found it easy to put the greater burden of taxation on the poor . . . Italy could boast almost the lowest wages in Europe, along with about the highest indirect dues payable on food, and the reformers all agreed that taxes fell disproportionately on consumption rather than on income or property . . . . Later in the century Fortunato computed that over 30 per cent of the individual incomes went in taxation--probably a higher proportion than anywhere else in the world."

powerful because its members were local patrons and friends of national patrons at the same time.

The consciousness of the political class is hard to demonstrate, since it had no ideology. It had, however, a distinctive style, appropriate to the personal exercise of power through patronage, and reminiscent, though in lesser degree, of intermediaries in the South. Around the turn of the century, its members began to be widely criticized, especially for their lack of principles--their egotism, materialism, positivism--and their propensity for corruption. The Italian parliament--that "field of contention for factions and cliques, for camarillas and organized interests, whose skirmishes and squabbles seldom touched even the fringe of political reality"--was a central target of the attack.[78] "Down with the deputies! The country has had enough of the deputies!"[79] Mosca, himself a Sicilian, understood deputies, Prefects and local notables much better. He preferred that they should "make elections," given that there were no middle class party organizations of any importance in Italy and not much chance for democracy even so. Knowing how the _gabelloti_ and the _mafiosi_ went about it, he concluded that the worst fault one could find with

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[78]See Arcangelo William Salomone, _Italy in the Giolittian Era: Italian Democracy in the Making, 1900-1914_ (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945), pp. 15-20.

[79]Quoted in _ibid_., p. 24.

the notables and deputies was their mediocrity. He attempted to show how the political system produced this.[80]

Economic Development and Political Integration

The Italian ruling class had largely political foundations, but important economic consequences followed from its exercise of power. Some of these deeply involved the poor. We have seen that among the acts initiated by the Left was one eliminating the much protested grist tax, imposed by the moderates on the milling of grain, and a big factor in the price of bread and pasta. However, the tariff policy that Center-Left governments pursued placed an equal if not greater burden on the subsistence population.[81] Contradicting earlier institutions of the free market, it protected above all the proprietors and merchants of the grain trade. Eventually it resulted in a protracted tariff war with France (1887-98), during which the price of staple foods overwhelmed the small consumer. Sugar, another heavily protected commodity, went quite out of his

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[80] Democracy--government by the people--justified a broader franchise; but a broader franchise created the political boss, and multiplied the powers of the grand electors. No "will of the people" was expressed in the process of voting. Rather, the deputies "had [themselves] elected by the electors." The outcome was a political system in which all who participated were one way or another demoralized. See ibid., p. 20, and James H. Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the Elite (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 105-16.

[81] Clough, The Economic History . . ., p. 117.

reach, as did any product made of steel for which he might have provided an expanding domestic market.[82] In the 1890s the poor rose in many parts of Italy against the oppression of tax-collectors, grain merchants, and landowners, only to be harshly repressed by government troops (called out by the Prefects and condoned in their actions, during the first half of the decade, by the Sicilian Prime Minister, Crispi).[83]

The tariff war also contributed to the depth in Italy of a world-wide depression (1888-93), which involved the government in a serious banking crisis. The years of depression revealed all too clearly that certain privileged bankers, at once creditors of the state, investors, speculators, and entrepreneurs, were also election makers for the *ministeriali*. Nor were the relationships limited to an exchange of money, since any one of these bankers, especially if he were connected with a building boom, or a project for the reclamation of marsh land, or the construction of a railroad in the South, had any number of powerful

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[82] *Ibid.*, pp. 116-19; Gerschenkron, *Journal of Economic History*, XV, p. 367.

[83] The rising in Milan, which took place in May of 1898 resulted in the death of over 80 people at the hands of troops. In Sicily, a few years earlier, martial law had been proclaimed, and a thousand exiled to the penal islands. Both disturbances were attributed to "socialism," and provided the excuse for jailing countless socialist, radical and republican leaders. Railroad workers and civil servants were conscripted and the universities at Rome, Naples, Padua, and Bologna closed. Many Catholic and labor organizations were dissolved, as were newspapers of anti-government persuasion. See Mack Smith, *Italy . . .*, pp. 192-97.

and well connected clients.[84] Those banks which issued illegal notes, or which engaged in or encouraged speculation, added to the marginal consumer's burden by contributing to inflation and crisis.

Another burden which the governing class placed upon the governed was that which resulted from its efforts at colonial expansion. It is generally conceded that the "imperialism" of the Left was a vain and expensive diversion from pressing problems at home.[85] Even counting the twentieth century, fewer than one per cent of Italian immigrants ever colonized North Africa, where the Italian troops were sent. Yet the costs of opening it to an Italian "penetration" were tremendous. In 1896, a military defeat in Ethiopia took more lives than all the wars of the Risorgimento combined.[86] It brought Crispi's government down for reasons that had in part to do with the poor and unrealistic military preparation occasioning the defeat. In addition, it is important to note the fiscal straits in which military preparation (superfluous in some areas, inadequate in others) left the government. Pareto shows how "taxes on consumption . . . furnished the point of least resistance

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[84] Ibid., pp. 162-70; Thayer, Italy and the Great War . . ., pp. 52-54 and 57-85; Pareto, The Ruling Class . . ., pp. 76-82; Clough, The Economic History . . ., pp. 124-29.

[85] See, for instance, Benedetto Croce, History of Italy, 1871-1915, trans. Cecilia M. Ady (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1929), pp. 174-76 and 259-61.

[86] Mack Smith, Italy . . ., p. 185.

in augmenting the revenues."[87] Since the colonial policy brought no economic gains to the nation, it was easier than usual to determine who paid for it.

Now, there is nothing unusual about the poor being forced to sacrifice for programs of national development. In fact, it is the general rule. Heavy industry was developed in the Soviet Union by extracting surpluses from the peasant population. Marx, in describing the process of "primitive accumulation" for England, observed how the state--defined as the "concentrated organized force of a society"--became the critical instrument in an accelerated transition from feudalism to capitalism.[88] This was because it could impose taxes and tariffs, conduct commercial wars, acquire colonies, and police the poor when they rebelled against the rising costs of mere subsistence. Furthermore, the state mobilized capital for economic development by means of the national debt, and encouraged, through it, the formation of financial oligarchs and banking institutions which were forerunners of joint stock companies and a stock exchange. Again, privileges granted to the "bankocracy" by the state contradicted the interests of all those whose lives were marginal. In the meanwhile, the state contributed to the agricultural revolution, on which primitive

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[87] Pareto, The Ruling Class . . ., pp. 73-74.

[88] Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Frederick Engels, I (New York: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1906), pp. 794-97 and 809-14.

accumulation was based, by legislating the sale of public, church, and communal domain and by repressing the rebellions of expropriated peasants.[89]

One can see that, on the surface, the Italian "political class" performed in accordance with an established pattern of primitive accumulation. In addition to the tariff war, the colonial adventures and speculative banking, its public representatives auctioned land on a large scale, using the _Carabinieri_ and the _mafiosi_ to control the peasants. The south Italian peasantry, in particular, felt an unprecedented impact from the sale of land, the grain tariff, the economic cycles whose fluctuations expressed, in their extent, the speculative ventures of friends of the government. In addition, peasants became vulnerable to a new development: the rapid deforestation of land by representatives of the political class, hard put to find a source for fuel in a country that was poor in coal.[90]

Yet the uprooted, the expropriated, the increasingly superfluous southern peasants did not form the bulwark of an Italian proletariat, as the uprooted and superfluous had done in England and will do in Russia. Most of them remained under- and un-employed on the land, and the rest left Italy. In fact, with real parsimony emigration

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[89] _Ibid._, pp. 784-848.

[90] On the effects of deforestation, see Dickinson, _The Population Problem . . ._, pp. 30-38 and 50-55.

statistics reveal what I think is the fundamental meaning of the political class: however much its policies resembled primitive accumulation, they contributed very little to the economic evolution of the country.[91]

Not all economists would agree with this conclusion, so let us try to elaborate on it.[92] Alexander Gerschenkron, in a widely recognized article on Italy's growth rate between 1881 and 1913, informs us that economists generally recognize the following to be characteristic of countries undergoing "late" industrialization. First, a big "initial push" resulting in a high growth rate at an early stage. Secondly, an emphasis on producer, as opposed to consumer, industries, in part because, in this sector, industrialists have the best chance to capitalize on the most recent technologies developed elsewhere. Thirdly, an early and considerable concentration of the means of production and of productive organization. Finally, extensive use of

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[91]". . . In the first 15 years of the twentieth century, what had been at the beginning a trickle and subsequently a small stream, became a vertiable flood. In 1913 a high point was reached with 872,598 leaving Italy and 313,032 coming back . . . . Altogether in the first one hundred years of Italian history, some 25.5 million people went abroad, of whom about two-thirds remained there permanently." The great majority of Italian emigrants, especially permanent ones, were from the South and the islands. See Clough, The Economic History . . ., pp. 136-40.

[92]See, for example, the discussion of Rosario Romeo's position on capital accumulation in Italy, *supra*, pp. 177-78. Romeo's assessment of Italian capitalist development is somewhat more positive than the one presented here.

institutional instruments, including the state and investment banking, to spearhead development.[93] We might add a fifth, suggested by Gerschenkron in another context: the active participation of an intellectual movement which has, at heart, an interest in the problems and prospects of industrial evolution.[94] Such a movement, among other things, influences the rate of borrowing from abroad.

While Italy industrialized "late"--i.e., after England and Northwestern Europe--the above only partially apply. According to Gerschenkron, the "push" in her evolution toward industrialism did not come until the years 1896-1908 and then did not amount to much.[95] Until the First World War, the rationalization of producer industries was neglected, and even sacrificed, to "persistent agriculture." Concentration of the means and relations of production was retarded.[96] The intervention of the state, which actually declined after 1900, was remarkable "primarily [for] the one-sided nature of [its] interest in industrial development, that is to say, its concentration on the least deserving branches of industrial activity."[97] For example, the protective tariff bolstered grains, cotton textiles,

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[93]Gerschenkron, Journal of Economic History, XV, pp. 360-61.

[94]*Ibid.*, p. 373.

[95]*Ibid.*, pp. 362-66.

[96]*Ibid.*, pp. 367-70.

[97]*Ibid.*, pp. 366-67.

and iron and steel for building construction, notwithstanding that grain and textiles were produced by outmoded techniques and that steel production necessitated coal, of which Italy had very little. (The cost of importing coal was borne by the government.)[98] The tariffs did not encourage the development of chemical or machine industries, although these were areas in which progress might have been made without coal. Similarly, governmental assistance to the construction industry found its way into many unnecessary and grotesquely elaborate public buildings, while public works projects--in particular the reclamation of land for cultivation--had the effect of setting notables and intermediaries up for life.[99]

The question arises whether restraints on industrial development reflect, in any way, the survival capacity of traditionalism in Italy. I think not. The organization of the economy seems to me to represent more precisely the relationships that pertain for intermediaries and notables than those which are profitably associated with traditionalism. It is true that to this day the industrial factory system is a relative stranger to most of Italy, the great majority of productive enterprises being family

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[98]The tariff was a real pièce de résistance: the work of vested interests. "By 1895, Italy had the most heavily protected wheat on the continent." Ibid., p. 367.

[99]Ibid., pp. 367-70.

owned and run by various kinds of patrons.[100] According to LaPalombara, the contemporary Italian factory (even in the North) is characteristically "personalized." Management considers the labor movement to be an evil and the distribution of largess through channels of patronage to be its responsibility.[101] However, even if this ideal were fulfilled in the most benevolent and secure way possible--which of course it isn't--it would still be necessary to underscore the difference between the resulting relationship and traditional social relations. When the *padrone* seeks the loyalty of his workers, it is not because he is responsible for protecting them from the world. This I take to be the essential meaning of patronage in the feudal context.[102] Rather, it is because his own relationships with others in that world depend considerably on the number of people he can claim to control. It is politics and not protection that prevails.

How about the "persistence of agriculture" in Italian economic development? Did it not represent the survival of traditional institutions? Not to the extent that it resulted from landowning notables and intermediaries

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[100] LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics*, p. 41. In 1951, 4,300,000 workers were employed by 680,000 firms, of which nearly 500,000 employed fewer than three workers each. Almost 90 per cent of the firms were the property of a single proprietor. Less than 312 of them employed more than 1,000 workers.

[101] *Ibid.*, pp. 40-45.

[102] *Supra*, pp. 32-34.

seeking to preserve the extensive cultivation of marketable grain for a competitive market. Their mode of production and relations on the land, if not "rational bourgeois capitalist," were not traditional either. More importantly, though, it was the very "persistence" of these people that made an integrated political system possible. The intermediaries, in particular, provided a meaningful link to the southern peasants who, under other circumstances, might well have served as a supply line for a socialist revolution. Were it not for policies like the tariff on grains, from which, ironically, those very peasants suffered most, the intermediaries could not have "plugged" their clients into national institutions. Such policies made the nation possible at the cost, if one will, of its "dynamic development." The outcome, however, could not be "engineered." That is, it does not provide a model for the developing countries of the present world. This is because, in addition to patterns of rationalization imposed by Western Europe, it depended so heavily upon its own, spontaneously developed resource for political organization: the clientele.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The political system, as it has just been described, was on the whole a late nineteenth century phenomenon. Moreover, there are several apparent disjunctures in twentieth century Italian history which might lead one to conclude that subsequent developments took place along different lines--for instance, the dualistic lines of traditionalism and modernization. Yet, it has been important in the foregoing to demonstrate that traditionalism was not particularly significant in the formation of the nation state. We suggested first that, in comparison with Western Europe, where the feudal experience was indigenous and the ancient city imposed from without, Italian history had long been more open and more urban. When European cities did develop spontaneously, it was predominantly as economic centers of production and distribution. For political organization, they depended on central bureaucratic authorities. Appropriately, the countryside represented the outstanding source of resistance to development, and the relations between town and country were antagonistic.

Italian cities, on the other hand, made important contributions to political organization themselves,

especially through structures known as clienteles. What distinguished them in particular was the continuity that they achieved with the countryside through networks of face-to-face contacts.

After the sixteenth century, when Western Europe entered an era of fundamental change and modernization, northern Italy was overlaid by European social patterns. This left the South to express more precisely the non-traditionality of the indigenous Italian culture. The divergence of North from South became more marked in the eighteenth century, and especially after the French Revolution, when both indigenous and externally influenced changes began to find expression in social movements.

Because of these movements, it was possible to understand the configuration of forces in Italian unification by tracing the relations between different patterns of socio-political organization. In northern Italy, and in the years between the French Revolution and 1848, a Western European pattern predominated. Rationalizing forces, through the media of the voluntary association, the political club, the secret society, confronted, criticized, and feared traditionalism. This was particularly true in the case of the democrats, because of their greater commitment to breaking with the past. In 1848-49, their insurrections were finally repressed by traditionalist alliances. After the moderates had withdrawn from the war with Austria, the Republics of the democrats were left to face the countryside

alone. When Austrian and French troops assisted the restoration of the old rulers, peasants (and the sub-proletarians of the cities) refused to rally behind the Republics, the defense of which became, as a result, impossible.

But if the European pattern of dualistic encounters between traditional and modern forces was important in 1848-49, it did not, finally, structure the Risorgimento. After those years, the moderates assumed an initiative that they had shunned before and, within the context of the constitutional monarchy established in Piedmont in 1848, pursued the unification of Italy with a minimum of insurrection. Their goal was also a more rational society, though one in which the interests of the upper middle class and liberal aristocracy were preserved. Their means of achieving it, however, involved them in various compromises with political organizations that were indigenous. In northern and north central Italy, they allied in particular with the National Society, which was itself a compromised organization. It was founded by exiles from the democratic movements of 1848-49, but dominated by local notables, many of whom were landowners, or reputed professional men, with limited clienteles. The structure of the Society emphasized less the association or the brotherhood than the network of friends and friends of friends. While the rank and file of the movement remained close to the experience of the democrats, networks of notables departed from it in important respects. For one thing, they reached into the countryside, though

without provoking counter-revolutionary actions. In the case of the plebiscites, they provided the foundation for shows of unanimity and subordination to Piedmont.

In southern Italy, networks of face-to-face contacts were more highly developed, in part because of a marked proliferation of intermediaries in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They reinforced the continuity between town and country that was peculiar to Italian patterns of evolution and made it possible for the moderates to short-circuit democratic forces in the South. Even local men of note could be ignored. The moderates negotiated alliances with the landowners, their agents and their retainers, even though there was little evidence (such as membership in the National Society) that these people were committed to unification.

Because of the southern alliances, national institutions--the hegemonic institutions of Piedmont--were faced with an environment that was less traditional than it was structured by open-ended networks of power-seeking individuals for which the distribution of patronage was essential. In the South, the extension of the Piedmontese institutions elevated the social position of these individuals since, in a crisis, they had the only real capacity to control the peasantry. As the intermediaries accumulated power, they became obvious allies for the democrats and notables of the South who, in 1860, had been excluded from the nation. After a decade and a half of moderate governments, an

arrangement emerged under which intermediaries helped the notables to "have themselves" elected. In return, notables patronized the intermediaries, permitting them, for instance, to preside over the political life of the southern towns and channeling increments from the state to them. In 1876, the moderates lost control of the national government to a coalition of left-of-center factions in which southerners predominated. The hegemony of Piedmont had been to some extent reversed, and national institutions took on more of the qualities of indigenous social forms.

Networks of intermediaries not only influenced the evolution of national institutions, in a sense they made the nation possible. This was because they neutralized the potential opposition of southern peasants, offering the means by which they could be, however tenuously, connected to the state. Yet making the nation possible, they can be said to have retarded its progress, since a relatively viable integration of political life interfered with economic growth. Further rationalization, especially of the economy, would have to proceed within the context of the political system. To the extent that this was impossible, revolutionary movements which opposed the system expanded. This, anyway, is what I think may be the link between Crispi's system and the twentieth century discontinuities. To clarify the suggestion, I wish to conclude by reviewing, very briefly, the most significant of these discontinuities,

stressing the relationships between rationalization and the political system which they seem to me to reveal.

The first major break with the Crispian era was the one which ended it. Culminating the crisis years of the 1890's, it eventually resulted in an overhaul of Italian liberalism. In Sicily, in 1893-94, 90 lives were lost in conflicts between rising peasants and the Carabinieri, after which Crispi was nearly assassinated by an anarchist. These were also the years of the bank scandals and a banking crisis. In 1895, 13 socialists, including one of the most influential socialist leaders, Filippo Turati, were elected to the Chamber of Deputies. The following spring, Italian troops were defeated at Adowa, and Crispi had to resign.

The cabinet fell to the control of right-of-center forces. A bad harvest in 1897 brought more risings and repressions, this time as far north as the city of Milan. In 1898, the King, Umberto I, whose wife was exceptionally conservative, appointed a general, Luigi Pelloux, to the premiership. Two years later Umberto was assassinated by an anarchist. During the preceding years, a coalition of radicals, republicans, and socialists (the Estrema), some liberals, and some moderate Catholics had been forming in opposition to the increasingly unconstitutional actions of the government. Throughout the administration of General Pelloux, it was consolidated and after 1900 did well in

elections. With a distinctly north Italian base, it was the foundation of Giovanni Giolitti's rise to power.[1]

Giolitti was not a southern notable in the tradition of Crispi, but a Piedmontese administrator in the tradition of Cavour. His governments were frequently opposed by liberals who had participated in Crispian alliances. In many respects, they were governments which pursued the path of rationalization and reform. For instance, they permitted the socialists to organize a political party and try for revisionist programs of social legislation. They recognized and legitimated trade unions and cooperatives. They enacted a universal manhood suffrage. Giolitti's experience as finance minister (which contrasted with Crispi's as Minister of the Interior) led him to seek reforms of the bureaucracy. The Prefects were to be weaned from the interests of property and made neutral in labor disputes. Without dismissing or transferring very many, he nonetheless insisted that they cut down on their calls for troops and--in the North--run elections honestly.[2]

In 1913, Giolitti's government established a functionally specific Inspectorate of Industry and Labor, the field representatives for which were dependent on the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce. They were not, in other words, clients of the Prefects, or of the

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[1] Mack Smith, <u>Italy . . .</u>, pp. 192-97.

[2] Fried, <u>The Italian Prefects . . .</u>, pp. 144-61.

Interior.[3] Theoretically they were to be organization men instead. At the same time, the distribution of reclamation projects came under review, so that landowners were constrained to settle the braccianti on reclaimed land, to use their land more intensively, and to respond to the health and sanitation problems posed by malarial marshlands. Appropriately, the government also sought a reduction of certain tariffs.[4]

The Giolittians showed some interest in educational reform and to some extent softened the militant anticlericalism of the nineteenth century liberals. Benedetto Croce was invited to be minister for public instruction and, during the brief interim before he had to resign, managed to provide for 2,000 new primary and secondary schools, for the decentralization of his ministry, for inspection tours of the schools, and for some measures against the "corruptions" that they endured.[5]

Whatever the Giolittians did, however, they did within the system. Indeed, there is no reason to insist that, because that system crystallized under Crispi, it was inflexible. The Giolittian era indicates how it could evolve. To some observers of Italian politics, Giolitti

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[3]Ibid., pp. 151-53.

[4]Carl T. Schmidt, The Plough and the Sword (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), pp. 74-79; Mack Smith, Italy . . ., pp. 243-45.

[5]Riccio, On the Threshold . . ., pp. 124-40.

was the master transformist--more artful at making coalitions than either Crispi or Depretis. His approach to the development of socialism, for example, is often interpreted as less "rational" than "clever." One admirer notes how well Giolitti understood a basic lesson: that "there is perhaps nothing better to spoil or to blunt the force of an ideal than to grant it its minimum demands and then invite it to share in the sordid exercise of active power."[6]

What is more telling about the Giolittians is that they governed the state and guided its evolution in perpetual alliance with the intermediaries of the South. Their intervention in the factional struggles between local clienteles was, if anything, more systematic than had been true before. Similarly, the upward extension of the southern networks persisted, although southern notables did not control the cabinet. It is interesting that the most militant and direct criticisms of the "corrupt" election and its effects on government were directed at Giolitti. Gaetano Salvemini, a noted socialist, found that it was this premier who perfected the political use of Prefects, facilitated their alliances with local political bosses, guaranteed them whatever patronage was necessary to successfully manipulate local competitions. Salvemini added his voice to the growing chorus which declared _Giolittismo_ to be the sum

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[6]Salomone, _Italy in the Giolittian Era . . ._, p. 87.

total of mediocrity, corruption, lack of programs and exclusion of ideals in government.[7]

The relationship between Giolitti's commitment to election-making in the South and the economic growth rates which coincided with his years in office should be interesting. It is important, to be sure, that growth rates increased somewhat, that government intervention in the economy declined, and that several new industries showed a growth potential.[8] Yet there is no evidence that these developments were unfettered by the political system. The new industries were best represented in shipping, electrical works and metallurgy--the latter concentrated in Milan and not Terni. They were quite dependent on government contracts, especially for munitions, without which they would have had to bear the costs of importing coal. Their potential was only realized during World War I, and, after the war, production was severely cut back.[9] Similarly, the

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[7]Salvemini, Il ministro della mala vita . . ., pp. 55-213, passim; Thayer, Italy and the Great War . . ., pp. 176-78 and 182-88. For Thayer's defense of Giolitti, see pp. 53-83.

[8]Gerschenkron, Journal of Economic History, XV, p. 362; Clough, The Economic History . . ., pp. 129-36. In 1896, producer goods accounted for 28 per cent of the total output. In 1908, the figure was 43 per cent, and in 1913, 47. Between 1906 and 1910, the mechanical industries surpassed textiles as the major contributor to the national income. (P. 66.) Urbanization, especially of northern Italy, increased substantially after 1900. (Pp. 134-36.)

[9]Ibid., pp. 71-98 and 180-81; Mack Smith, Italy . . ., p. 248; Gerschenkron, Journal of Economic History, XV, p. 375.

large investment banks which backed them were dependent on, and influenced by, the politicians. The economic structure did not change significantly under Giolitti.

At the close of the First World War, when Italy faced the gigantic task of converting to a peace time economy, and of absorbing the thousands who had at last found something to do in war time, strikes and demonstrations took place on a large scale. Where strikes failed to achieve the desired results in terms of labor contracts and the cost of living, or where strikes were impossible to organize, because of the number of unemployed, they were supplemented by "occupations": peasants occupied and cultivated land, workers occupied and ran factories. Since 1912, revolutionary socialists, or maximalists, had controlled the machinery of the Socialist Party, theretofore dominated by moderate, or revisionist, and center factions. (Most of the socialist deputies in parliament continued to represent the moderate wing of the party. The leadership of the General Confederation of Italian Labor, and of certain major industrial federations, remained loyal to the moderates too.)

The revolutionaries interpreted the occupations as a signal of the revolution to come. Their theoretical framework was Marxist, though broadened by the Russian Revolution insofar as they thought it reinforced Marx. They borrowed the slogan "All Power to the Soviets," meaning by it all power to the industrial proletarian organizations which have occupied the factories. However, these organizations,

without exception, supported majorities which had long been loyal to the moderate wing of the party.[10] In other words, the revolutionary socialists did not represent that section of the proletariat on whose rebellion they insisted the revolution be made. The revisionists who did represent that section could not endorse the revolution. The outcome was a failure.

Good assessments of that failure emphasize the inappropriateness of Marxism for Italy. Where the Italian proletariat was disciplined and well organized, it was no longer revolutionary; where it was revolutionary, it acted spontaneously on the basis of locally organized syndicates. Italian conditions, like the Russian, required an adaptation. However, only in Russia had the revolutionary party cut itself off from those political forces which sought to delay, or to compromise, or to avoid, the use of force, and systematically penetrated, over a long preparatory period, the spontaneous organizations of the people.

A revolutionary party, if it is to succeed, must build a "state within a state" up to the time of the revolution. It therefore must gain control of vast human and material resources. If it delays the revolution, or cooperates with moderates and reformists, it can probably

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[10]Most of the factory occupations were conducted by locals of the Federation of Italian Metal Workers, an industrial union which belonged to the General Confederation of Labor, and the leadership of which was committed to the revisionists.

acquire some resources from the state. This, of course, was more true under the liberal governments of Western Europe (Italy included) than under the Russian Tsar. But, in supporting itself this way, the revolutionary party endangers its intransigence. Appropriately, Italian revolutionaries prohibited the reform wing of the party from seriously considering cabinet posts or otherwise participating in "the system."

The alternative to this dilemma lies in another kind of supply line, which competes with the state in its exactions from the people. It is what Gramsci called the "political-military" or "guerilla" relationship. It requires that the revolutionary party build majority support in the communities and spontaneous organizations of the peasantry.[11] Why the peasantry? First because it is the class which is most affected by development in other sectors of the economy. Its experiences are those of "increasing misery" and it is therefore increasingly rebellious. Secondly, peasants are--theoretically--the most remote and peripheral class in a society; their relationship to the state has always been in terms of the tax-collector and the conscription officer.[12]

According to the rules of a guerilla relationship, the revolutionary party, gradually and in the course of a

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[11]Gramsci, The Modern Prince . . ., pp. 171-73.

[12]Ibid., pp. 28-51 and 138-39. Similar arguments by Labrousse and Hobsbawm were presented earlier. See supra, pp. 81-83.

long series of rebellions, inserts itself between the state and the peasantry, living only off of the latter, though perhaps with foreign assistance. The peasants' need for a wider coordination of their rebellion, and greater sophistication in timing, strategy, and tactics, leads them to accept--if not to love--the revolutionary cause. As their leaders are won over, undercut, discredited, or eliminated, they will begin to provide food and shelter directly for that cause. They will rob the state for it too, taking munitions and money, refusing to pay taxes, be conscripted, or answer requisitions. They will supply the revolutionary party--becoming a party-army--with intelligence and, where insurrections succeed, they will send their sons to die for it.[13]

In contrast to the spontaneous movements of the peasants, local syndicates need less outside assistance and are inferior as a source of supply. Unlike the peasantry, professional revolutionaries cannot count on them for food, nor is their capacity to hide people and weapons as great. The very existence of a syndicate suggests a level of organization that has achieved some success in its confrontations with local employers and governments and also some machinery for collecting dues, ensuring loyalty, and performing

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[13]Gramsci, The Modern Prince . . ., pp. 135-40. "Any formation of a national-popular collective will is impossible unless the great mass of peasant cultivators breaks simultaneously into political life." (P. 139.) The break necessitates the organizing capacities of the "modern Prince"--the revolutionary party.

services for the members. Syndicates are not formed by expropriated refugees from a ruined way of life. They are formed to counter or overcome the political and economic power of people in going concerns. Where the relationship between revolutionary parties and the peasants tends to be reciprocal, that between parties and syndicates is more likely to be competitive. The chances which a party has in relation to syndical organizations could, therefore, depend upon the constancy and capacity of its supply line. Since the syndicate seeks "worker control" over the immediate productive process, and often over local government, it is contradicted by the party. Only insofar as the latter conducts a successful campaign against constituted authority does it become a likely ally. Otherwise the syndicate, in contrast to the unassisted peasant movement, might advance on its own--and, doing so, not want to jeopardize its gains in revolutionary action.

In the Italian failure of 1920, syndicates and party were divided. The aftermath of the war had greatly accelerated syndicalist occupations especially in the Po Valley: local and provincial governments, the distribution of credit and commodities, the control of land, the relationships between town and country--these were all areas in which working class organizations made progress. The policies of a relatively liberal government made this possible, although only in collaboration with the power of collective organization, solidarity, and numbers. The

revolutionary Socialist Party, however, had very little to do with it. For the party had no source of supply with which it could improve upon what came from the state through the revisionists, from the state directly to the workers' organizations, or from these organizations themselves. The revolutionary party, in particular, was without a peasant base.

In southern Italy, at least, there was little chance for a party to live off the peasantry. Networks of patrons and clients did not leave enough room for the guerilla relationship to develop. And, in fact, Italian revolutionaries hardly ever ventured South. Their real alternatives only reflected their relative isolation. They could be Italian "Mensheviks" and await a revolution which formed of its own accord, or they could submit to the leaders of the Russian Revolution in the hope of acquiring external support. Those who took the first course were caught quite unprepared to assume leadership during the occupations. Those who took the second, founding the Italian Communist Party in 1921, met disappointments. The leaders of the Soviet Union found it too risky to supply revolutionary parties in Europe and did not do so. That is why Gramsci, one of the founders of the Communist Party, insisted that it was time for Italian socialism to organize the South. Its efforts in that direction are to this day limited by the political system. "I would rather be a socialist," the Calabrian acknowledged, "*but* . . ."

Italian fascism grew out of the failure of socialism, and out of the success of the political system. I do not think, in other words, that it can be traced to a "modern" institutional order or to "strains" between such an order and traditionalism.[14] More fundamental, it seems to me, is the fact that the political system was sufficiently integrated to block the processes of rationalization. In fact, some outstanding characteristics of the fascist revolution pointed in a legal-rational direction. In particular, its vanguard articulated the demands that Italy industrialize in order, among other things, to absorb her own substantial emigrant population.[15] The young men who were going to the New World should be entering an industrial proletariat in Italy. Since they were not, Italy was a proletarian nation, supplying exploiters--in Europe and America--with labor power.[16] Appropriately the Fascist Party was supported by

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[14]Parsons has identified National Socialism as "a 'fundamentalist reaction,' a reassertion in revolutionary form of precisely those traditional values which have been most injured and threatened by the development of the rational-legal order." See "Introduction," p. 72. He concludes that therefore "its character would seem to point to a far greater likelihood [than in the case of Communism--a child of the rationalistic Enlightenment] of its leading in a traditionalistic direction."

[15]Emigrants averaged 600,000 for some of the years after 1900. Approximately two-thirds did not return. Clough, The Economic History . . ., pp. 138-39.

[16]The nationalist, Enrico Corradini, expressed the argument this way:

"Just as socialism was the method utilized for the redemption from the bourgeois classes, so nationalism shall be for us Italians the method of redemption

new industrialists who, especially through the media of munitions manufacture and the organization of the corporate state, were advantaged. It is even possible that corporatism represented the radical imposition of an "associational life" where one had theretofore been slow to develop.

If fascism was a rationalizing force, however, one must ask why the notables and lower middle classes of the Po Valley supported and supplied its shock troops. For it was through the spontaneous attacks of *squadre* upon working class (and Catholic) organizations in this region that the Fascist Party made its revolution. Participants in the squads were very often sons of people who had been protected by the political system. The system, though, had been challenged by the socialists--most thoroughly in the years that followed the First World War and most particularly in that very region. Moreover, it is entirely consistent with the *de facto* structure of revolutions that their social bases should comprise those segments of a society most likely to retard social change where it is possible. One can argue, for instance, that an inherent attribute of revolutions is that they weld together the most militant supporters of change and the most committed opposition to certain aspects of it. This is especially true if one thinks of change as a process of rationalization. In that context, the relations

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from the French, the Germans, the British, and the North and South Americans who are our bourgeois." Quoted in Salomone, *Italy in the Giolittian Era . . .*, p. 94.

between the Russian peasantry and the Stalinists, or the <u>sans-culottes</u> and the Jacobins, are indicative.

Not in the same way, however. The mechanisms for resolving the contradictions within a revolution are those by which the party incorporates the spontaneous organizations of the people, coordinating them on a higher level for the purpose of seizing the state power. But, in the twentieth century, revolutionary parties go much further than that. Once the state is taken, they proceed to transform or modernize their own social base; to alter its mode of existence. This is possible because that mode has already been challenged; because the people who lived by it identify with important elements of the party's program and ideology; because of long months and sometimes years of cooperation and coordinated action against common enemies; because of the extent of socio-economic change caused by the revolution itself; and because of the modern party's access to totalitarian means. The latter were not available to the Jacobins, who had to relinquish the state power without in the least altering the over-all life style of those who supported them.

The relationship between the Italian Fascist Party and the political system of notables and intermediaries should, therefore, tell us something about the fascist revolution. One measure of its depth, for example, might be the success of the party in changing the patron-client society. In this connection, one notes that its greatest penetration occurred in the Po Valley where today communists and

socialists dominate many local institutions, including governments. To me this indicates a fundamental change in the structure of the system because for one region, at least, the continuity between national and local elites is broken.

In the South, the fascists gave substantial support to the status quo in local politics without, however, receiving the revolutionary commitment from local notables which they depended on in the North. This is not to say that the southern notables, and lower middle classes, though less challenged than their northern counterparts by working class "occupations," refrained from becoming good clients of the party. Actually, they had little choice, since fascism did attempt a hegemony over intermediaries who had, for several decades, provided the foundation for the notables' power.

One reason for the hegemony is to be found in the abolition of elections. After all, the _gabelloti_ had multiplied their own powers because of their capacity to control votes. Another was more direct. Some local brokers--especially those like the _mafiosi_ who controlled the means of law enforcement and evasion--were put in jail.

However, in southern Italy as opposed to the North, the impact of fascism was somewhat superficial. When allied armies liberated Sicily from the Nazi occupation of Italy, the _mafiosi_ were released from prison and reinstated. This was in lieu of reinforcing the partisans, or the independently organized workers' and peasants' leagues, and represented,

it seems to me, a return to the old ways of "restoring order."[17] In the postwar period, the dominant Christian Democratic Party continues to "make elections" in the South, though the *mafiosi* have become less important to its clienteles than local priests and bishops. While the party is technically a modern organization, outlined on paper like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it is probably unique as a mass party because of the proliferation of networks within it. One suspects that in many ways the party organization itself functions like "the system" did under Crispi.

One purpose of the foregoing has been to suggest the extent to which the political system, as we described it earlier, shaped even the discontinuities in modern Italian history. By implication we have minimized the relevance of a traditional-modern antagonism for these discontinuities. Relationships which were neither traditional nor modern, but which gave the system its structure and its distinctive characteristics, monopolized the environment within which rationalization had to proceed. Where, in 1848, rationalizing forces were chiefly constrained by traditionalist alliances, in the twentieth century resistance came from a fairly well integrated political system. The system was the work of a Risorgimento in which the pattern of development that characterized Western Europe was compromised by

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[17]Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels . . .*, p. 48; Hobsbawm, *New Society*, p. 12.

an Italian evolutionary pattern. Its major contributions were the result of its capacity to join town and country in a single and continuous political life. It provided, I think, the ultimate reason why the socialists were restricted as revolutionaries, and why the fascists were encouraged to attack the system by alternative, and anti-socialist, means. In the long run, it also influenced the structure and style of Italian fascism. These are ideas which I hope to explore in the future.

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